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DATE: March 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1992-93
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CITATION:
S. 32: Title to immovable property cannot pass when its value is more than Rs.100/- unless it is executed on a proper stamp paper and is also duly registered with the sub-Registrar. Accordingly, a lessee cannot be said to be the "owner" for purposes of claiming depreciation. Under Explanation 1 to s. 32, the lessee is entitled to depreciation on the cost of construction incurred by him but not on the cost incurred by the owner and reimbursed by the lessee

We are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Building which was constructed by the firm belonged to the firm. Admittedly it is an immovable property. The title in the said immovable property cannot pass when its value is more than Rs.100/- unless it is executed on a proper stamp paper and is also duly registered with the sub-Registrar. Nothing of the sort took place. In the absence thereof, it could not be said that the assessee had become the owner of the property. As is clear from the plain language of the Explanation, it is only when the assessee holds a lease right or other right of occupancy and any capital expenditure is incurred by the assesee on the construction of any structure or doing of any work in or in relation to and by way of renovation or extension of or improvement to the building and the expenditure on construction is incurred by the assessee, that assessee would be entitled to depreciation to the extent of any such expenditure incurred. In the instant case, records show that the construction was made by the firm. It is a different thing that the assessee had reimbursed the amount. The construction was not carried out by the assessee himself. Therefore, the explanation also would not come to the aid of the assessee

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DATE: February 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 9(1)(vii)/ Article 12: In order to constitute “technical services”, services catering to the special needs of the person using them must be rendered. The provision of a common facility is not “technical services”. Amount paid towards reimbursement of a common technical computer facility is not “fees for technical services”. Amount received by way of reimbursement of expenses does not have the character of income

It is clearly held that no technical services are provided by the assessee to the agents. Once these are accepted, by no stretch of imagination, payments made by the agents can be treated as fee for technical service. It is in the nature of reimbursement of cost whereby the three agents paid their proportionate share of the expenses incurred on these said systems and for maintaining those systems. It is reemphasised that neither the AO nor the CIT (A) has stated that there was any profit element embedded in the payments received by the assessee from its agents in India. Record shows that the assessee had given the calculations of the total costs and pro-rata division thereof among the agents for reimbursement. Not only that, the assessee have even submitted before the Transfer Pricing Officer that these payments were reimbursement in the hands of the assessee and the reimbursement was accepted as such at arm’s length. Once the character of the payment is found to be in the nature of reimbursement of the expenses, it cannot be income chargeable to tax

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DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 30, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 10(37) Capital Gains: Meaning of "compulsory acquisition" under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 explained. The fact that the assessee entered into a settlement with the Collector regarding the compensation amount does not mean that the acquisition was not "compulsory" if the prescribed procedure was followed. Info Park Kerala vs. ACIT (2008) 4 KLT 782 overruled

It goes without saying that had steps not been taken by the Government under Sections 4 & 6 followed by award under Section 9 of the LA Act, the appellant would not have agreed to divest the land belonging to him to Techno Park. He was compelled to do so because of the compulsory acquisition and to avoid litigation entered into negotiations and settled the final compensation. Merely because the compensation amount is agreed upon would not change the character of acquisition from that of compulsory acquisition to the voluntary sale. It may be mentioned that this is now the procedure which is laid down even under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 as per which the Collector can pass rehabilitation and resettlement award with the consent of the parties/land owners. Nonetheless, the character of acquisition remains compulsory

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DATE: August 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 271(1)(c): Omission by the AO to explicitly specify in the penalty notice as to whether penalty proceedings are being initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars or for concealment of income makes the penalty order liable for cancellation

Whether, omission if assessing officer to explicitly mention that penalty proceedings are being initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars or that for concealment of income makes the penalty order liable for cancellation even when it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the assessee had concealed income in the facts and circumstances of the case?

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 2(22)(2) Deemed Dividend: The argument that as the shares are issued in the name of the Karta, the HUF is not the “registered shareholder” and so s. 2(22)(e) will not apply to loans paid to the HUF is not correct because in the annual returns filed with the ROC, the HUF is shown as the registered and beneficial shareholder. In any case, the HUF is the beneficial shareholder. Even if it is assumed that the Karta is the registered shareholder and not the HUF, as per Explanation 3 to s. 2(22), any payment to a concern (i.e. the HUF) in which the shareholder (i.e. the Karta) has a substantial interest is also covered

Section 2(22)(e) of the Act creates a fiction, thereby bringing any amount paid otherwise than as a dividend into the net of dividend under certain circumstances. It gives an artificial definition of ‘dividend’. It does not take into account that dividend which is actually declared or received. The dividend taken note of by this provision is a deemed dividend and not a real dividend. Loan or payment made by the company to its shareholder is actually not a dividend. In fact, such a loan to a shareholder has to be returned by the shareholder to the company. It does not become income of the shareholder. Notwithstanding the same, for certain purposes, the Legislature has deemed such a loan or payment as ‘dividend’ and made it taxable at the hands of the said shareholder. It is, therefore, not in dispute that such a provision which is a deemed provision and fictionally creates certain kinds of receipts as dividends, is to be given strict interpretation. It follows that unless all the conditions contained in the said provision are fulfilled, the receipt cannot be deemed as dividends. Further, in case of doubt or where two views are possible, benefit shall accrue in favour of the assessee

