Search Results For: transfer


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DATE: November 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)(v): Immovable property can be regarded to have been transferred on the date of execution of the Development Agreement and irrevocable General Power of Attorney only if the terms indicate that complete control is given to the developer. If the entire consideration is not received by the assessee and physical possession of the property is not parted with, there is no transfer u/s 2(47)(v)

What binds this Court is that the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia v/s. Commissioner of Income Tax (2003) 260 ITR 491 (Bom). The Division Bench held that the date of contract is relevant provided the terms of the contract indicate passing off or transferring of complete control over the property in favour of the developer. The Division Bench laid down the test for determining the date which should be taken into account for determining the relevant accounting year in which the liability accrues. Admittedly, on the date of execution of the development agreement, the entire consideration was not received by the respondent assessee. The physical possession of the property subject matter of development agreement was parted with by the respondent assessee on 1st March, 2008. It was held that on that day, complete control over the property was passed on to the developer

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DATE: October 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)/ 45: Entire law on whether a joint development agreement entered into by an owner of land with a developer constitutes a "transfer" u/s 2(47) and whether the same gives rise to capital gains chargeable to tax u/s 45 and 48 of the Income-tax Act explained in the context of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act and real income theory

If an agreement, like the JDA in the present case, is not registered, then it shall have no effect in law for the purposes of Section 53A. In short, there is no agreement in the eyes of law which can be enforced under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. This being the case, we are of the view that the High Court was right in stating that in order to qualify as a “transfer” of a capital asset under Section 2(47)(v) of the Act, there must be a “contract” which can be enforced in law under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. A reading of Section 17(1A) and Section 49 of the Registration Act shows that in the eyes of law, there is no contract which can be taken cognizance of, for the purpose specified in Section 53A. The ITAT was not correct in referring to the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” in Section 2(47)(v) in order to arrive at the opposite conclusion. This expression was used by the legislature ever since sub-section (v) was inserted by the Finance Act of 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1988. All that is meant by this expression is to refer to the ingredients of applicability of Section 53A to the contracts mentioned therein. It is only where the contract contains all the six features mentioned in Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi (supra), that the Section applies, and this is what is meant by the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A”. This expression cannot be stretched to refer to an amendment that was made years later in 2001, so as to then say that though registration of a contract is required by the Amendment Act of 2001, yet the aforesaid expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” would somehow refer only to the nature of contract mentioned in Section 53A, which would then in turn not require registration. As has been stated above, there is no contract in the eye of law in force under Section 53A after 2001 unless the said contract is registered. This being the case, and it being clear that the said JDA was never registered, since the JDA has no efficacy in the eye of law, obviously no “transfer” can be said to have taken place under the aforesaid document

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DATE: June 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1995-96
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CITATION:
Capital Gains: While a family arrangement/settlement does not amount to a "transfer" u/s 2(47) as it only recognizes "pre-existing rights" between the parties, the same applies only to members of the families and not to transfers made by corporate entities. The corporate veil can never be lifted at the instance of the company itself because that would amount to its denying its own corporate existence. The fact that the Company is wholly owned by the members of the family is irrelevant

There is no dispute before us that a family arrangement/settlement would not amount to a transfer. So far as the members of Mohota family are concerned, who are parties to the family settlement, any transfer inter se between them on account of family settlement would not result in a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the Capital gain tax under the Act. However, in the present case, we are not concerned with the members of Mohota family who were parties to the family settlement, but with transfer of share done by the Company incorporated under the Companies Act having separate/independent corporate existence, perpetual succession and common seal. This Company is independent and distinct from it’s members

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DATE: March 28, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 8, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Capital gains: An amount received from a wholly-owned subsidiary in consideration of transfer of shares of the WOS to a group of shareholders is not taxable as capital gains. The Department cannot subject a transaction under the Gift-tax Act and also levy tax under the Income-tax Act.

