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DATE: January 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 29, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05 to 2011-12
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S. 245F: The Settlement Commission does not have the power to direct a special audit u/s 142(2A)

The exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement commission to exercise the powers and perform the functions of an income tax authority, in terms of section 245F(2) of the said Act, is to be exercised and performed for the purpose of settlement of the case under Chapter XIX-A and not for assessment under Chapter XIV. That being the case, the powers and functions which are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement commission are circumscribed by the object and role which has been ascribed to the settlement commission, which is to settle the case in terms of the procedure stipulated in Chapter XIX-A. Since assessment of the type contemplated under section 143(3) is outside the purview of settlement proceedings, a special audit under section 142(2A), which is in aid of assessment, would also be beyond the scope of settlement proceedings

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DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
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S. 254(2A): The Third Proviso which restricts the power of the ITAT to grant stay beyond 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee” is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory. It is struck down as violative of Article 14. The ITAT has the power to extend stay even beyond 365 days

While it could be argued that the condition that the stay order could be extended beyond a period of 180 days only if the delay in disposing of the appeal was not attributable to the assessee was a reasonable condition on the power of the Tribunal to the grant an order of stay, it can, by no stretch of imagination, be argued that where the assessee is not responsible for the delay in the disposal of the appeal, yet the Tribunal has no power to extend the stay beyond the period of 365 days. The intention of the legislature, which has been made explicit by insertion of the words – ‘even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee’– renders the right of appeal granted to the assessee by the statute to be illusory for no fault on the part of the assessee. The stay, which was available to him prior to the 365 days having passed, is snatched away simply because the Tribunal has, for whatever reason, not attributable to the assessee, been unable to dispose of the appeal

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DATE: January 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 2(15)/ 10(23C)(iv): If the definition of "charitable purpose" is construed literally, it is violative of the principles of equality & unconstitutional. If the dominant object is not to carry on business or trade or commerce, then an incidental or ancillary activity for which a fee is charged does not destroy the character of a charitable institution

The expression “charitable purpose”, as defined in Section 2(15) cannot be construed literally and in absolute terms. It has to take colour and be considered in the context of Section 10(23C)(iv) of the said Act. It is also clear that if the literal interpretation is given to the proviso to Section 2(15) of the said Act, then the proviso would be at risk of running foul of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution India. In order to save the Constitutional validity of the proviso, the same would have to be read down and interpreted in the context of Section 10(23C)(iv) because, in our view, the context requires such an interpretation. The correct interpretation of the proviso to Section 2(15) of the said Act would be that it carves out an exception from the charitable purpose of advancement of any other object of general public utility and that exception is limited to activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business for a cess or fee or any other consideration. In both the activities, in the nature of trade, commerce or business or the activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, the dominant and the prime objective has to be seen. If the dominant and prime objective of the institution, which claims to have been established for charitable purposes, is profit making, whether its activities are directly in the nature of trade, commerce or business or indirectly in the rendering of any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, then it would not be entitled to claim its object to be a ‘charitable purpose’. On the flip side, where an institution is not driven primarily by a desire or motive to earn profits, but to do charity through the advancement of an object of general public utility, it cannot but be regarded as an institution established for charitable purposes

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DATE: August 14, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 1, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07 to 2011-12
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S. 153C cannot be invoked unless the AO is satisfied for cogent reasons that the seized documents do not belong to the searched person. Finding of photocopies with the searched person does not mean they "belong" to the person holding the originals. The distinction between "belongs to" and "relates to" or "refers to" must be borne in mind by the AO

(i) First of all, it is nobody’s case that the Jaipuria Group had disclaimed these documents as belonging to them. Unless and until it is established that the documents do not belong to the searched person, the provisions of Section …

Pepsi India Holdings Private Ltd vs. ACIT (Delhi High Court) Read More »

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DATE: October 17, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 24, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 147: The reasons must specifically indicate as to which material fact was not disclosed by the petitioner in the course of its original assessment

In the reasons supplied to the petitioner, there is no whisper, what to speak of any allegation, that the petitioner had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment and that because of this failure there …

Global Signal Cables (I) Pvt. Ltd vs. DCIT (Delhi High Court) Read More »

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DATE: August 13, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 7, 2014 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
Stay of demand in high-pitched assessments should be considered as per observations in Soul v. DCIT 323 ITR 305 (Delhi)

This writ petition is directed against the order dated 06.08.2014 passed by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax with the approval of the CIT, Delhi-I, New Delhi. By virtue of the said order dated 06.08.2014 the stay application filed by …

Charu Home Products Pvt. Ltd vs. CIT (Delhi High Court) Read More »