Search Results For: Balbir Singh


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DATE: April 24, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 24, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
Entire law on principles of mutuality reiterated. The doctrine of mutuality bestows a special status to qualify for exemption from tax liability. It is a settled proposition of law that exemptions are to be put to strict interpretation. If the assessee fails to fulfil the stipulations and to prove the existence of mutuality, the question of extending exemption from tax liability to the assessee, that too at the cost of public exchequer, does not arise. Taking any other view would entail in stretching the limits of construction.

On cogitating over the rival submissions, we reckon that the following questions of law would arise for our consideration in the present case: (i) Whether the assessee company would qualify as a mutual concern in the eyes of law, thereby exempting subject transactions from tax liability? (ii) Whether the excess of income over expenditure in the hands of the assessee company is not taxable?

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DATE: March 4, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 220(6) Recovery of demand: A Petitioner invoking the discretionary extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court is expected to approach with clean hands. Instead, there is gross suppression and misstatement, which led to a false projection of the outstanding liability due from the petitioner. Also, the Petitioner ought not to have sought adjournment before the CIT(A) on the ground that the earlier year is pending without seeking modification of the Court's order. Writ Petition dismissed with costs of Rs. 5 lakh. (Note: The Supreme Court has stayed recovery of the demand)

Considering the fact that the petitioner has invoked the discretionary extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court, the petitioner was expected to approach this Court with clean hands, which, unfortunately, we find is completely lacking in the present case. We are, therefore, not inclined to exercise our discretionary writ jurisdiction in favour of such a petitioner. Accordingly, we dismiss this petition with costs quantified at Rs. 5 lakhs to be paid to the Delhi High Court Advocates’ Welfare Trust

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DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 10(20): Law on whether an industrial township referred to in proviso to Article 243Q is equivalent to a "municipality" and a "local authority" explained. Law on interpretation of statutes as to the scope of an "Explanation" and "Proviso" explained. There is no concept of "equity" or "presumption" or "intendment" in a taxing statute. Only the language has to be seen

What she argued was that looking to the nature of the functions enjoined upon the appellant committee, it must be deemed to be a municipal committee within the meaning of that expression in clause (iii) of the Explanation. We regret our inability to accept that submission. We say so for two distinct reasons. Firstly because the expression “municipal committee” appears in a taxing statute and must, Therefore, be construed strictly. It is fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court that while interpreting a taxing statute, one has simply to look to what is clearly stated therein. There is, in fiscal statutes, no room for any intendment nor is there any equity about the levy sanctioned under the same