Search Results For: Domestic Tax


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DATE: June 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 2(15)/12AA(3): The DIT has no jurisdiction to cancel registration of a charitable institution on the ground that it is carrying on commercial activities which are in breach of the amended definition of "charitable purpose" in s. 2(15). Registration can be cancelled only if the activities of the trust are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with its objects. This is clarified by Circular No.21 of 2016

The submission made on behalf of the Revenue that the Circular No.21 of 2016 would have only prospective effect in respect of Assessment made subsequent to the amendment under Section 2(15) of the Act w.e.f. 1st April, 2016 is also not sustainable. The amendment in Section 2(15) of the Act brought about by Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1st April, 2016, is essentially that where earlier the receipts in excess of Rs.25 lakhs on commercial activities would exclude it from the definition of ‘charitable purpose’ is now substituted by receipts from commercial activities in excess 20% of the total receipts of the institution. In the above view, Circular No.21 of 2016 directs the Officer of the Revenue not to cancel Registration only because the receipts on account of business are in excess of the limits in the proviso to Section 2(15) of the Act would also apply in the present case. The impugned order has held that cancellation of a Registration under Section 12AA(3) of the Act, can only take place in case where the activities of trust or institution are not genuine and/or not carried on in accordance with its objects

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DATE: May 27, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 68: Long-term capital gains arising from transfer of penny stocks cannot be treated as bogus merely because SEBI has initiating an inquiry with regard to the Company & the broker if the shares are purchased from the exchange, payment is by cheque and delivery of shares is taken & given

Assessee has made investment in shares which was purchased on the floor of stock exchange and not from M/s Basant Periwal and Co. Against purchases payment has been made by account payee cheque, delivery of shares were taken, contract of sale was also complete as per the Contract Act, therefore, the assessee is not concerned with any way of the broker. Nowhere the AO has alleged that the transaction by the assessee with these particular broker or share was bogus, merely because the investigation was done by SEBI against broker or his activity, assessee cannot be said to have entered into ingenuine transaction, insofar as assessee is not concerned with the activity of the broker and have no control over the same

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DATE: September 7, 2011 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 10(38)/ 69: Fact that a small amount invested in "penny" stocks gave rise to huge capital gains in a short period does not mean that the transaction is "bogus" if the documentation and evidences cannot be faulted

The explanations of the assessee seems to have been rejected by the assessing authority more on the ground of presumption than on factual ground. The presumption is so compelling that comparatively a small amount of investment made by the assessee during the previous year period relevant to the assessment years 1999- 2000 and 2000-01 have grown into a very sizable amount ultimately yielding a fabulous sum of Rs. 1,41,08,484 which was used by the assessee for the purchase of the flat at Colaba. The sequence of the events and ultimate realization of money is quite amazing. That itself is a provocation for the Assessing Officer to jump into a conclusion that the transactions were bogus. But, whatever it may be, an assessment has to be completed on the basis of records and materials available before the assessing authority. Personal knowledge and excitement on events, should not lead the Assessing Officer to a state of affairs where salient evidences are over-looked. In the present case, howsoever unbelievable it might be, every transaction of the assessee has been accounted, documented and supported. Even the evidences collected from the concerned parties have been ultimately turned in favour of the assessee. Therefore, it is, very difficult to brush aside the contentions of the assessee that he had purchased shares and he had sold shares and ultimately he had purchased a flat utilizing the sale proceeds of those shares

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DATE: April 27, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 10(38)/ 68: Long-term capital gains on sale of "penny" stocks cannot be treated as bogus & unexplained cash credit if the documentation is in order & there is no allegation of manipulation by SEBI or the BSE. Denial of right of cross-examination is a fatal flaw which renders the assessment order a nullity

There is no evidence on record to show that any action or enquiry was carried out either by the SEBI or BSE in respect of the alleged manipulation or propping up of the price rate movement of the ‘said shares’ of Shukun Constructions Ltd., as has been assessed by the AO. The shares of Shukun Constructions Ltd. is listed on BSE and that the sale transaction of the ‘said shares’ by the assessee is at the rate quoted on the date of sale has been confirmed both by BSE and the concerned stock broker M/s. Khambatta Securities Ltd. It is strange that the AO has made the addition under section 68 of the Act treating the entire sale proceeds of the ‘said shares’ received by the assessee through regular banking channels from stock broker registered with SEBI, M/s. Khambatta Securities Ltd., which facts have been confirmed by the said stock broker. In our considered view, the assessee has discharged the onus required under section 68 of the Act as she has established the identity of the payer, source of funds received on sale of the same shares and the genuineness of the transaction

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DATE: June 3, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 147/ 148: The AO is duty bound to provide to the assessee the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment within a reasonable time. Failure to do so renders the reassessment order unsustainable in law

