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DATE: April 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 68 cash credit: If the assessee has explained the source of the loans received by it, the fact that the lender may have raised bogus share capital to advance the funds to the assessee does not mean that the loan received by the assessee can be treated as unexplained income. A statement recorded under duress, which is retracted later, cannot be the sole basis for addition

If the Ld. Assessing Officer was apprehensive about the genuineness of the amount, he was duty bound to examine in the hands of the M/s Encee Securities Pvt. Ltd. or its share holders. At least, the money was germinated from the hands of the share holders, who contributed to M/s Encee Securities Pvt. Ltd. but in the hands of the present assessee, it is merely a loan and this fact has not been denied by any of the party. Even till this date, M/s Encee Securities Pvt. Ltd. has never denied that loan was given to the present assessee, therefore, the assessee is not expected to prove the source of source

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DATE: May 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 13, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2000-01
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CITATION:
Law on tests to be applied to determine whether income from property is chargeable as “Income from house property” or as “Profits and gains of business” explained. The objects clause is not determinative. Income earned from a shopping center is required to be taxed under the head “Income from House Property” (Chennai Properties 373 ITR 673 (SC) and Rayala Corporation distinguished)

Wherever there is an income from leasing out of premises and collecting rent, normally such an income is to be treated as income from house property, in case provisions of Section 22 of the Act are satisfied with primary ingredient that the assessee is the owner of the said building or lands appurtenant thereto. Section 22 of the Act makes ‘annual value’ of such a property as income chargeable to tax under this head. How annual value is to be determined is provided in Section 23 of the Act. ‘Owner of the house property’ is defined in Section 27 of the Act which includes certain situations where a person not actually the owner shall be treated as deemed owner of a building or part thereof. In the present case, the appellant is held to be “deemed owner” of the property in question by virtue of Section 27(iiib) of the Act. On the other hand, under certain circumstances, where the income may have been derived from letting out of the premises, it can still be treated as business income if letting out of the premises itself is the business of the assessee

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DATE: May 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 13, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 145: If the AO has not rejected the books of account, it means that the assessee has maintained the books of accounts in accordance with the prescribed standards as per s. 145 of the Act. If so, the AO is not entitled to make any addition on account of sale of goods out of books or for investment in stock out of undisclosed sources

On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 27.10.2009 reveals that the assessee has maintained the books of accounts in accordance with the prescribed standard as per Section 145 of ‘the Act’. The account books have not been rejected by the assessing officer. In view of the above, the Tribunal formed an opinion where once the account books are expected to be maintained in the prescribed accounting standard, the assessing officer could not have made any additions towards the sale of rice treating it to be outside the books of accounts or towards investing in stock of rice and wheat outside the books of accounts

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DATE: March 21, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 12, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Valid service of notice: Law explained on whether sending a notice by RPAD and its return by the postal authorities with the remark "addressee refused to accept" amounts to a valid service or not

When it was sent by R.P.A.D. to the address, it was returned by the postal authorities with the remark, that the addressee refused to accept the packet. That is why it is returned. Thus, the presumption that when the addressee whose address is set out on the envelope had an occasion to notice and peruse the packet, meant for him, but he refuses to accept it, then, that is deemed to be served. The addressee in this case is correctly described. There is no dispute about his identity. Even his address is correct. It is at that address the packet is carried and by the concerned postal authority. The duly authorised person carrying the packet reached the address. On noticing the addressee, he serves it, but the addressee after having perused the packet refused to accept it. It is in these circumstances, the postal remark that the concerned person has refused to accept; hence, returned to the sender denotes good and valid service.

