| COURT: | Supreme Court |
| CORAM: | Arun Mishra J, Rohinton Fali Nariman J. |
| SECTION(S): | 28, 4, 56 |
| GENRE: | Domestic Tax |
| CATCH WORDS: | capital vs. revenue receipt, entertainment tax subsidy, subsidy |
| COUNSEL: | Ajay Vohra, Kavita Jha |
| DATE: | November 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement) |
| DATE: | December 15, 2017 (Date of publication) |
| AY: | - |
| FILE: | Click here to download the file in pdf format |
| CITATION: | |
| Taxability of subsidies: Supreme Court stays judgement of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Bhushan Steels And Strips which held that if the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, the subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits | |
In CIT vs. Bhushan Steels And Strips Ltd, the Delhi High Court had to consider the following question of law at the instance of the Revenue:
“Whether the ITAT was correct in law in holding that the amount received by the assessee by way of exemption of sales tax payments was not a trading receipt but was a capital receipt, hence not liable to tax?”
The High Court allowed the appeal of the Revenue on the basis that:
(i) In the present case, the provisions of the original scheme (i.e. the original policy of 1990) and its subsidy scheme are relevant; they have quite correctly been relied upon by the revenue. Paras 6 (A) and 6(B) of that scheme specifically provided for capital subsidy to set up prestige units; the amounts indicated (Rupees fifteen lakhs) were to be towards capital expenditure. Now, if that was the scheme under which the assessees set-up their units, undoubtedly it contained specific provisions that enabled capital subsidies. Whether the assessees were entitled to it, or not, is not relevant. The assessees are now concerned with the sales tax amounts they were permitted to retain, under the amended scheme (dated 27.07.1991) which allowed the facility of such retention, after the unit (established and which could possibly claim benefit under the first scheme) was already set up. This subsidy scheme had no strings attached. It merely stated that the collection could be retained to the extent of 100% of capital expenditure. Whilst it might be tempting to read the linkage with capital expenditure as not only applying to the limit, but also implying an underlying intention that the capital expenditure would thereby be recouped, the absence of any such condition should restrain the court from so concluding.
(ii) How a state frames its policy to achieve its objectives and attain larger developmental goals depends upon the experience, vision and genius of its representatives. Therefore, to say that the indication of the limit of subsidy as the capital expended, means that it replenished the capital expenditure and therefore, the subsidy is capital, would not be justified. The specific provision for capital subsidy in the main scheme and the lack of such a subsidy in the supplementary scheme (of 1991) meant that the recipient, i.e. the assessee had the flexibility of using it for any purpose. Unlike in Ponni Sugars (supra), the absence of any condition towards capital utilization meant that the policy makers envisioned greater profitability as an incentive for investors to expand units, for rapid industrialization of the state, ensuring greater employment. Clearly, the subsidy was revenue in nature.
On appeal by the assessee to the Supreme Court HELD:
Issue notice. In the meantime, the operation of the impugned judgment shall remain stayed.
Leave a Reply