Home › › Page 19

Search Results For: ITAT Mumbai

This section is now closed. Click here for new judgements


Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE: ,
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): Payments by a CA firm to foreign professional entities for services rendered abroad is not taxable under Articles 12 and 15 of the India-USA DTAA. The retrospective amendment to s. 9(1)(vii) to tax services rendered outside India does not apply in the context of a disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) in the hands of the payer

Ostensibly, the requirement of rendering services in India in order to attract section 9(1)(vii) of the Act was removed by insertion of Explanation by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1/4/1976. This has been understood by the Revenue to say that inspite of the services having been rendered by the recipients outside India, the same is taxable in India by applying the aforesaid amendment. In our view, such retrospective amendment would be determinative of the tax liability in the hands of the recipients of income. So however, in the present case, what is held against the assessee is the failure to deduct tax at source at the time of payment of such income. Ostensibly, dehors the aforesaid amendment, the impugned income was not subject to tax deduction at source in India as per the prevailing legal position. Taxability of a sum in the hands of recipient, on account of a subsequent retrospective amendment would not expose the assessee-payer to an impossible situation of requiring deduction of tax at source on the date of payment. Therefore, on this count also the assessee cannot be held to be in default in not deducting tax at source so as to trigger the disallowance under section 40(a)(i) of the Act

Read more ›

Posted on by itatbar
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: March 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
A liberal view must be taken in matters of condonation of delay. A delay of 2191 days caused by an employee leaving the services of the assessee and not handing over papers to the assessee deserves to be condoned

In every case of delay, there can be some lapses on the part of the litigant concern. That alone is not enough to turn down the plea and to shut the doors against him, unless and until, it makes a mala-fide or a dilatory statutory, the court must show utmost consideration to such litigant. In matters concerning the filing of appeals, in exercise of the statutory right, a refusal to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold, which may lead to miscarriage of justice. Since the employee who was earlier handling the tax matters of the assessee company, while leaving the job of the assessee company, did not handover the relevant papers either to the assessee or to the next person, a fact which caused the delay, the delay was liable to be condoned by taking a lenient view

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: May 4, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 7, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Transfer pricing of AMP Expenditure: In the case of a manufacturer operating in a competitive industry, high AMP expenditure cannot be assumed to have been incurred for the benefit of the brand owner. The TPO has to prove that the real intention of the assessee in incurring AMP expenses was to benefit the AEs and not to promote its own business. Also, if the assessee has reported high turnover & profits & offered to tax, the basic ingredient required to invoke s. 92 that there is transfer of profit from India remains unproved. In the absence of the AO/ TPO showing that there is a formal/ informal agreement to share the AMP expenditure, the adjustment cannot be made. The matter cannot be remanded to the AO/ TPO for reconsideration

In these circumstances, the fundamental question to be answered is to decide as to whether in absence of any agreement for payment of AMP expenses by the AEs can it be held that there was an international transaction only on the basis that AMP expenditure, incurred by the assessee, would have benefitted the AEs, who owned the brands used by the assessee. In our opinion, the arguments suffers from the very basic flaw that it presumes that the assessees would incur AMP not to promote its own business. In other words, the TPO has failed to prove that the real intention of the assessee in incurring advertisement and marketing expenses were to benefit the AEs and not to promote its own business. The turnover of the assessee proves that during the year under consideration the assessee had done a reasonably good business, as stated earlier. The resultant profit was offered for taxation in India. Therefore, transferring of profit from India, the basic ingredient to invoke the provisions of section 92 of the Act, remains unproved

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: April 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 7, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Transfer Pricing: Corporate Guarantees are not comparable to Bank Guarantees & so the commission of 3% charged by Banks is not a benchmark to evaluate the ALP of a corporate guarantee but it has to taken at 0.5%. ITAT decisions which upheld the 3% rate cannot be followed as they are contrary to Everest Kanto 378 ITR 57 (Bom)

Instances of commercial banks providing guarantees could not be compared to instances of issuance of corporate guarantee. When commercial banks issue bank guarantees, the same is quite distinct in character, than the situation where a corporate issues guarantee to the effect that, if a subsidiary associated enterprise does not repay a loan, the same would be made good by such corporate. It is quite clear that the manner in which the Transfer Pricing Officer has proceeded to determine the arm’s length rate based on the probable rate being charged by the commercial banks is not justified. In this view of the matter, we are unable to approve 3% rate of guarantee commission fee determined as arm’s length rate by the income-tax authorities. In the alternative, the addition that is required to be sustained is the position canvassed by the assessee before the Transfer Pricing Officer i.e. adoption of 0.50% as arm’s length rate for the purpose of determining the arm’s length income on account of guarantee commission fee in the present case

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Bogus Purchases: Purchases cannot be treated as bogus is (i) assessee has furnished quantitative reconciliation, (ii) Gross Profit rate is comparable to earlier & subsequent years, (iii) suppliers are income-tax assessees and their sales have not been treated as bogus by their AOs, (iv) payments are by account payee cheques and other documentary evidences are available

Another crucial fact which commands consideration is, all the suppliers are income tax assessees and as per the evidence produced on record they have disclosed these sale transactions in the books of account as well as return filed by them. However, no adverse inference has been drawn in respect of sales made by them by concerned Assessing Officers to the effect that they are not genuine parties or they are providing accommodation bills only. At least, no such fact is forthcoming from assessment order nor the department has filed any paper book before us to demonstrate that there is any adverse material in the possession of the Department to establish that concerned suppliers are non-genuine and are providing accommodation bills. In contrast, enough documentary evidences by way of purchase bills, sales bills, ledger copies of suppliers, etc., along with the fact that payments were made through cheque has been brought on record by assessee to demonstrate that purchases made from the concerned suppliers are genuine

