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DATE: July 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1995-96
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Whether subsidy is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt: If the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, it means that the policy makers envision greater profitability as an incentive for investors to expand units. Such subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

How a state frames its policy to achieve its objectives and attain larger developmental goals depends upon the experience, vision and genius of its representatives. Therefore, to say that the indication of the limit of subsidy as the capital expended, means that it replenished the capital expenditure and therefore, the subsidy is capital, would not be justified. The specific provision for capital subsidy in the main scheme and the lack of such a subsidy in the supplementary scheme (of 1991) meant that the recipient, i.e. the assessee had the flexibility of using it for any purpose. Unlike in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals [2008] 306 ITR 392 (SC), the absence of any condition towards capital utilization meant that the policy makers envisioned greater profitability as an incentive for investors to expand units, for rapid industrialization of the state, ensuring greater employment. Clearly, the subsidy was revenue in nature

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DATE: March 14, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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Bogus share capital: Fact that the investigation wing’s report alleged that the assessee was beneficiary to bogus transactions and that the identity of shareholders, genuineness etc was suspect is not sufficient. The AO is bound to conduct scrutiny of documents produced by the assessee and cannot rest content by placing reliance on the report of the investigation wing

The assessee had provided several documents that could have showed light into whether truly the transactions were genuine. It was not a case where the share applicants are merely provided confirmation letters. They had provided their particulars, PAN details, assessment particulars, mode of payment for share application money, i.e. through banks, bank statements, cheque numbers in question, copies of minutes of resolutions authorizing the applications, copies of balance sheets, profit and loss accounts for the year under consideration and even bank statements showing the source of payments made by the companies to the assessee as well as their master debt with ROC particulars. The AO strangely failed to conduct any scrutiny of documents and rested content by placing reliance merely on a report of the Investigation Wing. This reveals spectacular disregard to an AO’s duties in the remand proceedings which the Revenue seeks to inflict upon the assessee in this case

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DATE: April 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Strictures passed regarding the "standard excuses" of the department for delay in filing appeals, namely, budgetary constraints, lack of infrastructure to make soft copies, change of standing counsel etc

The Court finds that the standard excuse that the Department is putting forth in all such applications for condonation of delay in re-filing the appeal is two-fold. The first is regarding the budgetary constraints of the Department which delayed payment of the differential court fees as a result of the Court Fees Delhi Amendment Act, 2012 which came into force on 1st August 2012. The second is regarding the practice directions issued by the Court pertaining to filing of soft copies of the paperbooks in tax matters

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DATE: April 11, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 279: As there is no time limit prescribed for filing an application for compounding of an offense, the CBDT is not entitled to reject an application on the ground of 'inordinate delay'. The CBDT has no jurisdiction to demand that the assessee pay a 'pre-deposit' as a pre-condition to considering the compounding application. The larger question as whether in the garb of a Circular the CBDT can prescribe the compounding fee in the absence of such fee being provided for either in the statute or prescribed under the rules is left open

The Court finds nothing in Section 279 of the Act or the Explanation thereunder to permit the CBDT to prescribe such an onerous and irrational procedure which runs contrary to the very object of Section 279 of the Act. The CBDT cannot arrogate to itself, on the strength of Section 279 of the Act or the Explanation thereunder, the power to insist on a ‘pre-deposit’ of sorts of the compounding fee even without considering the application for compounding. Indeed Mr Kaushik was unable to deny the possibility, even if theoretical, of the application for compounding being rejected despite the compounding fee being deposited in advance. If that is the understanding of para 11(v) of the above Circular by the Department, then certainly it is undoubtedly ultra vires Section 279 of the Act. The Court, accordingly, clarifies that the Department cannot on the strength of para 11(v) of the Circular dated 23rd December 2014 of the CBDT reject an application for compounding either on the ground of limitation or on the ground that such application was not accompanied by the compounding fee or that the compounding fee was not paid prior to the application being considered on merits

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DATE: February 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06, 2006-07
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S. 271(1)(c): Entire law explained on whether levy of penalty is automatic if return filed by the assessee u/s 153A discloses higher income than in the return filed u/s 139(1) in the context of the law as it stood prior to, and after, the insertion of Explanation 5 to s. 271(1)(c). Also, the law on levy of penalty on revised returns explained

When the A.O. has accepted the revised return filed by the assessee under Section 153A, no occasion arises to refer to the previous return filed under Section 139 of the Act. For all purposes, including for the purpose of levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, the return that has to be looked at is the one filed under Section 153A. In fact, the second proviso to Section 153A(1) provides that “assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years referred to in this sub-section pending on the date of initiation of the search under Section 132 or making of requisition under Section 132A, as the case may be, shall abate.” What is clear from this is that Section 153A is in the nature of a second chance given to the assessee, which incidentally gives him an opportunity to make good omission, if any, in the original return. Once the A.O. accepts the revised return filed under Section 153A, the original return under Section 139 abates and becomes non-est. Now, it is trite to say that the “concealment” has to be seen with reference to the return that it is filed by the assessee. Thus, for the purpose of levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c), what has to be seen is whether there is any concealment in the return filed by the assessee under Section 153A, and not vis-a vis the original return under Section 139

