Year: 2012

Archive for 2012


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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 22, 2012 (Date of publication)
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S. 220(6): Guidelines laid down on how stay applications should be dealt with The assessee, a mutual fund, was a beneficiary of a trust named India Corporate Loan Securitisation Trust which was set up for securitising a loan of Rs.300 …

UTI Mutual Fund vs. ITO (Bombay High Court) Read More »

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 22, 2012 (Date of publication)
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In several judgments of this Court, the parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction u/s 220(6) of the Act have been spelt out. In KEC International Ltd. v. B.R. Balakrishnan 251 ITR 158, the importance of reasoned orders being passed on the stay applications was emphasized. The AOs consistently refuse to follow the law laid down in the judgment of this Court. The AO & the appellate authorities are duty bound to act in accordance with binding precedent and there is no reason or justification to act in the manner in which the applications for stay have been disposed of in this case

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 22, 2012 (Date of publication)
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The power which is vested in the AO u/s 220(6) and on the CIT (A) to grant a stay of demand is a judicial power. It is necessary for both the AO as well as the appellate authorities constituted under the Income-tax Act to have due regard to the fact that their function is not merely to act as tax gatherers, but equally as quasi judicial authorities, they owe a duty of fairness to the assessee. This seems to be lost sight of in the manner in which the authority has acted in the present case. The parameters for the exercise of the jurisdiction to grant a stay of demand has been set out in several judgments of this Court, including in KEC International vs. B.R.Balakrishnan 251 ITR 158. The assessee’s submissions on merits require consideration. The CIT (A) ought to have devoted a more careful consideration to the issue as to whether a stay of demand was warranted. As out of a total demand of Rs.1.18 crores, Rs.78 lakhs has been adjusted, the balance has to be stayed

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 20, 2012 (Date of publication)
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We have carefully gone through the review petition filed by the Union of India on 17th February, 2012. We find no merit in the review petition. The review petition is, accordingly, dismissed

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 20, 2012 (Date of publication)
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S. 47(iv) exempts a transfer of a capital asset by a company to its subsidiary if “the parent company or its nominees hold the whole of the share capital of the subsidiary company”. The word used is “or” and not “and”. The assessee held only 99.99% of the shareholding. The shares held by the nominees cannot be considered as held by the assessee. If, under Indian law (s. 49 (3) of the Companies Act), a company cannot by itself hold 100% of the shares in a subsidiary, it would only mean that Parliament did not intend to confer the benefit of s. 47(iv) on such a parent company. Though this approach confines the relief to a particular species of parent companies, it does not mean that the provision is unworkable. If the nominees are treated as holding the shares benami for the parent company, it would offend the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and also violate s. 49(3) of the Companies Act. The nominees can also not be regarded as a trustee in view of s. 153 of the Companies Act. The result is that the applicant does not hold 100% of the share capital of the subsidiary and so s. 47(iv) is not attracted

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 17, 2012 (Date of publication)
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The principal object of s. 80-I is to encourage setting up of new industrial undertakings by offering tax incentives. A reasonable and purposive construction should be adopted. There is no logic in the argument of the department that the true test would be as to whether a new industrial undertaking can function independently of the existing industrial undertaking. If this argument is accepted, it will amount to adding a new clause in s. 80-I of the Act. The fact that the new unit is not capable of independently producing the goods without taking the assistance of the existing plant and machinery of the old unit is no ground to reject the claim u/s 80-I. The test laid down in Textile Machinery Corporation 107 ITR 195 (SC), namely that the new unit should have a “separate and distinct identity” is not violated only because the new undertaking is to a certain extent dependent on the existing unit. It all depends on the nature of the technology and the mechanism of production. One cannot ignore the fact that new machinery and new plant have been installed at an investment of Rs.7 crore and the fact that production has gone from 34000 MT to 75000 MT (Associated Cement Company 118 ITR 406 & other judgements distinguished /explained)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 17, 2012 (Date of publication)
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S. 40A (3) & Rule 6 DD (j) have been incorporated in the Act to check the incurring of bogus and fictitious expenses to non existing parties. In the present case, there is no dispute on the identity of the payee and genuineness of the transaction. The only question is whether the assessee has been able to establish “exceptional or unavoidable circumstances” why the payment made in cash. The assessee was not doing well in its business and was facing liquidity and financial crunch. The assessee’s explanation that payments were made in cash as preparation of a bank draft or issue of cheque would have resulted in a missed opportunity or failure of a good business deal with third parties is acceptable because there were earlier cases of bounced cheques and when a party is facing liquidity problem, it can get difficult as third parties are reluctant to accept cheques and insist on cash payments. Arranging funds is also a problem and not easy. Also, the cash was obtained from a known party and the AO had not made any addition on that score. Accordingly, disallowance u/s 40A(3) was not justified.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 16, 2012 (Date of publication)
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As regards the constitutional challenge, while the right to practice as an advocate is not only a statutory right under the Advocates Act but is also a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, it is subject to reasonable restrictions. The restriction imposed by s. 129(6) of the Customs Act is constitutional because (i) the restriction is partial to the extent of practice before CESTAT and does not bar practice before other judicial bodies & (ii) the restriction is intended to serve a larger public interest and to uplift the professional values and standards of advocacy in the country. It adds to public confidence in the administration of justice by the Tribunal

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2012 (Date of publication)
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The distinction between a “Finance lease” and an “operating lease” is set out in the Guidance Note on Accounting for Leases and Accounting Standard (AS) 19. It is also set out in the judgement of the Supreme Court in Asea Brown Boveri vs. IFCI 154 TM 512 (SC) & Association of Leasing & Financial Services Companies v. UOI. In a finance lease, the lessee selects the equipment & the lessor provides the funds, acquires the title to the equipment and allows the lessee to use it for its expected life. The lessee uses the asset for its entire economic life & all risks and rewards incidental to ownership are transferred to the lessee even though title may or may not be eventually transferred to the lessee. A finance lease is for a fixed period & non-cancellable. There is a fixed obligation on the lessee for payment of lease money & in case of premature termination, the lessor is entitled to recover his investment with expected interest. In substance, finance lease is a loan from the lessor to the lessee. In an operating lease, the lessor bears the risk of loss, the period is cancellable and lease rentals are not synchronized with the economic life of the asset. On facts, the assessee’s lease agreement had all the characteristics of a finance lease

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2012 (Date of publication)
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The main reason for reopening the assessment was the insertion of the Explanation to s. 80-IB(10) by the FA (No. 2) Act 2009 w.r.e.f. 1.04.2000 which denies deduction to a contractor in respect of works contract awarded by any person and that at the stage of the original assessment, no opinion regarding the allowability or otherwise of deduction u/s 80IB (10) was given. of the Act. As regards the retrospective amendment, if an Explanation is added to a section for the removal of doubts, the implication is that the law was the same from the very beginning and the same is further explained by way of addition of the Explanation. It is not a case of introduction of a new provision of law by retrospective operation. As regards the formation of opinion, the assessee had disclosed all the material relevant for claiming s. 80-IB(10) deduction and there was no suppression of material. The fact that the AO in the s. 143(3) assessment did not give any opinion regarding the allowability or otherwise of deduction u/s 80IB (10) of the Act cannot be a ground for invoking s. 147.