Search Results For: Ravindra Bhat J


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DATE: September 10, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 13, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 56(2)(vii): Law explained on (i) reopening of assessment by issue of s. 148 notice at the 11th hour and based on "stale" material, (ii) nature of sanction to be accorded by the CIT u/s 151 and (iii) scope of s. 56(2)(vii) and whether difference between 'fair market value' and face value of unquoted shares can be assessed as income. All important judgements referred

When the assessees acquired the shares through allotment, the taxing event, as it were, occurred on account of the differential between what is said to be market value and what was value paid by them. As a result, it is held that the primary obligation to disclose about the acquisition of shares, was not relieved by virtue of the notification under Section 25 (6) of the (now repealed) Companies Act, 1956. It is, therefore, held that prima facie, there is no merit in this argument; it cannot be said that the effect of the exemption notification was to relieve the assessees from their obligation to disclose about the acquisition of the shares, which appears to be the taxing event (on account of the differential between the acquisition cost and the fair market value).

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DATE: August 16, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 28, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: The revenue played a subterfuge in trying to cover up its omission and in ante dating the record. The court hereby directs the Chief Commissioner to cause an inquiry to be conducted as to the involvement of the officials or employee in the manipulation of the record, and take strict disciplinary action, according to the concerned rules and regulations. This inquiry should be in regard to the conduct of the concerned AO posted at the time, who issued the notice under Section 147/148 as well as the officers who filed the affidavits in these proceedings

It goes without saying that whilst the “reasons” shown to the court and the petitioner may ipso facto not be faulted, yet the file tells a different story; they were not recorded before the impugned notice was issued. In fact, the revenue played a subterfuge, in trying to cover up its omission, and in ante dating the record, in the attempt to establish that such reasons existed, and this court’s interference was not called for. In these circumstances, this court hereby directs the Chief Commissioner concerned to cause an inquiry to be conducted as to the involvement of the officials or employee in the manipulation of the record in this case, and take strict disciplinary action, according to the concerned rules and regulations. This inquiry should be in regard to the conduct of the concerned AO posted at the time, who issued the notice under Section 147/148 as well as the officers who filed the affidavits in these proceedings. The investigation and consequential action shall be completed within four months

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DATE: February 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Voluntary surrender of income after survey by filing a revised income does not save the assessee from levy of penalty for concealment of income in the original return if there is no explanation as to the nature of income or its source. SAS Pharmaceuticals 335 ITR 259 (Del) is not good law after MAK Data 358 ITR 593 (SC)

The assessee merely made a voluntary surrender; she did not offer any explanation as to the nature of income or its source. The observations in MAK Data (supra) are that the authorities are not really concerned with the statement- whether voluntarily or otherwise and have to see whether there was any non disclosure of material facts, or income. The complete failure to furnish any details with respect to the income, which if given could have been the only reasonable basis for deletion of penalty, in the opinion of the court, reinforced the views of the AO and CIT (A) that the revised return was an afterthought, based on the subsequent event of disclosure of Rs 2,00,00,000/-

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DATE: February 5, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 20, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 206AA TDS: The requirement (pre amendment) that TDS should be deducted at 20% on payments to non-residents even though the income is chargeable to tax at a lower rate under the DTAA is not acceptable because the DTAA has primacy over the Act. S. 206AA (as it existed) has to be read down to mean that where the non-resident payee is resident in a territory with which India has a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, the rate of taxation would be as dictated by the provisions of the treaty

Having regard to the position of law explained in Azadi Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India, (2003) 263 ITR 706 (SC) and later followed in numerous decisions that a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement acquires primacy in such cases, where reciprocating states mutually agree upon acceptable principles for tax treatment, the provision in Section 206AA (as it existed) has to be read down to mean that where the deductee i.e the overseas resident business concern conducts its operation from a territory, whose Government has entered into a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with India, the rate of taxation would be as dictated by the provisions of the treaty

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DATE: August 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 9, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) Penalty: In the absence of any overt act, which disclosed conscious and material suppression, invocation of Explanation 7 to s. 271(1)(c) in a blanket manner could not only be injurious to the assessee but ultimately would be contrary to the purpose for which it was engrafted in the statute. It might lead to a rather peculiar situation where the assessees who might otherwise accept such determination may be forced to litigate further to escape the clutches of Explanation 7

The Court is also of the opinion that in the absence of any overt act, which disclosed conscious and material suppression, invocation of Explanation 7 in a blanket manner could not only be injurious to the assessee but ultimately would be contrary to the purpose for which it was engrafted in the statute. It might lead to a rather peculiar situation where the assessees who might otherwise accept such determination may be forced to litigate further to escape the clutches of Explanation 7

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DATE: November 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 263 Revision: The failure to issue notice on any particular issue does not vitiate the exercise of power u/s 263, as long as the assessee is heard and given opportunity. The lack of opportunity at the revisional stage does not vitiate the entire order, or the proceedings. It is a curable defect. The CIT has power to consider all aspects which were the subject matter of the AO’s order, if in his opinion, they are erroneous, despite the assessee’s appeal on that or some other aspect