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DATE: February 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 194-I: S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act distinguishes between 'premium' for acquiring the lease and 'rent' for enjoying user of the property. Payment towards 'premium' for the lease (even if paid annually) is a capital payment and is not subject to s. 194-I TDS. CBDT Circular No. 35/2016 dated 13.10.2016 referred

That brings the court to the next question, which is as to the nature of the payments made towards lease. Do they constitute rent so as to attract Section 194-I? The court is of opinion that clearly these payments are not “rent”. That they are annual payments cannot be doubted. Yet, part of the payment is clearly capital in nature. Clause 1 of the lease deeds entered into in each of the cases, clearly points to the fact that a small percentage of the agreed amounts were paid as part of the lease premium and were towards acquisition of the asset; they fell, consequently in the capital stream and were not “rents”. The balance of such premium payments were spread over a period of 8 to 10 years, in specified annual or bi-annual installments. Here, distinction between a single payment made at the time of the settlement of the demised property and recurring payments made during the period of its enjoyment by the lessee is to be made. This distinction is clearly recognized in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, which defines both premium and rent. Such payments were held to constitute capital and not “rent” or advance rent,

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DATE: January 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 31, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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S. 68 Bogus capital gains: A transaction cannot be treated as fraudulent if the assessee has furnished documentary proof and proved the identity of the purchasers and no discrepancy is found. The AO has to exercise his powers u/s 131 & 133(6) to verify the genuineness of the claim and cannot proceed on surmises

The assessee has adduced the documentary evidences in support of the transaction in question. The identity of the purchasers of the shares was established as it was borne on the record of the Income Tax Department. The purchasers have PAN card as well. Turning to the shares which were sold by the appellant as per its version, there is no evidence or material to even suggest, as pointed out as on behalf of the assessee, that the cheques directly or indirectly emanated from the assessee so that it could be said that the assessee’s own money was brought back in the guise of sale proceeds of the shares. Though, the purchasers of the shares could not be examined by the AO, since they were existing on the file of the Income Tax Department and their Income Tax details were made available to the AO, it was equally the duty of the AO to have taken steps to verify their assessment records and if necessary to also have them examined by the respective AOs having jurisdiction over them which has not been done by him

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DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 147/ 151: The mere appending of the word "approved" by the CIT while granting approval u/s 151 to the reopening u/s 147 is not enough. While the CIT is not required to record elaborate reasons, he has to record satisfaction after application of mind. The approval is a safeguard and has to be meaningful and not merely ritualistic or formal

Section 151 of the Act clearly stipulates that the CIT (A), who is the competent authority to authorize the reassessment notice, has to apply his mind and form an opinion. The mere appending of the expression ‘approved’ says nothing. It is not as if the CIT (A) has to record elaborate reasons for agreeing with the noting put up. At the same time, satisfaction has to be recorded of the given case which can be reflected in the briefest possible manner. In the present case, the exercise appears to have been ritualistic and formal rather than meaningful, which is the rationale for the safeguard of an approval by a higher ranking officer

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DATE: November 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 2(42C)/ 50B: The fact that certain assets of the "undertaking" are left out of the sale transaction because it would cause inconvenience for the purchaser does not mean that the transaction is not a "slump sale". To expect a purchaser to buy and pay value for defunct or superfluous assets flies in the face of commercial sense

The sale transaction was reported for a total consideration of Rs.45.83 crores. The sale was for a going concern, which included ongoing service contracts, employment contracts and other tangible assets, and intangible assets such as technical know-how etc. To expect a purchaser to buy and pay value for defunct or superfluous assets flies in the face of commercial sense. Unfortunately, the Revenue’s understanding is that in a going concern the buyer is bound to pay good money, transact and purchase bad and irrecoverable debts. Not only does it fly in the face of common and commercial understanding, but it is not even a pre-condition , as is evident from the definition of “undertaking”, cited in Explanation (1) to Section 2 (19) (A) of the Act

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DATE: November 21, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 6, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 14A Rule 8D: The fact that the AO did not expressly record his dissatisfaction with the assessee's working does not mean that he cannot make the disallowance. The AO need not pay lip service and formally record dissatisfaction. It is sufficient if the order shows due application of mind to all aspects

Undoubtedly, the language of Section 14A presupposes that the AO has to adduce some reasons if he is not satisfied with the amount offered by way of disallowance by the assessee. At the same time Section 14A (2) as indeed Rule 8D(i) leave the AO equally with no choice in the matter inasmuch as the statute in both these provisions mandates that the particular methodology enacted should be followed. In other words, the AO is under a mandate to apply the formulae as it were under Rule 8D because of Section 14A(2). If in a given case, therefore, the AO is confronted with a figure which, prima facie, is not in accord with what should approximately be the figure on a fair working out of the provisions, he is but bound to reject it. In such circumstances the AO ordinarily would express his opinion by rejecting the disallowance offered and then proceed to work out the methodology enacted

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