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DATE: January 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 16, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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S. 9(1)(vi)/ 9(1)(vii): Important law explained on whether payment for use of equipment can be assessed as "royalty" and whether payment for rendering of services can be assessed as "fees for technical services" in the context of s. 9(1)(vi) and 9(1)(vii) and Article 12 of the India-Canada DTAA

Article 12(4) provides that, “The term “fees for technical included services” as used in this Article means payments of any kind to any person in consideration for services of a managerial, technical or consultancy nature (including the provision of such services through technical or other personnel) if such services : (a) are ancillary and subsidiary to the application or enjoyment of the right, property or information for which a payment described in paragraph 3 is received ; or (b) make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes, which enables the person acquiring the services to apply the technology contained therein”. In order to invoke article 12(4)(a) it is necessary that such services should “make available” technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design The services provided by BT Canada were simply management support or consultancy services which did not involve any transfer of technology. It is not even the case of the Assessing Officer that the services were such that the recipient of service was enabled to perform these services on its own without any further recourse to the service provider. It is in this context that we have to examine the scope of expression ‘make available’

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DATE: January 6, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 16, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
Bogus capital gains from penny stocks: The fact that the Stock Exchanges disclaimed the transaction is irrelevant because purchase and sale of shares outside the floor of Stock Exchange is not an unlawful activity. Off-market transactions are not illegal. It is always possible for the parties to enter into transactions even without the help of brokers. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the transactions reported by the assessee were sham or bogus

Purchase and sale of shares outside the floor of Stock Exchange is not an unlawful activity. Off-market transactions are not illegal. It is always possible for the parties to enter into transactions even without the help of brokers. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the transactions reported by the assessee were quite sham on the legal proposition arrived at by the CIT(A) that off-market transactions are not permissible. The assessee has stated that the transactions were made with the help of professional mediators who are experts in off-market transactions. When the transactions were off-market transactions, there is no relevance in seeking details of share transactions from Stock Exchanges. Such attempts would be futile. Stock Exchanges cannot give details of transactions entered into between the parties outside their floor. Therefore, the reliance placed by the assessing authority on the communications received from the Stock Exchanges that the particulars of share transactions entered into by the assessee were not available in their records, is out of place. There is no evidential value for such reliance placed by the assessing authority. The assessee had made it very clear that the transactions were not concluded on the floor of the Stock Exchange. The matter being so, there is no probative value for the negative replies solicited by the assessing authority from the respective Stock Exchanges. We are of the considered view that the materials collected by the assessing authority from the Stock Exchanges are not valid to dispel or disbelieve the contentions of the assessee

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DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 14, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
Bogus capital gains from penny stocks: Long-term capital gains claimed exempt u/s 10(38) cannot be treated as bogus unexplained income if the paper work is in order. The fact that the Company whose shares were sold has violated SEBI norms and is not traceable does not mean that the assessee is at fault

The lower authorities have not brought on record any concrete evidence for disallowing the long term capital gain of the assessee. The AO should have issued notices and summons to M/s RFL and ACPL under section 133(6) and 131 of the Act for the production of the necessary financial information before rejecting the claim of the assessee. We find that all the necessary information which were available with the assessee had been brought on record by the assessee before the lower authorities. In case ACPL has not filed the financial statements with the stock exchange then the assessee for the fault of ACPL cannot be held guilty under the income tax proceedings. The assessee in the instant case has made the transactions for the sale and purchase of the shares through a valid stock broker who was in existence at the relevant time with the stock exchange and this fact has not been doubted by the lower authorities. In view of the above we hold that the lower authorities had not brought on record sufficient reasons for disallowing the claim of the assessee

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 14, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vii)/ Article 12: There is a difference between a 'contract of work' and a ‘contract of service’. In a 'contract of work', the activity is predominantly physical while in a 'contract of service', the dominant feature of the activity is intellectual. Fees paid with respect to a ‘contract of work’ does not constitute "fees for technical services" and consequently the assessee is not liable to deduct TDS u/s 195

There is a difference between ‘Contract of work and ‘Contract of service’. The two words convey different ideas. In the ‘Contract of work’ the activity is predominantly physical; it is tangible. In the activity referred as ‘Contract of service’, the dominant feature of the activity is intellectual, or at least, mental. Certainly, ‘Contract of work’ also involves intellectual exercise to some extent. Even a gardener has to bestow sufficient care in doing his job; so is the case with a mason, carpenter or a builder. But the physical (tangible) aspect is more dominant than the intellectual aspect. In contrast, in the case of rendering any kind of ‘service’, intellectual aspect plays the dominant role. In the case under consideration, the scope of work mentioned in the agreement clearly explains that it is ‘contract of work’ to dismantle the machinery, therefore, it is not a ‘contract of service’ hence payment by the assessee is not for technical services, therefore, the assessee company is not liable to deduct TDS

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DATE: August 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Omission by the AO to explicitly specify in the penalty notice as to whether penalty proceedings are being initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars or for concealment of income makes the penalty order liable for cancellation

Whether, omission if assessing officer to explicitly mention that penalty proceedings are being initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars or that for concealment of income makes the penalty order liable for cancellation even when it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the assessee had concealed income in the facts and circumstances of the case?

