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DATE: September 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 2, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
Strictures passed against CBDT for causing ‘very unfair discrimination' between taxpayers by extending due date for filing ROI only for taxpayers in P&H and Gujarat and not for those in other States

Taking into account the fact that the decision of the Gujarat High Court and Punjab and Haryana High Court have been accepted by the CBDT issuing orders under Section 119 of the Act but very unfairly in case of an all India Statute restricting its benefit to only two States and one Union Territory. This itself warrants an extension of due date to the same date as is available for the assessees in Gujarat, Punjab and Haryana to avoid any discrimination to the assessees else where

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DATE: September 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 30, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
CBDT directed to forthwith issue an order u/s 119 to extend the due date for filing ROI to 31.10.2015

The Respondent No.2 i.e. CBDT is directed to forthwith issue the order/ notification under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act and extend the due date for Efiling of the Income Tax Returns in respect of the assessee who are required to file return of income by 30th September, 2015 to 31st October, 2015

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DATE: September 8, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 16, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-00, 2000-01
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CITATION:
Law laid down in CIT Vs. Orient (Goa)(P) Ltd 325 ITR 554 that s. 172 is applicable only to non-residents carrying on shipping business and not to residents and that the expenditure of demurrage charges cannot be allowed u/s 40(a)(i) in the absence of TDS does not appear to be correct and issue is referred to Full Bench

We are unable to agree with the above view of this Court in Orient (Goa)(P) Ltd. (supra). This is for the reason that the assessee placed reliance upon Section 172 of the Act in respect of payments made by it to a non-resident shipping company by way of demurrage charges. The tax which is deducted at source by the assessee company is on behalf of the recipient of the charges. The issue before the Court was whether demurrage charges which are paid by the assessee to a non-resident company would be allowed as an expenditure in the absence of deduction of tax at source in view of Section 40(a)(i) of the Act

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DATE: September 9, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 16, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-08
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CITATION:
Circumstances in which gains from sale of shares can be assessed as short-term capital gains and not as business profits explained

On consideration of the above facts, the CIT (A) and Tribunal rightly concluded that compliance on the part of the assessee in terms of Instruction No.1827 dated 31 August 1989 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes laying down the tests for distinguishing the shares held in stock-in-trade and shares held as an investment, the shares held by the assessee was investment and held the income to be treated as short term capital gains

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DATE: March 12, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 10(23C)(via): Institution consistently generating surplus, utilizing the surplus to buy assets, spending meager amount on treatment of poor patients is not existing “solely for philanthropic purpose” and “not for the purpose of profits”. Fact that exemption has been allowed in the past does not mean exemption has to be continued

The intention of the legislature in making provisions of section 10 (23C)(via) is that an institution shall exist solely for philanthropic purpose and not for the purpose of profits. The expression “solely for philanthropic purpose” and “not for the purpose of profits” spells out a clear intention of the legislature that the institution should not merely exist for philanthropic purpose but existence shall not be for profits. Satisfaction of this twin test by an institution claiming a deduction would entitle it for the benefit of the provisions of section 10 (23C)(via) of the Act

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DATE: March 12, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1980-81, 1981-82
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CITATION:
S. 32: Expenditure allowable u/s 35D cannot be capitalized to asset for claim of depreciation

A plain reading of section 35D indicates that the Legislature has thought it appropriate to give a special benefit to the assessee in respect of expenditure specified in sub-section (2) incurred before commencement of business or after the commencement of business, in connection with the extension of industrial undertaking or in connection with setting up a new industrial unit. This provision allows amortisation of the specific category of expenditures incurred by the assessee, by way of deduction of an amount equal to one-tenth of such expenditure for each of the ten successive previous years as provided therein. The legislature, therefore, having specifically provided for amortisation of the preliminary expenditure which includes expenditure incurred for issuance of shares by the assessee in connection with the issue of shares, the said expenditure on issue of shares is not eligible for depreciation.

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DATE: March 3, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 12, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Law laid down in Zoom Comm 327 ITR 510 (Del) does not apply if claim of assessee is bona fide and not in defiance of the law

The decision of the Delhi High Court in Zoom Communication P. Ltd. 327 ITR 510 (Del) is not applicable in the present facts for the reason that in this case, the stand taken by the assessee cannot be said to be in defiance of law and thus not bonafide

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DATE: February 11, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 24, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
(i) Even if gains have accrued on execution of the development agreement as per Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas, the subsequent modification/ supercession of the agreement means that gains are not taxable as per real income theory, (ii) expenditure on buy-back of shares of warring shareholders is business expenditure

In Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia, the issue was to determine the year in which the property was transferred for the purpose of capital gains. In this case the issue is what is the consideration received for the transfer of an asset. No income is accrued or received of the value of 18000 sq.feet of constructed area under the development agreement because the said agreement was not acted upon as it came to be uperseded/modified by the Tripartite agreement. This was the position when the return of income was filed. On the application of the real income theory, there would be neither accrual nor receipt of income to warrant bringing to tax to the constructed area of 18,000 sq.ft which has not been received by the assessee (CIT vs. Shoorji Vallabhdas 46 ITR 144 (SC) followed)

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DATE: January 28, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 24, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 147: S. 143(3) assessment order is not a scrap of paper & AO is expected to have applied his mind. Reopening on ground of "oversight, inadvertence or mistake" is not permissible

The argument that the AO has been careless in bringing to tax a particular amount which is chargeable to tax and that the Revenue should not be precluded from issuing notice u/s 148 overlooks the fact that power to reopen is not a power to review an assessment order. At the time of passing assessment order, it expected of the AO that he will apply mind and pass an order. An assessment order is not a mere scrap of paper. To accept the submission of the department would mean to negate the well settled position in law as stated by the Supreme Court in CIT Vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd 256 ITR 1 (Delhi)(FB) that the concept of ‘change of opinion’ brought in so as to have in built test to check abuse of power

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DATE: February 13, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 16, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 260A: Entire law on condonation of delay explained

Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be stretched to bring about a situation of unsettling judicial decisions which stood accepted by the parties. If the contention of the applicant is accepted, it would create a situation of chaos and unsettling various orders passed from time to time by the Tribunal as accepted by the parties. The legislative mandate in stipulating a limitation to file an appeal within the prescribed limitation cannot be permitted to be defeated when a litigant has taken a decision not to pursue further proceedings. A new ruling is no ground for reviewing a previous judgment. If this is permitted, the inevitable consequence is confusion, chaos, uncertainty and inconvenience as then no orders can ever attain finality though accepted by parties

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