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DATE: November 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 192/ 234B: Where receipt is by way of salary, TDS deductions u/s 192 has to be made. No question of payment of advance tax can arise in cases of receipt by way of 'salary'. Consequently, S. 234B & 234C which levy interest for deferment of advance tax have no application

A perusal of the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Act [Part A, B, C and F of Chapter VII] would go to show that against salary a deduction, at the requisite rate at which income tax is to be paid by the person entitled to receive the salary, is required to be made by the employer failing which the employer is liable to pay simple interest thereon. The provisions relating to payment of advance tax is contained in Part ‘C’ and interest thereon in Part ‘F’ of Chapter VII of the Act. In cases where receipt is by way of salary, deductions under Section 192 of the Act is required to be made. No question of payment of advance tax under Part ‘C’ of Chapter VII of the Act can arise in cases of receipt by way of ‘salary’. If that is so, Part ‘F’ of Chapter VII dealing with interest chargeable in certain cases (Section 234B – Interest for defaults in payment of advance tax and Section 234C – Interest for deferment of advance tax) would have no application to the present situation

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DATE: December 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 10A/ 10B: Though s. 10A/ 10B were amended by FA 2000 w.e.f. 01.04.2001 to change "exemption" to "deduction", the "deduction" contemplated therein is qua the eligible undertaking of an assessee standing on its own and without reference to the other eligible or non-eligible units or undertakings of the assessee. The benefit of deduction is given by the Act to the individual undertaking and resultantly flows to the assessee. The deduction of the profits and gains of the business of an eligible undertaking has to be made independently and before giving effect to the provisions for set off and carry forward contained in s. 70, 72 and 74. The deductions u/s 10A/10B are prior to the commencement of the exercise to be undertaken under Chapter VI of the Act for arriving at the total income of the assessee from the gross total income

If the specific provisions of the Act provide [first proviso to Sections 10A(1); 10A (1A) and 10A (4)] that the unit that is contemplated for grant of benefit of deduction is the eligible undertaking and that is also how the contemporaneous Circular of the department (No.794 dated 09.08.2000) understood the situation, it is only logical and natural that the stage of deduction of the profits and gains of the business of an eligible undertaking has to be made independently and, therefore, immediately after the stage of determination of its profits and gains. At that stage the aggregate of the incomes under other heads and the provisions for set off and carry forward contained in Sections 70, 72 and 74 of the Act would be premature for application. The deductions under Section 10A therefore would be prior to the commencement of the exercise to be undertaken under Chapter VI of the Act for arriving at the total income of the assessee from the gross total income. The somewhat discordant use of the expression “total income of the assessee” in Section 10A has already been dealt with earlier and in the overall scenario unfolded by the provisions of Section 10A the aforesaid discord can be reconciled by understanding the expression “total income of the assessee” in Section 10A as ‘total income of the undertaking’

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DATE: December 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: A Writ Petition to challenge the issue of a reopening notice u/s 148 is maintainable as per the law laid down in Calcutta Discount 41 ITR 191 (SC). The law laid down in Chhabil Dass Agarwal 357 ITR 357 (SC) deals with the maintainability of a Writ to challenge the reassessment order and does not apply to a challenge to the reassessment notice

The High Courts dismissed the writ petitions preferred by the assessee challenging the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the reasons which were recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment. The writ petitions were dismissed by the High Courts as not maintainable. The aforesaid view taken is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Calcutta Discount Limited Company vs. Incom Tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta & Anr. [(1961) 41 ITR 191 (SC)]

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DATE: December 7, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-00
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S. 4: Law laid down in Sahney Steel 228 ITR 253 (SC) and Ponni Sugars 306 ITR 392 (SC) regarding the taxability of subsidies as a revenue receipt does not apply to voluntary subsidies (subvention) paid by a holding company to its loss making subsidiary. The said subsidy is to protect the capital investment of the holding company and is a capital receipt in the hands of the recipient

The question of law that was presented before the High Court, namely, whether subvention was capital or revenue receipt, was sought to be answered by the High Court by making a reference to two decisions of this Court in Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd., Hyderabad versus Commissioner of Income Tax, A.P.-I, Hyderabad [(1997) 7 SCC 764]/ 228 ITR 253 and Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras versus Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Limited [(2008) 9 SCC 337]/ 306 ITR 392 (SC). The view expressed by this Court that unless the grant-in-aid received by an Assessee is utilized for acquisition of an asset, the same must be understood to be in the nature of a revenue receipt was held by the High Court to be a principle of law applicable to all situations. The aforesaid view tends to overlook the fact that in both Ponni Sugars (supra) and Sahney Steel (supra) the subsidies received were in the nature of grant-in-aid from public funds and not by way of voluntary contribution by the parent Company as in the present cases. The above apart, the voluntary payments made by the parent Company to its loss making Indian company can also be understood to be payments made in order to protect the capital investment of the Assessee Company. If that is so, we will have no hesitation to hold that the payments made to the Assessee Company by the parent Company for Assessment Years in question cannot be held to be revenue receipts

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