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DATE: December 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 54EC: Investment in specified bonds from the amounts received as an advance is eligible for s. 54EC deduction. The fact that the investment is made prior to the transfer of the asset is irrelevant

Thus, these amounts when received as advance under an Agreement to Sale of a capital asset are invested in specified bonds the benefit of Section 54EC of the Act is available. Moreover, on almost identical facts, this Court in Parveen P. Bharucha Vs. DCIT, 348 ITR 325, held that the earnest money received on sale of asset, when invested in specified bonds under Section 54EC of the Act, is entitled to the benefit of Section 54EC of the Act. This was in the context of reopening of an assessment and reliance was placed upon CBDT Circular No. 359 dated 10th May, 1983 in the context of Section 54E of the Act

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DATE: January 10, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 37(1): The loss on sale of shares of a wholly-owned subsidiary is allowable as a business loss if the investment in the subsidiary was made for commercial purposes

The objective of ATAG was undertaking sales and marketing related activities for the brand of the appellant in Singapore. The said factual assertion has not been rebutted by the AO in the impugned assessment order. There is nothing on record to show that the said subsidiary company was doing any activity completely independent and unrelated to the activities carried out by the appellant company. Thus, the claim of the appellant that the investment was made for commercial purposes and not for purpose of accretion of investment cannot be rejected

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DATE: November 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 143(3): An addition towards income cannot be made merely on the basis of the statement of a third party that an amount has been paid to the assessee in the absence of conclusive evidence

Now the issue which requires our consideration is whether the addition can be sustained solely on the basis of the statement of Shri Hanuman Yadav, when there is no material placed on record that Shri Hanuman Yadav has made any claim against the assessee in any court of law seeking cancellation of sale deed or filing a recovery suit. The Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal after following the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court under the similar circumstances in Union of India vs. T. R. Verma 1957 SC 882 and Kishan Chand Chellaram vs. CIT, 125 ITR 713 (SC) has held in the case of Ghanshyam Das Agarwal vs. ITO in ITA No. 1161/JP/2010 that in the absence of any conclusive evidence the document could not have been disbelieved. The D/R could not point out any binding precedent wherein it has been held that the oral statement would over ride the documentary evidence. Therefore, respectfully following the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Ghanshyam Das Agarwal vs. ITO in ITA No. 1161/JP/2010, we are of the view that the AO was not justified to make addition solely on the basis of the statement of Shri Hanuman Yadav when there was a registered sale deed and more particularly when the maker of statement has not challenged the sale deed before any court of law. It is also not placed on record whether the sale deed was executed under coercion.

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 2(22)(2) Deemed Dividend: The argument that as the shares are issued in the name of the Karta, the HUF is not the “registered shareholder” and so s. 2(22)(e) will not apply to loans paid to the HUF is not correct because in the annual returns filed with the ROC, the HUF is shown as the registered and beneficial shareholder. In any case, the HUF is the beneficial shareholder. Even if it is assumed that the Karta is the registered shareholder and not the HUF, as per Explanation 3 to s. 2(22), any payment to a concern (i.e. the HUF) in which the shareholder (i.e. the Karta) has a substantial interest is also covered

Section 2(22)(e) of the Act creates a fiction, thereby bringing any amount paid otherwise than as a dividend into the net of dividend under certain circumstances. It gives an artificial definition of ‘dividend’. It does not take into account that dividend which is actually declared or received. The dividend taken note of by this provision is a deemed dividend and not a real dividend. Loan or payment made by the company to its shareholder is actually not a dividend. In fact, such a loan to a shareholder has to be returned by the shareholder to the company. It does not become income of the shareholder. Notwithstanding the same, for certain purposes, the Legislature has deemed such a loan or payment as ‘dividend’ and made it taxable at the hands of the said shareholder. It is, therefore, not in dispute that such a provision which is a deemed provision and fictionally creates certain kinds of receipts as dividends, is to be given strict interpretation. It follows that unless all the conditions contained in the said provision are fulfilled, the receipt cannot be deemed as dividends. Further, in case of doubt or where two views are possible, benefit shall accrue in favour of the assessee

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DATE: December 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 5, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 10(23C)(vi)/ (via)/ 80G: The law laid down in Visvesvaraya Technological University vs. ACIT 384 ITR 37 (SC) is that the generation of surplus is not fatal to the grant of exemption u/s 10(23C)(vi)(via)/ 80G if such surplus is utilized for charitable purposes. The fact that the hospital charges of the assessee, as compared to other commercial establishments, are very nominal, throws further light on its charitable character

In view of the findings of the Apex Court in paragraphs 8 and 9 of its judgment in Visvesvaraya’s case (supra), as reproduced earlier, we unhesitantly conclude that even if substantial surplus is generated, but the same is found to have been ploughed back for building infrastructure/assets, which in turn are used for educational/charitable purposes, the institution would not lose its charitable character. In the case before us, it has not been disputed that the assessee is registered under Section 12A and that it has been held entitled to the grant of exemption under Section 10 (23C)(vi) of the Act as per orders of this Court passed in C.W.P. No. 6031 of 2009, upheld by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 9606 of 2013. It has further come on record that the assessee was granted exemption under Section 80G of the Act from the year 1997 till the passing of the impugned order. Further, the finding of the Tribunal, that the assessee has never mis-utilized its funds, has not been assailed before us. The generated surplus having been ploughed back for expansion purposes also remains undisputed by the Revenue as no challenge to the same has been made. In fact, the utilization of surplus for large scale expansion at the behest of the assessee was also acknowledged by the Commissioner. The Tribunal had further detailed in its order the receipts, expenditure, capital expenditure, income/surplus of receipts over expenditure, income applied for the charitable purposes and percentage of the income applied in a tabulated form, which clearly depicted utilization of surplus by the assessee for only charitable purposes

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