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DATE: March 19, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 24, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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Bogus Capital gains from penny stocks: Capital gains from penny stocks cannot be assessed as unexplained cash credit u/s 68 if the assessee has produced documentary evidence to prove the source, identity and genuineness of the transaction and the AO has not found any fault with it. The fact that the investigation dept has alleged that there is a modus operandi of bogus LTCG scheme is not relevant if the same is not substantiated

I further note that the addition in dispute made by the AO and upheld by the Ld. CIT(A) u/s 68 as unexplained credit instead of long term capital gain as claimed by the assessee, however, the source, identity and genuineness of the transaction having been established by documentary evidences and there is no case for making addition u/s 68 of the Act, hence, the same deserve to be deleted. I note that in most of the case laws of the Hon’ble High Courts referred by the Ld. DR the reason on the basis of addition was confirmed was that the assessee had not tendered cogent evidence with regard to share transaction, however, in the present the case assessee has submitted all the documents / evidences, therefore, the case laws relied by the Ld. DR are based on distinguished facts and circumstances

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DATE: March 15, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 24, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 271(1)(c) Penalty: The primary burden of proof is on the Revenue to show that the assessee is guilty of concealment/ furnishing inaccurate particulars. Making an incorrect claim does not tantamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars by any stretch of imagination. Wrong claim of depreciation by crediting capital subsidy to reserves instead of reducing from actual cost/ WDV does not attract s. 271(1)(c) penalty

The expression “has concealed the particulars of income” and “has furnished inaccurate particulars of income” have not been defined either in sec. 271(l)(c) or elsewhere in the Act. One thing is certain that these two circumstances are not identical in details although they may lead to same effect, namely, keeping of a certain portion of income. The former is direct and the later may be indirect in its execution. The word “conceal” is derived from the Latin word “concolare” which implies to hide. In the present appeal, even if a excess depreciation has been claimed by the assessee on the basis of the Companies Act does not mean that the assessee had hidden something, therefore, even if a wrong claim is made, automatically, does not tantamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars. Concealment refers to a deliberate act on the part of the assessee. The primary burden of proof is on the Revenue, before a penalty is imposed u/s 271(l)(c) because by no stretch of imagination, making a incorrect claim, does not tantamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars, therefore, keeping in view the totality of facts and the judicial pronouncements, that too from the Hon’ble Apex Court, no penalty is leviable especially when there is no finding that any details supplied by the assessee in its return is erroneous or incorrect, therefore, mere making a excess claim in itself does not invite imposition of penalty u/s 271(l)(c) because the same cannot amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars

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DATE: March 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 21, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): Tribunal orders (in sister concern's case) are binding on the Tribunal unless set-aside or stayed. A rectification application on the ground that the orders in the sister concern's case are not correct is not permissible as it amounts to a review

The Revenue has filed appeals in the sister concern case for the Assessment Years 199697 to 200001 under Section 260A of the Act to this Court. The question raised therein is on the issue of appropriate classification of the rent/ compensation under the head ‘income from the other sources’ or under the head ‘income from the house property’. The aforesaid appeals have been admitted and are awaiting consideration for final disposal. Till such time, as the orders of the Tribunal of its Coordinate Bench in respect of the Assessment Years 1996-97 to 2000-01 are set aside or are stayed pending the final disposal, its ratio would, prima facie, continue to be binding. Therefore, even if the Revenue seek to contend to the contrary it would be a debatable issue. This cannot be a subject matter of rectification

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DATE: March 8, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 21, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 143(2) Notice: The issue of a s. 143(2) notice by an AO not having jurisdiction over the assessee is irrelevant. If the proper AO does not issue the notice within the time limit, the assessment is null and void. The argument that the non-jurisdictional AO issued the s. 143(2) notice as per PAN or computerized system or internal procedure is not relevant as it violates the law

The contention of the Ld. D.R. has no merit that ITO, Ward-1(1), Faridabad was empowered to issue notice as per PAN or it was issued as per Computerized System of the Department because it is against the provisions of Law. As such the issue would be in violation of the principles of law and as such the internal procedure provided by the department would not justify the illegality committed by the ITO, Ward-1(1), Faridabad

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DATE: February 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 16, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 14A/ Rule 8D - Applicability to shares held for controlling interest or as stock-in-trade: The argument that S. 14A & Rule 8D will not apply if the "dominant intention" of the assessee was not to earn dividends but to gain control of the company or to hold as stock-in-trade is not acceptable. S. 14A applies irrespective of whether the shares are held to gain control or as stock-in-trade. However, where the shares are held as stock-in-trade, the expenditure incurred for earning business profits will have to be apportioned and allowed as a deduction. Only that expenditure which is "in relation to" earning dividends can be disallowed u/s 14A & Rule 8D. The AO has to record proper satisfaction on why the claim of the assessee as to the quantum of suo moto disallowance is not correct

The first and foremost issue that falls for consideration is as to whether the dominant purpose test, which is pressed into service by the assessees would apply while interpreting Section 14A of the Act or we have to go by the theory of apportionment. We are of the opinion that the dominant purpose for which the investment into shares is made by an assessee may not be relevant. No doubt, the assessee like Maxopp Investment Limited may have made the investment in order to gain control of the investee company. However, that does not appear to be a relevant factor in determining the issue at hand. Fact remains that such dividend income is non-taxable. In this scenario, if expenditure is incurred on earning the dividend income, that much of the expenditure which is attributable to the dividend income has to be disallowed and cannot be treated as business expenditure. Keeping this objective behind Section14A of the Act in mind, the said provision has to be interpreted, particularly, the word ‘in relation to the income’ that does not form part of total income. Considered in this hue, the principle of apportionment of expenses comes into play as that is the principle which is engrained in Section 14A of the Act