On the request of the Assessee, the AO is bound to furnish the reasons recorded for initiation of proceedings under section 147 of the Act within a reasonable period of time so that the assessee could file its objections thereto and the AO was to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order thereon, which the AO has not done. We also note that even as per the rules of natural justice, the assessee is entitled to know the reasons on the basis of which the AO has formed an opinion that income assessable to tax has escaped assessment. The furnishing of reasons to the assessee is to enable/facilitate it to present its defence and objections to the initiation of proceedings under section 147/148 of the Act. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that there was no justifiable reasons for the AO to deprive the assessee of the recorded reasons by him for initiating proceedings under section 147/148 of the Act

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DATE: June 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Law on whether "installation or construction activity" constitutes a PE under Article 5 and whether "mobilisation/ demobilisation charges" can be treated as "royalty" u/s 9 (1) (vi) & Article 12 (3) (b) of the DTAA and whether "installation charges" could be treated as "Fees for Technical Services" under Explanation 2 below s. 9 (1) (vii) read with Article 12 (4) (a) of the India-Singapore DTAA explained

Therefore, on two counts the finding of the AAR on FTS cannot be sustained. The first being that the installation services are not incidental to the mobilisation/demobilisation service. The contract was in fact for installation, erection of equipment. Mobilisation/demobilisation constituted an integral part of the contract. Secondly, the AAR has proceeded on a factual misconception that the dominion and control of the equipment was with IOCL. It was erroneously concluded that the payment for such mobilisation/demobilisation constitutes royalty. In that view of the matter, the consideration for installation cannot not be characterized as FTS and brought within the ambit of Article 12.4(a) of the DTAA. The resultant position is that no part of the income earned by the Petitioner from the contract with IOCL can be taxed in India

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DATE: June 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, and interest accruing thereon, is to ameliorate the sufferings of the victims and does not have the character of "income". If there is a conflict between a social welfare legislation and a taxation legislation, the social welfare legislation will prevail since it subserves larger public interest. CBDT Circular dated 14.10.2011 is not good law

While going through the said provisions of law, one comes to the inescapable conclusion that the mandate of the said provisions does not apply to the accident claim cases and the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be said to be taxable income. The compensation is awarded in lieu of death of a person or bodily injury suffered in a vehicular accident, which is damage and not income. The Circular, dated 14.10.2011, issued by the Income Tax Authorities, whereby deduction of income Tax has been ordered on the award amount and interest accrued on the deposits made under the orders of the Court in Motor Accident Claims Cases, is quashed

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DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1993-94, 1994-95
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CITATION:
Entire law on concept of "revenue receipt", "capital receipt" and "casual income" explained in the context of taxability of compensation received for cancellation of a sale deed of immovable property. If the AO claims that the receipt is a capital gain, he cannot change his stand to contend that it is a revenue receipt

The sum of Rs.20 lakhs received by the Assessees was in the context of the cancellation of the sale certificate and the sale deed executed in their favour in relation to an immovable property and neither Assessee was dealing in immovable property as part of his business. While it could if at all be said to be in the nature of a capital receipt, what is relevant for the present case is that the Revenue has been unable to make out a case for treating the said receipt as of a casual and non-recurring nature that could be brought to tax under Section 10(3) read with Section 56 of the Act. Following the decision in Cadell Weaving Mill (supra), there can be no manner of doubt that what is in the nature of capital receipt, cannot be sought to be brought to tax by resorting to Section 10(3) read with Section 56 of the Act

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DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 2, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Penalty under Explanation 5A to s. 271(1)(c) cannot be levied on the basis of a mere surrender by the assessee if no incriminating material has been found during search. MAK Data 358 ITR 593 (SC) considered

It is undisputed fact that during the course of search, no incriminating documents were found and seized. The assessee surrendered the additional income under section 132(4) at Rs. 15 lacs and requested not to impose penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the IT Act. The AO imposed the penalty by invoking the Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c) of the Act, which has been confirmed by ld. CIT (A) by considering the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of MAK Data Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (2013) 358 ITR 593 (SC). But for imposing the penalty under Explanation 5A on the basis of statement recorded during the course of search, it is necessary to be found incriminating documents and is to be considered at the time of assessment framed under section 153A of the Act

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DATE: May 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 2, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(1): The Tribunal cannot consider new material or information which comes to the possession of the AO after passing the assessment order. The appellate procedure is designed to adjudicate matters that were originally framed in the assessment order and new material cannot be considered

Under the scheme of the Act, the order passed by the assessing officer is being contested by the assessee before Ld CIT(A) and thereafter, by both the parties before the Tribunal, if they feel aggrieved by the order passed by Ld CIT(A). After passing the assessment order, the assessing officer becomes functus officio and hence, if any material or information comes to the knowledge of the AO subsequently, then the assessing officer is required to follow the course of action provided under the Act and the Income tax Act does not provide for modification of the order that has already been passed. The appellate procedure has been designed to adjudicate the matters that were originally framed in the assessment order