It is not in dispute that M/s Annamalaiar Textiles (P) Ltd. did not pay any amount to the shareholders who ultimately got the shares transferred in their names. The respondent was holding 100 per cent shares of M/s Annamalaiar Textiles (P) Ltd., before it was transferred to Group B. No payment was made to the shareholders belonging to Group B and, therefore, the question of there being any capital gains at the hands of the respondent herein does not arise

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DATE: December 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 23, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)/ 54EC/54F: U/s 108 of the Companies Act read with CBDT Circular No. 704 dated 28.04.1995, a mere agreement for transfer of shares does not cause effective transfer of shares unless it is accompanied with delivery of share certificate and duly signed and stamped share transfer form. An agreement to transfer share merely gives an enforceable right to the parties

The word transfer of shares is an act of the parties, i.e. transferor and transferee by which title to share is transferred from one person to another for a consideration or otherwise. Share transfer is governed by section 108 of the Companies Act, 1956. As per section 108 of the Companies Act, 1956 registration of transfer of shares is possible only if a proper transfer deed in form no. 7B duly stamped and signed by or on behalf of the transferor and by or on behalf of the transferee and specifying the name, address and occupation, if any of the transferee and has been delivered to the company along with share certificates and endorsed by the Company by changing such details in the share holder register maintained under the Companies Act. In the case of shares of listed companies, effective transfer would take place when title to share is transferred from one person to another through demat account in recognized stock exchange. In the case of shares of unlisted companies, transfer would take place, only when valid share transfer form in form no. 7B is delivered to the company and endorsed by the Company. Therefore, for effective transfer of shares a mere agreement for transfer of shares is not sufficient, unless it is physically transfer shares by delivery of share certificate along with duly signed and stamped share transfer form

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DATE: September 28, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)(v): Entire law on whether entering into a "joint development agreement" with the builder and handing over possession/ power of attorney amounts to a "transfer" and gives rise to capital gains explained. Chaturbuj Dwarkadas Kapadia 260 ITR 491(Bom) explained/ distinguished

It is generally seen that there may be several stages or events arising in a joint development arrangement made between owner of the land and the developer. For the purpose of determining the actual date of transfer of the land by the land owner, all these stages / events needs to be collectively analsysed and after evaluating overall effect of the same we can determine the actual date of transfer. These stages / events may be described as date of entering into JDA, date of executing power of attorney authorising the developer for taking various approvals / permissions etc., handing over the possession of the land to the developer for various purposes, receipt of part / full sale consideration from the developer, date of execution of power of attorney in favour of developer authorising him for the sale of developed units to the customers at his absolute discretion; and transfer of developed units to the customers etc. There may be few more stages / events to complete the transaction. Though, one single event may trigger the process of transfer but may not necessarily complete it also. Whether the transfer has, in substance, taken place, can be determined by analysing the inter-play and effect of all these stages / events combined and put together. For example, possession may be given for various purposes, viz. possession given to a contractor, or to a tenant also, but such an event in itself cannot be regarded as “transfer” of land. Possession of land may also be handed over as licensee only for the purpose of development of real estate on land. Here again, it shall not give rise to “transfer”. Thus, when the possession is given along with other legal rights to the developer resulting into entitlement of the developer for full use and enjoyment of the property as well as its further sale after converting it into developed units at its full, own and sole discretion, then it may result into ‘transfer’ provided other conditions also suggest so. Thus, handing over of the possession has to be necessarily coupled with the intention of transferring the rights of ownership and enjoyment of the property to the developer. Handing over of the possession for the limited purpose of developing the land while still retaining the ownership and control of various legal rights upon the property by the land owner would not fall in clause (v) of section 2(47)

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DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 54F: The demolition of a structure does not amount to a "transfer". It is not correct to contend that Vania Silk Mills 191 ITR 647 (SC) is overruled by Grace Collis 248 ITR 323 (SC). Lower authorities cannot refuse to apply binding High Court judgements on the basis that the High Court has not considered a Supreme Court judgement