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DATE: May 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Severe strictures passed against the High Court for "inconsistent decision-making" and passing orders which are "palpably illegal, faulty and contrary to the basic principles of law" and by ignoring "large number of binding decisions of the Supreme Court" and giving "impermissible benefit to accused". Law on condonation of delay explained. CBI directed to implement mechanism to ensure that all appeals are filed in time

Judicial discipline requires that such a blatant contradiction in such an important matter should have been avoided. The order passed in the case of Dr. R.K. Rana was on sound basis and though the court had noted that there was some overlapping of facts but the offences were different, it, however, has taken a different view in the impugned order for the reasons which are not understandable. The court ought to have been careful while dealing with such matters and consistency is the hallmark of the court due to which people have faith in the system and it is not open to the court to take a different view in the same matter with reference to different accused persons in the same facts and same case. Such inconsistent decision-making ought to have been avoided at all costs so as to ensure credibility of the system. The impugned orders are palpably illegal, faulty and contrary to the basic principles of law and Judge has ignored large number of binding decisions of this Court while giving impermissible benefit to the accused persons and delayed the case for several years. Interference had been made at the advanced stage of the case which was wholly unwarranted and uncalled for

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DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) penalty proceedings are “quasi-criminal” and ought to comply with the principles of natural justice. The non-striking of the irrelevant portion in the show-cause notice means that the AO is not firm about the charge against the assessee and the assessee is not made aware as to which of the two limbs of s. 271(1)(c) he has to respond. The fact that the assessment order is clear about the charge against the assessee is irrelevant (Samson Perinchery (Bom) followed, Kaushalya 216 ITR 660 (Bom) distinguished)

Apart from the aforesaid discussion, we may also refer to the one more seminal feature of this case which would demonstrate the importance of non-striking off of irrelevant clause in the notice by the Assessing Officer. As noted earlier, in the assessment order dated 10.12.2010 the Assessing Officer records that the penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act are to be initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. However, in the notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s. 271(1)(c) of the Act of even date, both the limbs of Sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act are reproduced in the proforma notice and the irrelevant clause has not been struck-off. Quite clearly, the observation of the Assessing Officer in the assessment order and non-striking off of the irrelevant clause in the notice clearly brings out the diffidence on the part of Assessing Officer and there is no clear and crystallised charge being conveyed to the assessee u/s 271(1)(c), which has to be met by him. As noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra), the quasi-criminal proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act ought to comply with the principles of natural justice, and in the present case, considering the observations of the Assessing Officer in the assessment order alongside his action of non-striking off of the irrelevant clause in the notice shows that the charge being made against the assessee qua Sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act is not firm and, therefore, the proceedings suffer from non-compliance with principles of natural justice inasmuch as the Assessing Officer is himself unsure and assessee is not made aware as to which of the two limbs of Sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act he has to respond

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DATE: May 5, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing: Law explained as to when the “Resale Price Method” (RPM) can be used with respect to related parties under Rule 10B (1)(b) + Law on determining arm’s length rate of the corporate guarantee commission/fee explained

The Transfer Pricing Officer has selected RPM as most appropriate method for determining the arm’s length price of the transaction of sale of programmes and film rights to ATL in contrast to the TNM method selected by the assessee. The first controversy is as to whether the Transfer Pricing Officer was justified in selecting the RPM as most appropriate method. Section 92(1) of the Act provides that the arm’s length price in relation to the international transaction shall be determined by any of the methods prescribed therein, being the most appropriate method. Notably, the phraseology of section 92C(1) of the Act makes it clear that the selection of the most appropriate method is to be made “having regard to the nature of transaction or class of transaction or class of associated persons or functions performed by such persons or such other relevant factors………………..”. Further, Rule 10B of the Rules enumerates the various methods to determine the arm’s length price of an international transaction and for the present purpose, what is relevant is clause(b) of Rule 10B(1) of the Rules, which prescribes the manner in which the RPM is to be effectuated

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DATE: May 2, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Bogus purchases cannot be assessed as 'unexplained expenditure' u/s 69C if the transactions are duly disclosed and payments are through banks. The fact that the sellers are not traceable and the assessee surrendered the bogus purchases does not justify levy of penalty. Mere non-striking of the options in the s. 274 notice does not render the penalty proceedings void if the assessment order shows due application of mind.