It is in the context of the above position that this Court has repeatedly held that unlike the power of reopening an assessment under Section 147 of the Act, the power of revision under Section 263 is not contingent on the giving of a notice to show cause. In fact, Section 263 has been understood not to require any specific show cause notice to be served on the assessee. Rather, what is required under the said provision is an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The two requirements are different; the first would comprehend a prior notice detailing the specific grounds on which revision of the assessment order is tentatively being proposed

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DATE: July 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1995-96
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Whether subsidy is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt: If the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, it means that the policy makers envision greater profitability as an incentive for investors to expand units. Such subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

How a state frames its policy to achieve its objectives and attain larger developmental goals depends upon the experience, vision and genius of its representatives. Therefore, to say that the indication of the limit of subsidy as the capital expended, means that it replenished the capital expenditure and therefore, the subsidy is capital, would not be justified. The specific provision for capital subsidy in the main scheme and the lack of such a subsidy in the supplementary scheme (of 1991) meant that the recipient, i.e. the assessee had the flexibility of using it for any purpose. Unlike in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals [2008] 306 ITR 392 (SC), the absence of any condition towards capital utilization meant that the policy makers envisioned greater profitability as an incentive for investors to expand units, for rapid industrialization of the state, ensuring greater employment. Clearly, the subsidy was revenue in nature

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DATE: March 14, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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Bogus share capital: Fact that the investigation wing’s report alleged that the assessee was beneficiary to bogus transactions and that the identity of shareholders, genuineness etc was suspect is not sufficient. The AO is bound to conduct scrutiny of documents produced by the assessee and cannot rest content by placing reliance on the report of the investigation wing

The assessee had provided several documents that could have showed light into whether truly the transactions were genuine. It was not a case where the share applicants are merely provided confirmation letters. They had provided their particulars, PAN details, assessment particulars, mode of payment for share application money, i.e. through banks, bank statements, cheque numbers in question, copies of minutes of resolutions authorizing the applications, copies of balance sheets, profit and loss accounts for the year under consideration and even bank statements showing the source of payments made by the companies to the assessee as well as their master debt with ROC particulars. The AO strangely failed to conduct any scrutiny of documents and rested content by placing reliance merely on a report of the Investigation Wing. This reveals spectacular disregard to an AO’s duties in the remand proceedings which the Revenue seeks to inflict upon the assessee in this case

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DATE: February 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06, 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Entire law explained on whether levy of penalty is automatic if return filed by the assessee u/s 153A discloses higher income than in the return filed u/s 139(1) in the context of the law as it stood prior to, and after, the insertion of Explanation 5 to s. 271(1)(c). Also, the law on levy of penalty on revised returns explained

When the A.O. has accepted the revised return filed by the assessee under Section 153A, no occasion arises to refer to the previous return filed under Section 139 of the Act. For all purposes, including for the purpose of levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, the return that has to be looked at is the one filed under Section 153A. In fact, the second proviso to Section 153A(1) provides that “assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years referred to in this sub-section pending on the date of initiation of the search under Section 132 or making of requisition under Section 132A, as the case may be, shall abate.” What is clear from this is that Section 153A is in the nature of a second chance given to the assessee, which incidentally gives him an opportunity to make good omission, if any, in the original return. Once the A.O. accepts the revised return filed under Section 153A, the original return under Section 139 abates and becomes non-est. Now, it is trite to say that the “concealment” has to be seen with reference to the return that it is filed by the assessee. Thus, for the purpose of levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c), what has to be seen is whether there is any concealment in the return filed by the assessee under Section 153A, and not vis-a vis the original return under Section 139

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DATE: February 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 194-I: S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act distinguishes between 'premium' for acquiring the lease and 'rent' for enjoying user of the property. Payment towards 'premium' for the lease (even if paid annually) is a capital payment and is not subject to s. 194-I TDS. CBDT Circular No. 35/2016 dated 13.10.2016 referred

That brings the court to the next question, which is as to the nature of the payments made towards lease. Do they constitute rent so as to attract Section 194-I? The court is of opinion that clearly these payments are not “rent”. That they are annual payments cannot be doubted. Yet, part of the payment is clearly capital in nature. Clause 1 of the lease deeds entered into in each of the cases, clearly points to the fact that a small percentage of the agreed amounts were paid as part of the lease premium and were towards acquisition of the asset; they fell, consequently in the capital stream and were not “rents”. The balance of such premium payments were spread over a period of 8 to 10 years, in specified annual or bi-annual installments. Here, distinction between a single payment made at the time of the settlement of the demised property and recurring payments made during the period of its enjoyment by the lessee is to be made. This distinction is clearly recognized in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, which defines both premium and rent. Such payments were held to constitute capital and not “rent” or advance rent,