Category: High Court

Archive for the ‘High Court’ Category


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DATE: August 11, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 22, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1990-91
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S. 37(1): Law on when expenditure towards property can be termed as being for protection of the property or for curing a defect and whether that is capital or revenue explained

This payment made by the Appellant in its nature is different from a payment made to protect the property. In fact, Supreme Court in the case of Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v/s. CIT 27 ITR 34 while laying down the criteria to decide/ determine whether the payment is of capital or revenue nature has observed that the aim and object of the expenditure would determine the character of the payment. In the present facts, as pointed out above, the entire aim and object of the payment was not only that the certainty of acquisition is aborted but enduring benefit as pointed out above is obtained by the Appellant. This would conclusively determine that the payment in this case was capital in nature in the capital field

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DATE: January 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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Interest on NPAs and Stick Loans, even if accrued as per the mercantile system of accounting, is not taxable as per prudential norms

The assessee herein being a Cooperative Bank also governed by the Reserve Bank of India and thus the directions with regard to the prudential norms issued by the Reserve Bank of India are equally applicable to the Cooperative banks. The provisions of Section 45Q of Reserve Bank of India Act has an overriding effect vis-à-vis income recognition principle under the Companies Act. Hence, Section 45Q of the RBI Act shall have overriding effect over the income recognition principle followed by cooperative banks. Hence, the Assessing Officer has to follow the Reserve Bank of India directions 1998. In UCO Bank the Supreme Court considered the nature of CBDT circular and held that the Board has power, inter alia, to tone down the rigour of the law and ensure a fair enforcement of its provisions, by issuing circular in exercise of its statutory powers under section 119 of act which are binding on the authorities in the administration of the Act, it is a beneficial power given to the Board for proper administration of fiscal law so that undue hardship may not be caused to the assessee and the fiscal laws may be correctly applied

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DATE: August 11, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 40(b)(v): Provision in partnership deed for payment of salary at percentage share of profits multiplied by “allocable profits” is valid and entitles claim for deduction. S. 37(1): Contribution by law firm to IFA to create awareness of its activities is business expenditure

A plain reading of Clause 6(a) leads us to a conclusion that the term ‘allocable profits’ was used to mean ‘book profits’ as used in Section 40(b)(v) of the Act or otherwise the reference to the section in the Clause has no meaning. When the partners have understood and meant that the word “allocable profits” to mean surplus/book profits, prior to calculation of partners’ remuneration, and when such an understanding is manifest in its actions, we do not see any reason why the Revenue authorities should not understand this term in the same sense

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DATE: July 3, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06 to 2007-08
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S. 40(a)(ia): (a) The second provisio inserted by FA 2012 cannot be treated as retrospective in operation (b) The fact that the payees have already paid tax on the amounts paid does not mean that a disalliowance for failure to deduct TDS cannot be made, (c) S. 40(a)(ia) cannot be interpreted to mean that it applies only to amounts "paid" and not to those "payable"

The fact the second proviso was introduced with effect from 01.04.2013 is expressly made clear by the provisions of the Finance Act 2012 itself. A statutory provision, unless otherwise expressly stated to be retrospective or by intendment shown to be retrospective, is always prospective in operation. Finance Act 2012 shows that the second proviso to Section 40 (a)(ia) has been introduced with effect from 01.04.2013. Reading of the second proviso does not show that it was meant or intended to be curative or remedial in nature, and even the appellants did not have such a case. Instead, by this proviso, an additional benefit was conferred on the assessees. Such a provision can only be prospective

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DATE: August 13, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 253: Severe strictures passed regarding the conduct of the Vice President and President of the ITAT and the CBDT for seeking to constitute Special Bench for non-judicial reasons and on grounds of "political sensitivity"