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DATE: March 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Principles of Mutuality: Receipts by housing co­-operative societies such as non­-occupancy charges, transfer charges, common amenity fund charges and certain other charges from their members are exempt from income-tax based on the doctrine of mutuality. The fact that the receipts are in excess of the limits prescribed by the State Government does not mean that the Societies have rendered services for profit attracting an element of commerciality and thus was taxable

Transfer charges are payable by the outgoing member. If for convenience, part of it is paid by the transferee, it would not partake the nature of profit or commerciality as the amount is appropriated only after the transferee is inducted as a member. In the event of non­ admission, the amount is returned. The moment the transferee is inducted as a member the principles of mutuality apply. Likewise, non­occupancy charges are levied by the society and is payable by a member who does not himself occupy the premises but lets it out to a third person. The charges are again utilised only for the common benefit of facilities and amenities to the members. Contribution to the common amenity fund taken from a member disposing property is similarly utilised for meeting sudden and regular heavy repairs to ensure continuous and proper hazard free maintenance of the properties of the society which ultimately enures to the enjoyment, benefit and safety of the members. These charges are levied on the basis of resolutions passed by the society and in consonance with its bye­laws. The receipts in the present cases have indisputably been used for mutual benefit towards maintenance of the premises, repairs, infrastructure and provision of common amenities

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DATE: March 13, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Foreign law firms and foreign lawyers cannot practice profession of law in India either in the litigation or in non-litigation side though they can "fly in and fly out" for the purpose of giving legal advice to their clients in India regarding foreign law. The expression “fly in and fly out” will only cover a casual visit not amounting to “practice”. If the Rules of Institutional Arbitration apply or the matter is covered by the provisions of the Arbitration Act, foreign lawyers are not debarred from conducting arbitration proceedings arising out of international commercial arbitration but will be governed by code of conduct applicable to the legal profession in India. B.P.O. Companies providing wide range of customized and integrated services and functions to its customers like word processing, secretarial support, transcription services, proof reading services, travel desk support services, etc. may come within the purview of the Advocates Act, 1961 or the Bar Council of India Rules if in pith and substance the services amount to practice of law

We uphold the view of the Bombay High Court and Madras High Court in para 63 (i) of the judgment to the effect that foreign law firms/companies or foreign lawyers cannot practice profession of law in India either in the litigation or in nonlitigation side. We, however, modify the direction of the Madras High Court in Para 63(ii) that there was no bar for the foreign law firms or foreign lawyers to visit India for a temporary period on a “fly in and fly out” basis for the purpose of giving legal advice to their clients in India regarding foreign law or their own system of law and on diverse international legal issues. We hold that the expression “fly in and fly out” will only cover a casual visit not amounting to “practice”. In case of a dispute whether a foreign lawyer was limiting himself to “fly in and fly out” on casual basis for the purpose of giving legal advice to their clients in India regarding foreign law or their own system of law and on diverse international legal issues or whether in substance he was doing practice which is prohibited can be determined by the Bar Council of India. However, the Bar Council of India or Union of India will be at liberty to make appropriate Rules in this regard including extending Code of Ethics being applicable even to such cases

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DATE: February 28, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 13, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 47(iv) Transfer/ Capital Gains: The term 'subsidiary company’ is not defined under the Income-tax Act and so will have to be given the meaning in s. 4(1)(c) of the Companies Act. A subsidiary of a subsidiary (step-down subsidiary) is also a subsidiary of the parent. Consequently, transfers between the holding company and the step-down subsidiary are not "transfers" which can give rise to capital gains or loss

The transaction in question cannot be regarded as transfer in view of provisions of section 47(iv) of the Act, as it is a transfer of capital asset by a company to its subsidiary company and as a second step down 100% subsidiary company is also as subsidiary of the assessee company under the Companies’ Act 1956 as the term ‘subsidiary company’ has not been defined under the Income-tax Act, 1961

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DATE: December 21, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10, 2010-11
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Bogus Purchases: The fact that s. 133(6) notices could not be served upon the alleged vendors and they were not physically available at the given addresses does not falsify the claim of the assessee that the purchases are genuine if the assessee has produced other evidence and made payments through banking channels

Anyhow, after receipt of the information from DGIT(Inv.) Mumbai, the Assessing Officer issued the notice u/s 133(6) of the Act to all the parties but the said noticed were not served upon the said parties. The Assessing Officer also deputed the tax inspector to verify the genuineness of the claim and to know about the existence said 20 parties but the 17 parties were not available at the given address. However, notices served upon the Sampart Steel, Revika Trade Impex P. Ltd., Jindal Corporation but these parties nowhere submitted the required information. Sufficient evidence has been submitted by the assessee before the AO

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DATE: February 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 147 Reopening: The grant of approval by the CIT with the words “Yes. I am satisfied” proves that the sanction is merely mechanical and he has not applied independent mind while according sanction as there is not an iota of material on record as to what documents he had perused and what were the reasons for his being satisfied to accord the sanction to initiate the reopening of assessment u/s 148 of the Act

Apparently, from the approval recorded and words used that “Yes. I am satisfied.”, it has proved on record that the sanction is merely mechanical and Addl.CIT has not applied independent mind while according sanction as there is not an iota of material on record as to what documents he had perused and what were the reasons for his being satisfied to accord the sanction to initiate the reopening of assessment u/s 148 of the Act

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