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DATE: March 2, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 2, 2021 (Date of publication)
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Taxability of sums received for supply of software as "royalty": Given the definition of royalties contained in Article 12 of the DTAAs, the amounts paid by resident Indian end-users/ distributors to non-resident computer software manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through EULAs/distribution agreements is not the payment of royalty for the use of copyright in the computer software and that the same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a result of which the persons referred to in section 195 of the Income Tax Act were not liable to deduct any TDS under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. The provisions contained in the Income Tax Act (section 9(1)(vi), along with explanations 2 and 4 thereof), which deal with royalty, not being more beneficial to the assessees, have no application in the facts of these cases

Given the definition of royalties contained in Article 12 of the DTAAs mentioned in paragraph 41 of this judgment, it is clear that there is no obligation on the persons mentioned in section 195 of the Income Tax Act to deduct tax at source, as the distribution agreements/EULAs in the facts of these cases do not create any interest or right in such distributors/end-users, which would amount to the use of or right to use any copyright. The provisions contained in the Income Tax Act (section 9(1)(vi), along with explanations 2 and 4 thereof), which deal with royalty, not being more beneficial to the assessees, have no application in the facts of these cases. Our answer to the question posed before us, is that the amounts paid by resident Indian end-users/distributors to non-resident computer software manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through EULAs/distribution agreements, is not the payment of royalty for the use of copyright in the computer software, and that the same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a result of which the persons referred to in section 195 of the Income Tax Act were not liable to deduct any TDS under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. The answer to this question will apply to all four categories of cases enumerated by us in paragraph 4 of this judgment

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DATE: September 15, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
Interpretation of statutes & DTAAs: The substitution of a provision results in repeal of earlier provision and its replacement by new provision. When a new rule in place of an old rule is substituted, the old one is never intended to keep alive and the substitution has the effect of deleting the old rule and making the new rule operative. Though Notification dated 18.07.2005 (which substitutes paragraph 12 of Article 12 of the DTAA to provide for levy of tax on the royalties or fees for technical services at a rate not exceeding 10%) issued u/s 90 came into force with effect from 01.08.2005, it applies to the entire fiscal year

Before proceeding further, we may advert to well settled rules of Interpretation with regard to taxing statutes. The substitution of a provision results in repeal of earlier provision and its replacement by new provision. [See: U.P.SUGAR MILLS ASSN. VS. STATE OF U.P.’, (2002) 2 SCC 645]. The aforesaid principle of law was reiterated by the Supreme Court in WEST UP SUGAR MILS ASSOCIATION V. STATE OF UP (2012) 2 SCC 773 and by this Court in GOVARDHAN M V. STATE OF KARNATAKA (2013) 1 KarLJ 497. When a new rule in place of an old rule is substituted, the old one is never intended to keep alive and the substitution has the effect of deleting the old rule and making the new rule operative.

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DATE: March 13, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 25, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 44DA prevails over s. 44BB after the amendment w.e.f. 01.04.2011. Income from provision of services through high end customized software does not constitute "Fees For Technical Services" u/s 9(1)(vii) as the definition excludes income from "mining or like project". The Q whether income from composite software and maintenance services constitutes "royalty" for purposes of s. 44DA would have to be decided from the nature of services. The assessee is eligible to take benefit of the definition of 'royalty' as per the DTAA for the purpose of applicability of s. 44DA

If the nature of services rendered have a proximate nexus with the extraction of production of mineral oils, it would be outside the ambit of the definition of FTS. In the instant case, since the nature of services rendered by the Petitioner gets excluded from the definition of “FTS”, in light of what is discussed above, the next logical question that arises for consideration is whether the Petitioner can claim the benefit of Section 44BB. The answer to this question is contingent on factual determination, as the legal position has changed from April 01, 2011. It is now required to be considered whether the receipts in the hands of the assessee qualify to be “royalty” or not? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then in that event, the relevant provision would now be 44DA(1).

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DATE: November 15, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 30, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2018-19
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CITATION:
Static vs. Ambulatory interpretation of DTAAs: Entire law on whether the retrospective amendments to the definition of "royalty" in s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act can have bearing on the interpretation of the same term in the DTAAs explained with reference to the doctrine of "treaty override" and the Vienna Convention (Siemens AG 310 ITR 320 (Bom) explained)

That is a classic case of a subtle unilateral treaty override. While, in India, the expression ‘treaty override’ is often loosely used for the situations where the provisions of tax treaty prevails over any inconsistent provisions of domestic law, this approach seems to be at variance with the international practices wherein connotations of ‘treaty override’ refer to a situation in which domestic legislation of a treaty partner jurisdiction overrules the provisions of a single treaty or all treaties hitherto having had effect in that jurisdiction. That will be the end result of a domestic law amendment of an undefined treaty term, in departure from the current position, and import such amended meaning of that term, under article 3(2), in the treaty situations as well. Such an approach, on the first principles, is unsound inasmuch as it is well settled in law that the treaty partners ought to observe their treaties, including their tax treaties, in good faith. Article 26 of Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties provides that, “Pacta sunt servanda: Every treaty in force is binding on the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”. What it implies is that whatever be the provisions of the treaties, these provisions are to be given effect in good faith. Therefore, no matter how desirable or expedient it may be from the perspective of the tax administration, when a tax jurisdiction is allowed to amend the settled position with respect to a treaty provision, by an amendment in the domestic law and admittedly to nullify the judicial rulings, it cannot be treated as performance of treaties in good faith. That is, in effect, a unilateral treaty over-ride which is contrary to the scheme of Article 26 of Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties

