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DATE: November 7, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 16, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay of 1754 days: If the stand of the Applicant in the Affidavit that he had no knowledge about the passing of the order is not expressly refuted by the Respondent, the question of disbelieving the stand of the Applicant cannot arise. For this reason, indulgence should be shown to the Applicant by condoning the delay

Unless that fact was to be refuted, the question of disbelieving the stand taken by the appellant(s) on affidavit, cannot arise and for which reason, the High Court should have shown indulgence to the appellant(s) by condoning the delay in filing the concerned appeal(s). This aspect has been glossed over by the High Court

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DATE: October 22, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 16, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay of 571 days: Mistake of counsel may be taken into account in condoning delay. Claim that the delay was caused by Counsel not communicating the order has to be accepted unless it is shown that blame put on counsel is with malafide intentions in order to cover up mistake/lapse on the part of the assessee. As per human conduct and probabilities, a professional counsel cannot be expected to admit his lapses as it may affect his reputation. Also, if the appeal is adjudicated on merits, refusing to condone the delay is an error (All imp judgements referred)

When an assessee authorizes a counsel to appear on his behalf, such authorization is given by placing faith on the legal expertise of the Counsel and also with the hope that the counsel shall take care of the interest of the assessee. Hence, when there is a lapse on the part of the legal counsel, in my view, the assessee should not be found fault with, unless it is shown that the blame put on the counsel with malafide intentions in order to cover up the mistake/lapse on the part of the assessee.

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DATE: October 31, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13 to 2017-18
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CITATION:
S. 68/ 69C: Bogus share capital + Bogus purchases: Photocopies of blank share transfer forms, blank signed receipts etc necessary for transfer of shares found with assessee are not admissible as evidence u/s 61 of Evidence Act and not incriminating in nature. On merits, all investors are assessed & have filed confirmations with trail of funds. AO did not make further inquiry into the documentary evidences or verify the trail of source of funds. As regards bogus purchases, the AO cannot blow hot & cold by disallowing the purchases from a party as bogus while treating sales to same party as genuine

Assessee produced sufficient documentary evidences before the A.O. to prove that money routed from the assessee itself which came back to the assessee in the form of share capital/premium, therefore, assessee proved identity of the Investors, their creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction in the matter and as such have been able to prove ingredients of Section 68 of the I.T. Act. The A.O. however did not make any further enquiry on the documentary evidences filed by the assessee. The A.O. did not verify the trail of the source of funds received by assessee through various entities as explained above. The A.O. thus, failed to conduct scrutiny of the documents at assessment stage and merely suspected the transaction between the Investor Companies and the assessee company despite the fact that in the deviation report the A.O. expressed doubts in making addition into the matter. It may also be noted here that no cash have been reported to have been deposited in the accounts of the assessee, the Investor Companies and other related parties

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DATE: October 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
S. 56(2)(viia) cannot apply to a foreign company as Rule 11U(b)(ii) (prior to 01.04.2019) which defines "balance sheet‟ was not applicable to a foreign company. If the computation provisions cannot apply, the charging section cannot apply. The amendment to Rule 11U with effect from 1.4.19 is prospective in nature (B. C. Srinivasa Shetty 128 ITR 294 (SC), Palai Central Bank Ltd (1985) 1 SCC 45 followed)

We hold that since the shares of a foreign company were acquired by the assessee company in the instant case, the ld AO ought to have relied on the balance sheet as audited by the auditor appointed under the Indian Companies Act. In the instant case, the ld AO had relied on the balance sheet of KNP Industries Pte Ltd, Singapore, which is prepared in accordance with Singapore Companies Act, which fact is not in dispute before us. Admittedly, the case of the assessee falls squarely on clause (ii) of the definition of “Balance Sheet‟ as defined in Rule 11U of the Rules supra. Hence it is mandatory to draw a balance sheet as on the valuation date i.e. 10.2.2015 /11.2.2015 (being the date of purchase of shares by the assessee company) and that the said balance sheet should have been audited by an auditor appointed under section 224 of the Companies Act, 1956. Hence it could be safely concluded that the ld AO had applied the valuation method on a different date which is not in accordance with law and that since the computation mechanism provided in Rule 11UA of the Rules is not applicable to the facts of the instant case, the provisions of section 56(2)(viia) of the Act also could not be invoked

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DATE: October 3, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Doctrine of mutuality: A club registered as a 'company' u/s 25 of Companies Act is not like other companies as it has no shareholders, no dividends declared, and no distribution of profits takes place. Such clubs cannot be treated as separate in law from their members. The ratio decidendi in Bacha F. Guzdar 27 ITR 1 does not apply to such clubs. When a club supplies goods to its members, there is no "sale" and sales-tax cannot be levied (Bangalore Club 350 ITR 509 (SC), Venkatesh Premises Coop Soc 402 ITR 670 (SC) & other imp judgements referred)

if persons carry on a certain activity in such a way that there is a commonality between contributors of funds and participators in the activity, a complete identity between the two is then established. This identity is not snapped because the surplus that arises from the common fund is not distributed among the members – it is enough that there is a 44 right of disposal over the surplus, and in exercise of that right they may agree that on winding up, the surplus will be transferred to a club or association with similar activities. Most importantly, the surplus that is made does not come back to the members of the club as shareholders of a company in the form of dividends upon their shares. Since the members perform the activities of the club for themselves, the fact that they incorporate a legal entity to do it for them makes no difference.

