Search Results For: Najmi Waziri J


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DATE: August 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 5, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 80IA(2A): As the words "derived from" are absent, there is no requirement to prove "first degree nexus" of the receipts with the eligible business. All receipts of the undertaking are eligible for 100% deduction

The legislature having ousted applicability of sub-section (1) and (2) in the opening sentence brought in for the purposes of time line sub-section (2) into play but made no efforts whatsoever to put the assessee under sub-section (2A) to meet the stringent requirements that the profits so contemplated were to be “derived from”. The requirements of the first degree nexus of the profits from the eligible business has not been brought into play

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DATE: July 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 14, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10, 2010-11
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S. 9(1)(vi): Though in Infrasoft 220 Taxman 273 (Del) the impact of the amendment to s. 9(1)(vi) on the question whether consideration received for sale of pre-packaged software was “royalty” or “fee for technical services” or "business income" was not examined, it is not required to be examined because u/s 90 (3) provides that the Act prevails only if it is more beneficial compared to the DTAA

The short question considered by the Court in Director of Income Tax v. Infrasoft Limited (2014) 220 Taxman 273 (Del) was whether the term “royalty” covered by Article 12 (3) of the DTAA would apply in the context of sale of pre-packaged copyrighted software. The Court stated that it has not examined the effect of the subsequent amendment to Section 9 (1) (vi) of the Act and also whether the amount received for use of software would be royalty in terms thereof for the reason that the Assessee is covered by the DTAA, the provisions of which are more beneficial

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DATE: December 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
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Pursuant to the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 all rights which were available to a Hindu male are now also available to a Hindu female. A daughter is now recognised as a co-parcener by birth in her own right and has the same rights in the co-parcenary property that are given to a son. Consequently, the eldest daughter is entitled to be the Karta of the HUF

The impediment which prevented a female member of a HUF from becoming its Karta was that she did not possess the necessary qualification of co-parcenership. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act is a socially beneficial legislation; it gives equal rights of inheritance to Hindu males and females. Its objective is to recognise the rights of female Hindus as co-parceners and to enhance their right to equality apropos succession. Therefore, Courts would be extremely vigilant apropos any endeavour to curtail or fetter the statutory guarantee of enhancement of their rights. Now that this disqualification has been removed by the 2005 Amendment, there is no reason why Hindu women should be denied the position of a Karta. If a male member of an HUF, by virtue of his being the first born eldest, can be a Karta, so can a female member. The Court finds no restriction in the law preventing the eldest female co-parcener of an HUF, from being its Karta. The plaintiff’s father‟s right in the HUF did not dissipate but was inherited by her. Nor did her marriage alter the right to inherit the co-parcenary to which she succeeded after her father‟s demise in terms of Section 6

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DATE: August 14, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 1, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07 to 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 153C cannot be invoked unless the AO is satisfied for cogent reasons that the seized documents do not belong to the searched person. Finding of photocopies with the searched person does not mean they "belong" to the person holding the originals. The distinction between "belongs to" and "relates to" or "refers to" must be borne in mind by the AO

(i) First of all, it is nobody’s case that the Jaipuria Group had disclaimed these documents as belonging to them. Unless and until it is established that the documents do not belong to the searched person, the provisions of Section …

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