Section 69C could not be applied to the facts of the case as the payments were through banking channels which were duly reflected in the books of accounts and therefore, there was no unexplained expenditure within the meaning of Section 69C incurred by the assessee. Further, we find that the assessee was in possession of purchase invoices and various other documentary evidences qua these purchases. A bare perusal of the purchase invoices reveals that the assessee has purchased consumables etc. from the alleged bogus suppliers, which are connected, at least to some extent, with the business of the assessee. The assessee, during quantum proceedings itself filed revised computation of income after disallowing the alleged bogus purchases by citing the reason that the suppliers were not traceable during assessment proceedings. Nevertheless, the assessee was in possession of vital evidences in his possession to prima facie substantiate his purchases to some extent particularly when the payments were though banking channels. Merely because the suppliers could not be traced at the given address would not automatically lead to a conclusion that there was concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the assessee

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DATE: April 27, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing AMP Adjustment: Entire law on whether the advertisement expenditure incurred by the Indian AE towards brand of a foreign company can be treated as an “international transaction” and whether a notional adjustment can be made in the hands of the Indian AE towards compensation receivable from the foreign AE for “deemed brand development” explained

A service has to be conscious activity and it cannot be a subliminal exercise- as is the impact on brand value in this case. A service, by definition, is an act of helping, or doing something on behalf of, someone. A passive exercise cannot be defined as a service. Every benefit accruing to an AE, as a result of dealing with another AE, is not on account of service by the other AE. What I benchmarked is not the accrual of ‘benefit’ but rendition of ‘service’. All benefits are not accounts or services by someone, just as all services do not result in benefits to the parties. The expressions ‘benefit’ and ‘service’ have different connotations, and what is truly relevant, for the purpose of definition of ‘international transaction’ in Indian context, is ‘service’- not the benefit. There is no rendition of service in the present context

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DATE: May 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 8, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
S. 14A disallowance has to be made also with respect to dividend on shares and units on which tax is payable by the payer u/s 115-O & 115-R. Argument that such dividends are not tax-free in the hands of the payee is not correct. S. 14A cannot be invoked in the absence of proof that expenditure has actually been incurred in earning the dividend income. If the AO has accepted for earlier years that no such expenditure has been incurred, he cannot take a contrary stand for later years if the facts and circumstances have not changed

While it is correct that Section 10(33) exempts only dividend income under Section 115-O of the Act and there are other species of dividend income on which tax is levied under the Act, we do not see how the said position in law would assist the assessee in understanding the provisions of Section 14A in the manner indicated. What is required to be construed is the provisions of Section 10(33) read in the light of Section 115-O of the Act. So far as the species of dividend income on which tax is payable under Section 115-O of the Act is concerned, the earning of the said dividend is tax free in the hands of the assessee and not includible in the total income of the said assessee. If that is so, we do not see how the operation of Section 14A of the Act to such dividend income can be foreclosed. The fact that Section 10(33) and Section 115-O of the Act were brought in together; deleted and reintroduced later in a composite manner, also, does not assist the assessee. Rather, the aforesaid facts would countenance a situation that so long as the dividend income is taxable in the hands of the dividend paying company, the same is not includible in the total income of the recipient assessee. At such point of time when the said position was reversed (by the Finance Act of 2002; reintroduced again by the Finance Act, 2003), it was the assessee who was liable to pay tax on such dividend income. In such a situation the assessee was entitled under Section 57 of the Act to claim the benefit of exemption of expenditure incurred to earn such income. Once Section 10(33) and 115-O was reintroduced the position was reversed. The above, actually fortifies the situation that Section 14A 44 of the Act would operate to disallow deduction of all expenditure incurred in earning the dividend income under Section 115-O which is not includible in the total income of the assessee

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