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DATE: October 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Recall of ex-parte order: A 'power of attorney holder' is an 'agent' and 'Principal Officer' u/s 2(35). If a CA is granted a POA, service upon him of a notice is valid. If a notice is duly served upon the litigant through its authorized representative, and it was provided sufficient opportunity to appear before the Court and contest the matter but the litigant choses to let the matter proceed exparte, the order cannot be recalled

In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nehata1 this Court held that : “A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the agent.”

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DATE: October 21, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 254(2A): In cases where there is stay of recovery of demand of tax, the Tribunal should deal with the appeals pending before it on a higher priority. The Tribunal should consider forming a separate list of such cases which should be heard on priority after arranging the cases on the basis of their seniority as well as the quantum involved in the stay

We are of the considered view that in cases where there is stay of recovery of demand of tax, the Tribunal should deal with the appeals pending before it on a higher priority. The Tribunal should consider forming a separate list of such cases which should be heard on priority after arranging the cases on the basis of their seniority as well as the quantum involved in the stay

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DATE: October 22, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Settlement Application: For purposes of making an application for settlement, a case i.e. an assessment would be pending till such time as the assessment order is served upon the assessee. The assessee is entitled to proceed on the basis that till the service of the assessment order, the case continues to be pending with the AO. Therefore, it was open to him to invoke the provisions of Chapter XIXA of the Act (CIT Vs. ITSC 58 TM 264 & Yashovardhan Birla 73 TM 5 followed, V.R.A. Cotton Mills 33 TM 675 & Shlibhadra Developers 2016 (10) TMI 778 distinguished)

For purposes of making an application for settlement, a case i.e. An assessment would be pending till such time as the assessment order is served upon the assessee. The declaration of law by this Court is binding on all authorities within the State including the Commission. The petitioner was entitled to proceed on the basis that till the service of the assessment order, the case continues to be pending with the Assessing Officer. Therefore, it was open to him to invoke the provisions of Chapter XIXA of the Act on 30th March, 2016 as till that date the assessment order was not served upon him

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DATE: August 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 26, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04, 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 2(7A)/ 120(4): Though, by virtue of the retrospective amendment to s. 2(7A), the Addl CIT is an "Assessing Officer", he can act as such only if there is a notification issued by the CBDT u/s 120(4)(b) or if there is an order u/s 127 transferring jurisdiction from the DCIT to the Addl CIT. In the absence of either, the assessment order is without jurisdiction and has to be quashed as null and void. The fact that the assessee co-operated is irrelevant because there is no estoppel. The argument of the Dept that as the order is passed by a higher officer, there is no prejudice to the assessee is not acceptable. The matter also cannot be remanded back (All imp judgements referred)

In view of the legal discussion made above and facts of the case, it is clear that impugned assessment order has been passed without authority of law in as much as Revenue has not been able to demonstrate that the Additional Commissioner of Income tax who had passed the assessment order had valid authority to perform and exercise the powers and functions of an Assessing Officer of the assessee and to pass the impugned assessment order. Under these circumstances, we have no other option but to hold the same as nullity and, therefore, the impugned assessment order is quashed having been passed with out authority of law

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DATE: October 14, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 26, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14, 2011-12, 2011-12, 2012-13, 2010-11
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CITATION:
Recovery of Tax u/s 220(6)/ 245: (i) The term “recovery” is comprehensive and includes adjustment thereby reducing the demand; (ii) It will be specious & illogical for the Revenue to contend that if an issue is decided in favour of the assessee giving rise to a refund in an earlier year, that refund can be adjusted u/s 245, on account of the demand on the same issue in a subsequent year (iii) The decisions of CIT(A) & Tribunal in favour of the assessee should not be ignored, (iv) Income-tax officials are officers of the State and the Law requires that they perform their duties with utmost objectivity and fairness, while keeping in mind the sanctity of the role and function assigned to them which at times requires tough steps (Maruti Suzuki Ltd 347 ITR 47 (Del) followed)

It is wrong to say that an adjustment of refund u/s 245 is not a “recovery” only on the ground that s. 245 is placed in the Chapter of “Refunds”. The term “recovery” is comprehensive and includes adjustment thereby reducing the demand. In Circular No. 1914 dated 2.12.1993, even the CBDT did not regard ‘recovery’ as excluding ‘adjustment’ u/s 245. However, different parameters may apply in considering a request for stay against coercive measures to recover the demand and a stay against refund adjustment. It is permissible for the authority to direct stay of recovery by coercive methods but not grant stay of adjustment of refund

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