This is the most distressing part. The president forwarded the letter of the Board to the Vice president for his comments. This was purely an internal movement of the file. It was not that the matter was judicially assigned to the Vice president and notified on his board. There was no indication for any litigant to know that the file was now before the Vice president. In spite of this position, the Special counsel who was to be engaged by the Revenue met the Vice president and explained him the need for a special bench. How the Special counsel knew that the file of the matter was before the Vice president, is a mystery. This was a private meeting and the Petitioner was not informed. The matter was seized before the regular bench and the revenue was a contesting party. The Petitioner was completely unaware that any such private meeting had taken place between the counsel and the Vice president. Permitting a party to the litigation to meet privately in absence of other side in respect of an ongoing litigation and then base an opinion on such meeting ,was most improper on the part of the Vice president. The Vice president did not even find it improper and he has proceeded to place the said private meeting on record as if nothing was wrong about the same. Not only holding such private meetings is opposed to judicial conduct, but not knowing that it is an improper judicial conduct, makes the matters worse

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DATE: August 5, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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S. 36(1)(vii)/ 36(2): The principal part of the Inter-corporate Debt (ICD) can be claimed as a bad debt if the interest thereon has been offered to tax in some year

The debt comprises not only the brokerage which was offered to tax but also principal value of shares which was not received. Therefore, even if a part of debt is offered to tax, Section 36(2)(i) of the Act, stands satisfied. The test under the first part of Section 36(2)(i) of the Act is that where the debt or a part thereof has been taken into account for computing the profits for earlier Assessment Year, it would satisfy a claim to deduction under Section 36(1)(vii) read with Section 36(2)(i) of the Act

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DATE: August 6, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 10, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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S. 92B(1): If assessee contends that it has not entered into an "international transaction" with an AE, the TPO has to counter that by furnishing relevant information. Failure to do so can be challenged by a Writ Petition

When the petitioner no.1 replied to the said notice by its letter dated 29th April, 2015, the concerned respondent authority ought to have given a reply by supplying such relevant materials with which it come to a conclusion that the petitioner no.1 was an “associated enterprise” of PricewaterhouseCoopers Services BV. The reason why furnishing of such relevant materials were singularly important is that if the petitioner no.1 was not an “associated enterprise” of PricewaterhouseCoopers Services BV, there cannot be any computation of income from “international transaction” having regard to arm’s length price as envisaged under section 92 of the Income Tax Act, 1961

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DATE: July 20, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 6, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06, 2006-07
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S. 40(a)(ia)/ 194C/ 194J: Deduction u/s 194C instead of u/s 194J renders the shortfall liable for disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia)

The expression “tax deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B” occurring in Section 40(a)(ia) has to be understood as tax deductible at source under the appropriate provision of Chapter XVII-B. Therefore, as in this case, if tax is deductible under Section 194J but is deducted under Section 194C, such a deduction would not satisfy the requirements of Section 40(a)(ia). The latter part of this Section that such tax has not been deducted, again refers to the tax deducted under the appropriate provision of Chapter XVII-B. Thus, a cumulative reading of this provision, therefore, shows that deduction under a wrong provision of law will not save an assessee from Section 40(a)(ia)

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DATE: July 16, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 30, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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Action of the ITAT in disregarding its own order without reason and remanding matter to AO for fresh consideration is "arbitrary" and "failure to perform basic judicial function" and a "lapse" which should not occur again.

The Tribunal should not completely disregard its earlier order without some reason. This is the minimum expected of any quasi judicial / judicial authority. If the Tribunal has failed to perform it’s basic judicial functions in such arbitrary manner, the approach of the Tribunal must be corrected, so as to ensure that such lapses do not occur again

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DATE: July 6, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 29, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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S. 271(1)(c): The rigors of penalty provisions cannot be diluted only because a small number of cases are picked up for scrutiny. No penalty can be levied unless if assessee's conduct is "dishonest, malafide and amounting concealment of facts". The AO must render the "conclusive finding" that there was "active concealment" or "deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars"

Conditions under Section 271(1)(c) must exist before the penalty can be imposed. Mr.Chhotaray tried to widen the scope of the appeal by submitting that the decision of the Apex Court should be interpreted in such a manner that there is no scope of misuse especially since minuscule number of cases are picked up for scrutiny. Because small number of cases are picked up for scrutiny does not mean that rigors of the provision are diluted. Whether a particular person has concealed income or has deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars, would depend on facts of each case