Month: April 2019

Archive for April, 2019


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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 142(2C) Special Audit/ Interpretation of statutes: The AO who has fixed the time in the first instance must necessarily, as an incident of the authority to fix time, be entitled to suo moto extend time without an application by the assessee. The amendment by FA 2008 was intended to remove an ambiguity and is clarificatory in nature. There exists a presumption of retrospective application in regard to amendments which are of a procedural nature

The issue as to whether the amendment which has been brought about by the legislature is intended to be clarificatory or to remove an ambiguity in the law must depend upon the context. The Court would have due regard to (i) the general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what power that the legislature contemplated

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DATE: April 2, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 43D Interest on NPAs: Even though the special provision in s. 43D for taxing interest income on NPAs on receipt basis does not apply to NBFCs, it does not mean that NBFCs have to offer interest on bad or doubtful debts to tax on accrual basis. Such interest is not taxable on the real income theory

Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that the assessee had to offer the interest income to tax on accrual basis. The special provision for taxing interest income on NPAs on the basis of receipt has been made under Section 43D of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act” for short) which does not apply to NBFC. By necessary implication, therefore, the legislature desired that such benefit would be restricted only to such of the entities as are referred to in Section 43D of the Act

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DATE: February 8, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 14A/ Rule 8D: In the absence of any exempt income, disallowance u/s 14A & Rule 8D of the Act of any amount is not permissible (Essar Teleholdings 401 ITR 445 (SC) followed, Cheminvest 378 ITR 33 (Del) approved)

In view of the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax 5, Mumbai vs. Essar Teleholdings Ltd. through its Manager [401 ITR 445 (SC)] (2018) 3 SCC 253, we see no reason to entertain this special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India

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DATE: March 1, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
Articles 136, 141: Entire law on legal effect of dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) by a speaking/ non-speaking order explained. If the dismissal is by a speaking order & reasons are given, the same is a declaration of law which is binding under Article 141. The findings are also binding by way of judicial discipline. However, this does not mean that the order of the lower court has merged in the dismissal order of the Supreme Court

If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
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CITATION:
S. 220(6)/ 281B Tax Recovery: Dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue. They should apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as binding decisions. The petitioner is being singled out for unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000 to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment

We have to express our dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue in this matter. We pride ourselves as a State which believes in rule of law. Therefore, the least that is expected of the Officers of the State is to apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect the revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as the binding decisions of this Court. The action of respondent nos.1 and 2 as adverted to in para 14 herein above clearly indicates that a separate set of rules was being applied by them in the case of the petitioner. Equal protection of law which means equal application of law has been scarified in this case by the Revenue. It appears that the S.R.JOSHI 21 of 22 WP-543-2018 petitioner is being singled out for this unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. In the above view, we direct the Respondent-Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only) to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment, it had to undergo at the hands of the Revenue

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DATE: March 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 194H TDS: Payment gateway charges paid to a bank for swiping credit cards are in the nature of fees for banking services and not "commission" or "brokerage". Accordingly, no TDS is deductible from the said charges u/s 194H and no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) can be made (JDS Apparels 370 ITR 454 (Del) followed)

The bank in question is not concerned with buying or selling of goods or even with the reason and cause as to why the card was swiped. It is not bothered or concerned with the quality, price, nature, quantum etc. of the goods bought/sold. The bank merely provides banking services in the form of payment and subsequently collects the payment. The amount punched in the swiping machine is credited to the account of the retailer by the acquiring bank, i.e. HDFC in this case, after retaining a small portion of the same as their charges. The banking services cannot be covered and treated as services rendered by an agent for the principal during the course of buying or selling of goods as the banker does not render any service in the nature of agency.

