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DATE: March 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 18, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 80-IB(7): Amounts by way of rent and other misc items, though shown as "other income" in the books, constitutes "key revenue category" as per ICAI Guidelines and are "derived" from the business of the hotel

Thus it can be seen from the above that, rent received by the assessee of Rs.180,000/- from Heritage Shop which represents rental income from Curio Shop and of Rs.120,000/- for the space and amenities given to Kumarakom Water Transport Pvt. Ltd. will fall within the key revenue generation category of ‘Space Rentals’ and ‘Arcade revenue’ and ‘Housekeeping bill’ for a hotel industry. Revenue from staff mess of Rs.7,139/- will also fall within the key revenue generation category of ‘Food and Beverages’ for a hotel industry. Revenue from staff telephone of R.90,048/- will fall within the key revenue category of ‘Communication revenue (both telephone & internet)’ as per ICAI guidelines

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DATE: March 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing Of Corporate Guarantees: Explanation i(c) to S. 92 B, though stated to be clarificatory and stated to be effective from 01.04.2002, has to be necessarily treated as effective from at best AY 2013-14 as it is an "anti abuse" provision. Dept’s submission that Bharti Airtel 161 TTJ 428 is “per incuriam” is not acceptable. Law laid down in Micro Ink 176 TTJ 8 (Ahd) on transfer pricing implications of corporate guarantees reiterated

It is very important to bear in mind the fact that right now we are dealing with amendment of a transfer pricing related provision which is in the nature of a SAAR (specific anti abuse rule), and that every anti abuse legislation, whether SAAR (specific anti abuse rule) or GAAR (general anti abuse rule), is a legislation seeking the taxpayers to organize their affairs in a manner compliant with the norms set out in such anti abuse legislation. An anti-abuse legislation does not trigger the levy of taxes; it only tells you what behavior is acceptable or what is not acceptable. What triggers levy of taxes is non-compliance with the manner in which the anti-abuse regulations require the taxpayers to conduct their affairs. In that sense, all anti abuse legislations seek a certain degree of compliance with the norms set out therein. It is, therefore, only elementary that amendments in the anti-abuse legislations can only be prospective. It does not make sense that someone tells you today as to how you should have behaved yesterday, and then goes on to levy a tax because you did not behave in that manner yesterday. It is for this reason that the Explanation to Section 92 B, though stated to be clarificatory and stated to be effective from 1st April 2002, has to be necessarily treated as effective from at best the assessment year 2013-14

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Posted on by editor
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DATE: April 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules which regulates the admission of additional evidence by the CIT(A) cannot override the principles of natural justice

The principle “Audi alteram partem”, i.e. no man should be condemned unheard is the basic canon principles of natural justice and accordingly we find merit in the contentions of the assessee that Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules cannot be over ride the principles of natural justice. Hence we are of the view that the learned CIT(A) was not justified in refusing to admit the various additional evidences furnished by the assessee

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Posted on by shreesh
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DATE: March 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 to 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 220(6): An order disposing off a stay application has to objectively consider the prima facie case on merits, financial hardship and balance of convenience and give reasons for the rejection

We find that neither the Assessing Officer in the impugned orders dated 13th October, 2015 nor the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) in the order dated 25.2.2016 has dealt with the Petitioner’s primary contentions that the amounts received as lease premium and shown as deposits, cannot be taxed as income. This Court has time again set out parameters to be kept in mind while considering the stay application under Section 220(6) of the Act. the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) has completely misunderstood the scope of her powers and issues to be considered while disposing of the stay applications. In the above view, we set aside the orders dated 13th October, 2015 of the Assessing Officer and order dated 25th February, 2016… However, the Petitioner’s stay application is restored to the file of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) for fresh disposal in accordance with law and after considering, prima facie, merits of the Petitioner’s case and in accordance with law

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Posted on by editor
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DATE: April 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 147: Though assessee claims that she is a non-resident & that onus is on the revenue to show that the money in the HSBC Geneva account is taxable in India, the non-cooperation with the Revenue by signing the consent waiver form shows that she has something to hide and makes it an unfit case for exercise of writ jurisdiction

In the normal course of human conduct if a person has nothing to hide and serious allegations /questions are being raised about the funds a person would make available the documents which would put to rest all questions which seem to arise in the mind of the Authorities. The conduct on the part of the Petitioner and her uncle, in not being forthcoming, to our mind leads us to the conclusion that this is not a fit case where we should exercise our extra ordinary writ jurisdiction and/or interfere with the orders passed by the authorities under the Act. If a person has nothing to hide, we believe the person would have cooperated in obtaining the Bank Statements