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DATE: April 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 27, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 92C/ Rule 10B: If the TPO is not satisfied with the assessee's method of benchmarking royalty payments, he should independently benchmark the ALP by adopting any one of the prescribed methods. He cannot determine The ALP at nil on an ad-hoc basis. TNMM is the most appropriate method for determining the ALP of royalty and not the CUP method. If an authority like the RBI or Commerce Ministry has approved the rate of royalty, it carries persuasive value that the rate is at ALP

The Transfer Pricing Officer has not proceeded to benchmark the payment of royalty by applying any of the prescribed methods provided under the statute. Without assigning any reason, the Transfer Pricing Officer has determined the arm’s length price of the royalty payment at nil. Prima-facie, it appears, the determination of arm’s length price of royalty payment at nil by the Transfer Pricing Officer is completely on ad-hoc basis without following the due process of law as provided under the statute

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DATE: February 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 8, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi) 'Royalty': The insertions of Explanations 5 & 6 to s. 9(1)(vi) by the Finance Act 2015 w.r.e.f. 01.04.1976, even if declaratory and clarificatory of the law, will not apply to the DTAAs. The DTAAs are a bilateral agreement between two Countries and cannot be overridden by a unilateral legislative amendment by one Country (New Skies Satellite BV 382 ITR 114 (Del) & Siemens AG 310 ITR 320 (Bom) followed)

India’s change in position to the OECD Commentary cannot be a fact that influences the interpretation of the words defining royalty as they stand today. The only manner in which such change in position can be relevant is if such change is incorporated into the agreement itself and not otherwise. A change in executive position cannot bring about a unilateral legislative amendment into treaty concluded between two sovereign states. It is fallacious to assume that any change made to domestic law to rectify a situation of mistaken interpretation can spontaneously further their case in an international treaty.

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DATE: May 10, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 8, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi) Royalty: Payment for 'bandwith services' is not assessable as 'royalty' if the assessee only has access to services and not to any equipment. The assessee also did not have any access to any process which helped in providing of such bandwith services. All infrastructure & process required for provision of bandwith services was always used and under the control of the service provider and was never given either to the assessee or to any other person availing the said services

The assessee pursuant to the terms of the “agreement‟ had only received standard facilities i.e bandwith services from RJIPL. In fact, as observed by the CIT(A), the assessee only had an access to services and did not have any access to any equipment deployed by RJIPL for providing the bandwith services. Apart there from, the assessee also did not have any access to any process which helped in providing of such bandwith services by RJIPL. As a matter of fact, all infrastructure and process required for provision of bandwith services was always used and under the control of RJIPL, and the same was never given either to the assessee or to any other person availing the said services

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DATE: October 24, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 6, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi) Royalty/ 40(a)(i): Law explained on whether payment of web hosting charges to Amazon Web Services LLC (USA) (AWS) constitutes "royalty" under Explanation 2 to s. 9(1)(vi) read with the India USA DTAA and whether there is any obligation to deduct TDS thereon u/s 195

The aspect which needs to be seen is whether the assessee is paying consideration for getting any right in respect of any property. The assessee claims that it does not pay for such right but it only pays for the services. The claim of assessee before us was that it was only using services provided by Amazon and was not concerned with the rights in technology. The fees paid by assessee was for use of technology and cannot be said to be for use of royalty, which stands proved by the factum of charges being not fixed but variable i.e. it varies with the use of technology driven services and also use of such services does not give rise to any right in property of Amazon and consequently, Explanation under section 9(1)(vi) of the Act is not attracted

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DATE: April 3, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 4, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi) Royalty: Domain name is an intangible asset which is similar to trademark. Consequently, income from services rendered in connection with such domain name registration is assessable as "royalty" u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act

It is now settled law that with the advent of modern technology particularly that relating to cyberspace, domain names or Internet sites are entitled to protection as a trade mark because they are more than a mere address. The rendering of Internet services is also entitled to protection in the same way as goods and services are, and trade mark law applies to activities on Internet

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DATE: January 29, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 16, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 40(a)(i) TDS disallowance: A party cannot be called upon to perform an impossible Act i.e. to comply with a provision not in force at the relevant time but introduced later by retrospective amendment. S. 40(a)(i) disallowance can be made only if the royalty falls under Explanation 2 to s. 9(1)(vi) but not if it falls under Explanation 6 to s. 9(1)(vi)

The view taken by the Tribunal that a party cannot be called upon to perform an impossible Act i.e. to comply with a provision not in force at the relevant time but introduced later by retrospective amendment. This is in accord with the view taken by this Court in CIT v/s. Cello Plast (2012) 209 Taxmann 617 – wherein this Court has applied the legal maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia (law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform)

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