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DATE: April 3, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 254(2)/ 271(1)(c): Though the High Court faulted the Tribunal's decision of reducing the penalty as a "way to bypass the minimum limit" and the Tribunal was in error in granting the relief, the same does not constitute a "mistake apparent from the record" so as to enable the Tribunal to revisit its decision

The observations of Hon’ble High Court, disapproving the conclusions, are based on the proposition that the conclusion of the Tribunal was a way to bypass the minimum limit. That is, with respect, a wholly a highly subjective observation and all a matter of perception. The other way of looking at the conclusions of the Tribunal could possibly be, and that’s how we looked at it, that the explanation of the assessee was partly accepted and, as regards the element of income on which explanation was not accepted, the penalty was still one hundred percent of tax sought to be evaded. It was stated to be accepted past history of the case, as pleaded before the Tribunal, that all the cash deposits were not of income nature but in the nature of business receipts and that only income embedded therein could be brought to tax. Wrongly though, as we have learnt the hard way, we were in error in following the same path for the purpose of evaluating explanation extended before the Tribunal during the hearing, but then this was not altogether devoid of any basis or rationale. The rationale or basis of our approach has turned out to be incorrect but it clearly did exist. In any event, it was not something which was incapable of two opinions

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 3, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 45(4): If new partners come into the partnership and bring cash by way of capital contribution and the retiring partners take cash and retire, the retiring partners are not relinquishing their interest in the immovable property. What they relinquish is their share in the partnership. As there is no transfer of a capital asset, no capital gains or profit can arise & s. 45(4) has no application (A. N. Naik 265 ITR 346 (Bom) distinguished, Dynamic Enterprises 359 ITR 83 (Karn) [FB] followed)

The property belongs to the partnership firm. It did not belong to the partners. The partners only had a share in the partnership asset. When the five partners came into the partnership and brought cash by way of capital contribution to the extent of their contribution, they were entitled to the proportionate share in the interest in the partnership firm. When the retiring partners took cash and retired, they were not relinquishing their interest in the immovable property. What they relinquished is their share in the partnership. Therefore, there is no transfer of a capital asset, as such, no capital gains or profit arises in the facts of this case. In that view of the matter, Section 45(4) has no application to the facts of this case

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DATE: March 8, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 3, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 10(38) Bogus Capital Gains from Penny Stocks: It is intriguing is that the company had meagre resources and reported consistent losses. The astronomical growth of the value of company’s shares naturally excited the suspicions of the Revenue. The company was even directed to be delisted from the stock exchange. The assessee’s argument that he was denied the right to cross-examine the individuals whose statements led to the inquiry and ultimate disallowance of the long term capital gain claim is not relevant in the wake of findings of fact

There was a specific information that assessee has indulged in non-genuine and bogus capital gain obtained from the transactions of purchase and sale of shares of M/s Kappac Pharma Ltd., a Mumbai based company. It is noticed that the purchase transaction has been done off market in physical form by paying cash. The assessee has purchased the share M/s Kappac Pharma Ltd. in physical form and thereafter, the same have been converted into electronic mode. The purchase payments were made in cash and not through the normal banking channel therefore the same were non verifiable from the authentic supporting details such as bank account/ documents. Assessee is not a regular investor in shares. The assessee has failed to furnish the proof of source for the purchase transactions. Thus, the entire transactions are against human probability

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DATE: April 3, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 3, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07, 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 45(4): The revaluation of asset being land held by the partnership firm which results into enhancement of value of asset and this enhanced amount credited in capital account of partners and when a retiring partner takes amount in his capital account including enhanced value of asset, it does not give rise to Capital Gain under section 45(4) r.w. Section 2(14) of the Income-tax Act

The partnership firm continued to exist even after the retirement of Smt. Hemlata Shetty and Shri Sudhakar Shetty from the partnership. There was only a reconstitution of partnership firm on their retirement without there being any dissolution and the land properly acquired by the partnership firm continued to be owned by the said firm even after reconstitution without any extinguishment of rights in favour of the retiring partners. The retiring partners did not acquire any right in the said property and what they got on retirement was only the money equivalent to their share of revaluation surplus (enhanced portion of the asset revalued) which was credited to their capital accounts. There was thus no transfer of capital asset by way of distribution of capital asset either on dissolution or otherwise within the meaning of section 45(4) read with section 2(14) of the Act.