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 54F: The demolition of a structure does not amount to a "transfer". It is not correct to contend that Vania Silk Mills 191 ITR 647 (SC) is overruled by Grace Collis 248 ITR 323 (SC). Lower authorities cannot refuse to apply binding High Court judgements on the basis that the High Court has not considered a Supreme Court judgement

The demolition of the structure would not constitute a transfer of the assets in terms of Section 54(3) of the Act in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Vania Silk Mills P. Ltd. v. CIT, reported in 191 ITR 647. In the above case, the Apex Court has held that when an asset is destroyed, there is no question of transfer taking place under the Act. The Apex court held that in terms of the Act that the words ‘Extinguishment of any right’ in Section 2(47) of the Act, does not include an extinguishment of right on account of destruction. It has to be an extinguishment of right on account of transfer. Thus, a destruction of assets when not on account of any transfer would not be hit by Section 54F(3) of the Act. Counsel for the revenue seeks to distinguish the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Vania Silk Mills P. Ltd. (Supra) that the destruction in that case took place because of fire and hence it was involuntary. This distinction is of no consequence. In our view of the decision of the Apex Court in Vania Silk Mills (Supra) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia)/ 192: Employees deputed pursuant to a secondment agreement are not "employees" of the assessee and so the amounts paid by way of reimbursement of their salary is not subject to TDS in the assessee's hands

The employees are not the employees of assessee Mahanagar Gas Ltd but employees of British Gas and they are working with assessee only in view of secondment agreement. As per joint venture agreement GAIL and British Gas have agreed to second, therefore, employees to the joint venture company i.e. Mahanagar Gas Ltd. on secondment basis and under secondment agreement certain employees have been seconded to the assessee. Since the employers were seconded for limited time of 2 to 3 years, the remuneration payable to these seconded employees were being paid by British Gas or GAIL recoverable from assessee on cost to cost basis. The nature of secondment agreement make clear the duties of second employees, their liabilities towards assessee and reimbursement of actual cost of remuneration, benefits and disbursement by assessee to the joint venture partners. These are reimbursements. Also the employee’s remuneration was allowable to tax in India then there would be tax deduction obligation on the employer who was responsible for making payment to the employees

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: March 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Transfer Pricing Of Corporate Guarantees: Explanation i(c) to S. 92 B, though stated to be clarificatory and stated to be effective from 01.04.2002, has to be necessarily treated as effective from at best AY 2013-14 as it is an "anti abuse" provision. Dept’s submission that Bharti Airtel 161 TTJ 428 is “per incuriam” is not acceptable. Law laid down in Micro Ink 176 TTJ 8 (Ahd) on transfer pricing implications of corporate guarantees reiterated

It is very important to bear in mind the fact that right now we are dealing with amendment of a transfer pricing related provision which is in the nature of a SAAR (specific anti abuse rule), and that every anti abuse legislation, whether SAAR (specific anti abuse rule) or GAAR (general anti abuse rule), is a legislation seeking the taxpayers to organize their affairs in a manner compliant with the norms set out in such anti abuse legislation. An anti-abuse legislation does not trigger the levy of taxes; it only tells you what behavior is acceptable or what is not acceptable. What triggers levy of taxes is non-compliance with the manner in which the anti-abuse regulations require the taxpayers to conduct their affairs. In that sense, all anti abuse legislations seek a certain degree of compliance with the norms set out therein. It is, therefore, only elementary that amendments in the anti-abuse legislations can only be prospective. It does not make sense that someone tells you today as to how you should have behaved yesterday, and then goes on to levy a tax because you did not behave in that manner yesterday. It is for this reason that the Explanation to Section 92 B, though stated to be clarificatory and stated to be effective from 1st April 2002, has to be necessarily treated as effective from at best the assessment year 2013-14

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: April 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules which regulates the admission of additional evidence by the CIT(A) cannot override the principles of natural justice

The principle “Audi alteram partem”, i.e. no man should be condemned unheard is the basic canon principles of natural justice and accordingly we find merit in the contentions of the assessee that Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules cannot be over ride the principles of natural justice. Hence we are of the view that the learned CIT(A) was not justified in refusing to admit the various additional evidences furnished by the assessee

Read more ›

Posted on by Dhaval Shah
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: March 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 50C does not apply to transfer of leasehold rights in land

Section 50C of the Act provides that if the consideration received or accruing is less than the value adopted or assessed or assessable by the stamp valuation authority of the State Government for such transfer then the value so adopted or assessed or assessable shall be deemed to be the full value of consideration and the capital gains will be computed accordingly. The phraseology of section 50C of the Act clearly provides that it would apply only to “a capital asset, being land or building or both”. The moot question before us is as to whether such expression would cover the transfer of a capital asset being leasehold rights in land or building. There cannot be a dispute to the proposition that the expression land by itself cannot include within its fold leasehold right in land also. Of-course, leasehold right in land is also a capital asset and we find no fault with this stand of the Revenue. So however, every kind of a ‘capital asset’ is not covered within the scope of section 50C of the Act for the purposes of ascertaining the full value of consideration. Infact, the heading of section itself provides that it is “Special provision for full value of consideration in certain cases”. Therefore, there is a significance to the expression “a capital asset, being land or building or both” contained in section 50C of the Act. The significance is that only capital asset being land or building or both are covered within the scope of section 50C of the Act, and not all kinds of capital assets

Read more ›