The demolition of the structure would not constitute a transfer of the assets in terms of Section 54(3) of the Act in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Vania Silk Mills P. Ltd. v. CIT, reported in 191 ITR 647. In the above case, the Apex Court has held that when an asset is destroyed, there is no question of transfer taking place under the Act. The Apex court held that in terms of the Act that the words ‘Extinguishment of any right’ in Section 2(47) of the Act, does not include an extinguishment of right on account of destruction. It has to be an extinguishment of right on account of transfer. Thus, a destruction of assets when not on account of any transfer would not be hit by Section 54F(3) of the Act. Counsel for the revenue seeks to distinguish the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Vania Silk Mills P. Ltd. (Supra) that the destruction in that case took place because of fire and hence it was involuntary. This distinction is of no consequence. In our view of the decision of the Apex Court in Vania Silk Mills (Supra) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case

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DATE: February 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
Entire law on difference between premium (salami) paid to acquire a lease and rent paid to use a lease explained in the context of whether a lease results in a transfer u.s 2(47)

By its nature the salami being a non-recurring payment -made by a tenant to the landlord at the inception of the grant of the lease has a/ways been regarded as a receipt of a capital nature in the hands of the landlord. The finding that had been recorded by the Tribunal was that this payment was made to the assessee by the tenants for getting them accepted as tenants. In other words, it was by way of a premium or salami that these payments were received by the assessee as a consideration for granting monthly tenancies to the tenants. Obviously, it was a non-recurring payment made by the tenants to the assessee for the purpose of getting the monthly tenancy. Every payment by way of a salami or a premium need not necessarily be held to be of a capital nature or on capital account, but since prima facie that is the nature of such payment it is for the department to establish facts which would go to show that such payment was in the – nature of income and not on capital account

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DATE: September 24, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1994-95
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CITATION:
Entire law on whether leasehold rights constitute a "capital asset" u/s 2(14), whether there is a "transfer" u/s 2(47) of such rights and whether "capital gains" u/s 45 can arise explained in detail

The Court is unable to agree with the above approach of the ITAT to interpreting what appear to be plain and unambiguous provisions of the Act. It is useful to recall that this entire discussion is in the backdrop of what constitutes “transfer” in relation to a capital asset. Further, the entire exercise is for ultimately determining if there has been any capital gains arising from the transaction. Under Section 45(1) ‘capital gains’ are any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year. When the word “transfer” itself has been defined under Section 2(47) (vi) and by virtue of Explanation 1 “shall” have the same meaning as Section 269UA(d) then it is not possible to ‘restrict’ Explanation 1 to only those transactions described in Chapter XXC. Explanation 1 is a deeming fiction and incorporates by way of reference the provisions of Section 269 UA (d) in order to understand the meaning of the word ‘transfer’ for the purposes of Section 2 (47) (vi). Therefore, that entire scheme has to be given effect to. In other words, it is not possible to omit the reference to Section 269UA(d) (i) which in turn brings in Section 269UA(f) (i). The ITAT has therefore erred in conveniently choosing to not apply the Explanation 1 to Section 2 (47) in order to arrive at the conclusion there was indeed a ‘transfer’ of a capital asset brought about by the lease agreement in question

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DATE: July 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 28, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)(v)/(vi): Entire law on whether the entering into a joint development agreement with an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the developer results in a "transfer" for purposes of capital gains explained

The concept of possession to be defined is an enormous task to be precisely elaborated. “Possession” is a word of open texture. It is an abstract notion. It implies a right to enjoy which is attached to the right to property. It is not purely a legal concept but is a matter of fact. The issue of ownership depends on rule of law whereas possession is a question dependent upon fact without reference to law. To put it differently, ownership is strictly a legal concept and possession is both a legal and a non-legal or pre-legal concept. The test for determining whether any person is in possession of anything is to see whether it is under his general control. He should be actually holding, using and enjoying it, without interference on the part of others. It would have to be ascertained in each case independently whether a transferee has been delivered possession in furtherance of the contract in order to fall under Section 53A of the 1882 Act and thus amenable to tax by virtue of Section 2(47)(v) read with Section 45 of the Act