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DATE: October 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 25, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Undisclosed income/ expenditure: A letter written in refutal of allegations contained in a news items with a without-prejudice offer cannot be treated as admission of non-disclosure or as an unconditional offer to pay tax. Also, the disclosure is by the USA Co and not by the assessee. It is not the case of the Dept that the amount has been received in the accounts of the assessee or spent for and on behalf of the assessee so as to be treated as undisclosed income of the assessee

In our opinion, such communication(s) cannot be treated as admission of non-disclosure as such. What is significant to note is that in the present case, the disclosure is attributed to Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co., USA, filed by it in the proceedings in USA; and not by the assessee as such. It is not the case of the Department that the amount referred to in the said disclosure has been received in the accounts of the assessee or spent for and on behalf of the appellant – assessee under instruction, so as to be treated as undisclosed income of the appellant.

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DATE: February 18, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus Share Premium: No reason to interfere. SLP dismissed. High Court held there is no limitation on the amount of premium that can be charged. The AO cannot question the transaction merely because he thinks the investor could have managed by paying a lesser amount as share premium. It is the prerogative of the Board of Directors to decide the premium and it is the wisdom of the shareholder whether they want to subscribe to shares at such a premium or not. S. 68 does not apply as the funds were received through banking channels and the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the investors was established

Issuing the share at a premium was a commercial decision. It is the prerogative of the Board of Directors of a company to decide the premium amount and it is the wisdom of shareholder whether they want to subscribe the shares at such a premium or not. This was a mutual decision between both the companies. In day to day market, unless and until, the rates is fixed by any Govt. Authority or unless there is any restriction on the amount of share premium under any law, the price of the shares is decided on the mutual understanding of the parties concerned. Once the genuineness, creditworthiness and identity are established, the revenue should not justifiably claim to put itself in the armchair of a businessman or in the position of the Board of Directors and assume the role of ascertaining how much is a reasonable premium having regard to the circumstances of the case

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DATE: November 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Taxability of subsidies: Supreme Court stays judgement of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Bhushan Steels And Strips which held that if the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, the subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

Taxability of subsidies: Supreme Court stays judgement of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Bhushan Steels And Strips Ltd which held that if the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, the subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

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DATE: September 24, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1994-95
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CITATION:
Entire law on whether leasehold rights constitute a "capital asset" u/s 2(14), whether there is a "transfer" u/s 2(47) of such rights and whether "capital gains" u/s 45 can arise explained in detail

The Court is unable to agree with the above approach of the ITAT to interpreting what appear to be plain and unambiguous provisions of the Act. It is useful to recall that this entire discussion is in the backdrop of what constitutes “transfer” in relation to a capital asset. Further, the entire exercise is for ultimately determining if there has been any capital gains arising from the transaction. Under Section 45(1) ‘capital gains’ are any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year. When the word “transfer” itself has been defined under Section 2(47) (vi) and by virtue of Explanation 1 “shall” have the same meaning as Section 269UA(d) then it is not possible to ‘restrict’ Explanation 1 to only those transactions described in Chapter XXC. Explanation 1 is a deeming fiction and incorporates by way of reference the provisions of Section 269 UA (d) in order to understand the meaning of the word ‘transfer’ for the purposes of Section 2 (47) (vi). Therefore, that entire scheme has to be given effect to. In other words, it is not possible to omit the reference to Section 269UA(d) (i) which in turn brings in Section 269UA(f) (i). The ITAT has therefore erred in conveniently choosing to not apply the Explanation 1 to Section 2 (47) in order to arrive at the conclusion there was indeed a ‘transfer’ of a capital asset brought about by the lease agreement in question

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DATE: August 11, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 40(b)(v): Provision in partnership deed for payment of salary at percentage share of profits multiplied by “allocable profits” is valid and entitles claim for deduction. S. 37(1): Contribution by law firm to IFA to create awareness of its activities is business expenditure

A plain reading of Clause 6(a) leads us to a conclusion that the term ‘allocable profits’ was used to mean ‘book profits’ as used in Section 40(b)(v) of the Act or otherwise the reference to the section in the Clause has no meaning. When the partners have understood and meant that the word “allocable profits” to mean surplus/book profits, prior to calculation of partners’ remuneration, and when such an understanding is manifest in its actions, we do not see any reason why the Revenue authorities should not understand this term in the same sense

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