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DATE: March 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 143(3): In an AIR scrutiny assessment, the AO is not entitled to widen the scope of scrutiny without approval of the CIT as per CBDT's Instruction. Such an assessment order is not sustainable

In fact, what the AO did was to widen the scrutiny. Now, para 2 of CBDT Instruction is specific when it states that where it is felt that apart from the AIR information, there is potential escapement of income more than Rs. 10 lakhs, the case may be taken up for wider scrutiny with the approval of the administrative Commissioner. So, the proper course for the AO before making these additional enquiries would have been to take approval from the administrative Commissioner to widen the scrutiny. This, however, was not done and therefore, the action of the AO is violative of the CBDT Instruction

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Posted on by editor
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DATE: April 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: Law laid down in Jet Airways India 331 ITR 236 and Ranbaxy 336 ITR 136 that if AO does not make any addition for the reason stated for reopening, he cannot add any other income holds good even for years when Explanation 3 to s. 147 is operative

The argument of the Ld. DR that the ratio propounded in Jet Airways India vs. CIT 331 ITR 236 and Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. vs. CIT(2011) 336 ITR 136 does not apply since those cases related to assessment years when Explanation 3 to section 147 was not on the statute, we find has not merit since in the above mentioned decisions the Court has interpreted the provision of section 147 on first principle to hold that only if addition are made on account of income which the AO had reason to believe had escaped assessment that any other addition can be made. It is not Explanation 3 which had been interpreted in favour of the assessee in these cases. In fact we find that Explanation 3 empowers AO’s to make assessment on any matter which comes to their notice during assessment proceedings. But the same alongwith section 147 has been interpreted as stated above. Therefore, the presence or absence of Explanation 3 to section 147 does not nullify the interpretation given by the courts in the above stated judgments

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Posted on by shreesh
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DATE: March 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 45/ 48: Deferred consideration dependent on a contingency does not accrue unless the contingency has occurred and is not liable to capital gains tax in year of transfer

The contention of the Revenue that the impugned order is seeking to tax the amount on receipt basis by not having brought it to tax in the subject assessment year, is not correct. This for the reason, that the amounts to be received as deferred consideration under the agreement could not be subjected to tax in the assessment year 2006-07 as the same has not accrued during the year. As pointed out above, accrual would be a right to receive the amount and the assessee alongwith its co-owners have not under the agreement dated 25th January, 2006 obtained a right to receive Rs.20 crores or any specified part thereof in the subject assessment year. In the above view there could be no occasion to bring the maximum amount of Rs. 20 crores, which could be received as deferred consideration to tax in the subject assessment year as it had not accrued to the assessee.

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Posted on by Dhaval Shah
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DATE: March 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 50C does not apply to transfer of leasehold rights in land

Section 50C of the Act provides that if the consideration received or accruing is less than the value adopted or assessed or assessable by the stamp valuation authority of the State Government for such transfer then the value so adopted or assessed or assessable shall be deemed to be the full value of consideration and the capital gains will be computed accordingly. The phraseology of section 50C of the Act clearly provides that it would apply only to “a capital asset, being land or building or both”. The moot question before us is as to whether such expression would cover the transfer of a capital asset being leasehold rights in land or building. There cannot be a dispute to the proposition that the expression land by itself cannot include within its fold leasehold right in land also. Of-course, leasehold right in land is also a capital asset and we find no fault with this stand of the Revenue. So however, every kind of a ‘capital asset’ is not covered within the scope of section 50C of the Act for the purposes of ascertaining the full value of consideration. Infact, the heading of section itself provides that it is “Special provision for full value of consideration in certain cases”. Therefore, there is a significance to the expression “a capital asset, being land or building or both” contained in section 50C of the Act. The significance is that only capital asset being land or building or both are covered within the scope of section 50C of the Act, and not all kinds of capital assets

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Posted on by Dhaval Shah
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DATE: April 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 2(22)(d): Redemption of preference shares does not constitute "deemed dividend"

As can be seen by s. 2(22)(d), there should be a reduction of its capital and distribution to the shareholders out of the accumulated profits. Section 80(3) of the Companies Act states that the redemption of preference shares under this section by a company shall not be taken as reducing the amount of its authorised share capital. By virtue of section 80(3) redemption of preference shares cannot be considered as reduction of authorised share capital, therefore, treating them as deemed dividend does not arise, as the provisions of section 2(22)(d) can only be invoked only when there is distribution of accumulated profits by way of reduction of share capital. Therefore the question of invoking deemed dividend provision on this transaction does not arise, eventhough the redemption of shares are to be made out of the profits of the company by virtue of section 80(1) of the Companies Act. However, since it cannot be treated as reduction of authorised share capital by virtue of section 80(3) of the Companies Act, the amount received by assessee on redemption of preference shares cannot be treated as deemed dividend

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