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Search Results For: Mohan M. Shantagoudar J

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DATE: June 1, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 11, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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S. 147: The reasons in support of the s. 148 notice is the very issue in respect of which the AO had raised a query during the assessment proceedings and the Petitioner had responded justifying its stand. The non-rejection of the explanation in the Assessment Order amounts to the AO accepting the view of the assessee, thus taking a view/forming an opinion. In these circumstances, the reasons in support of the notice proceed on a mere change of opinion and would be completely without jurisdiction

The non-rejection of the explanation in the Assessment Order would amount to the Assessing Officer accepting the view of the assessee, thus taking a view/forming an opinion. Therefore, in these circumstances, the reasons in support of the impugned notice proceed on a mere change of opinion and therefore would be completely without jurisdiction in the present facts

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DATE: May 11, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 16, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Doctrine of "Force Majeure" & "Frustration of Contract": Under Indian contract law, the consequences of a force majeure event are provided for u/s 56 of the Contract Act, which states that on the occurrence of an event which renders the performance impossible, the contract becomes void thereafter. When the parties have not provided for what would take place when an event which renders the performance of the contract impossible, then S. 56 of the Contract Act applies. The effect of the doctrine of frustration is that it discharges all the parties from future obligations (Imp judgements referred)

From the aforesaid discussion, it can be said that the contract was based on a fixed rate. The party, before entering the tender process, entered the contract after mitigating the risk of such an increase. If the purpose of the tender was to limit the risks of price variations, then the interpretation placed by the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be said to be possible one, as it would completely defeat the explicit wordings and purpose of the contract. There is no gainsaying that there will be price fluctuations which a prudent contractor would have taken into margin, while bidding in the tender. Such price fluctuations cannot be brought under Clause 23 unless specific language points to the inclusion.

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DATE: March 19, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 24, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 143(1-A): The object of s. 143(1- A) is the prevention of evasion of tax. As it has the deterrent effect of preventing tax evasion, it should be made to apply only to tax evaders. It can only be invoked where it is found on facts that the lesser amount stated in the return filed by the assessee is a result of an attempt to evade tax lawfully payable by the assessee. The burden of proving that the assessee has so attempted to evade tax is on the Revenue which may be discharged by establishing facts and circumstances from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the assessee has, in fact, attempted to evade tax lawfully payable by it

Taking a cue from Varghese case, we therefore, hold that Section 143(1-A) can only be invoked where it is found on facts that the lesser amount stated in the return filed by the assessee is a result of an attempt to evade tax lawfully payable by the assessee. The burden of proving that the assessee has so attempted to evade tax is on the Revenue which may be discharged by the Revenue by establishing facts and circumstances from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the assessee has, in fact, attempted to evade tax lawfully payable by it

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DATE: December 18, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 23, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Effect of dismissal of SLP: It is well-settled that the dismissal of an SLP by the Supreme Court against an order or judgment of a lower forum is not an affirmation of the same. If such an order is non-speaking, it does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, or attract the doctrine of merger

It is evident that all the above orders were non-speaking orders, inasmuch as they were confined to a mere refusal to grant special leave to appeal to the petitioners therein. At this juncture, it is useful to recall that it is well-settled that the dismissal of an SLP against an order or judgment of a lower forum is not an affirmation of the same. If such an order of this Court is non-speaking, it does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, or attract the doctrine of merger

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DATE: July 30, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 31, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Entire law on interpretation of statues relating to 'purposive interpretation', 'strict interpretation', 'literal interpretation', etc explained. Difference in interpretation of statutes vs. exemption notifications explained. Q whether there is doubt or ambiguity in interpretation of a statute or notification benefit of doubt should go to the taxpayer or to the revenue explained. Law on Doctrine of substantial compliance and “intended use” also explained

Literally exemption is freedom from liability, tax or duty. Fiscally, it may assume varying shapes, specially, in a growing economy. For instance tax holiday to new units, concessional rate of tax to goods or persons for limited period or with the specific objective etc. That is why its construction, unlike charging provision, has to be tested on different touchstone. In fact, an exemption provision is like an exception and on normal principle of construction or interpretation of statutes it is construed strictly either because of legislative intention or on economic justification of inequitable burden or progressive approach of fiscal provisions intended to augment State revenue. But once exception or exemption becomes applicable no rule or principles requires it to be construed strictly. Truly speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject, but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction

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DATE: April 24, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 26, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 147/ 148: In order to constitute "change in opinion", the assessment earlier made must either expressly or by necessary implication have expressed an opinion on the subject matter of reopening. If the assessment order is non-speaking, cryptic or perfunctory in nature, it may be difficult to attribute to the AO any opinion on the questions that are raised in the proposed re-assessment proceedings. The reassessment cannot be struck down as being based on "change of opinion" if the assessment order does not address itself to the aspect sought to be examined in the re-assessment proceedings.

Before interfering with the proposed re-opening of the assessment on the ground that the same is based only on a change in opinion, the court ought to verify whether the assessment earlier made has either expressly or by necessary implication expressed an opinion on a matter which is the basis of the alleged escapement of income that was taxable. If the assessment order is non-speaking, cryptic or perfunctory in nature, it may be difficult to attribute to the assessing officer any opinion on the questions that are raised in the proposed re-assessment proceedings. Every attempt to bring to tax, income that has escaped assessment, cannot be absorbed by judicial intervention on an assumed change of opinion even in cases where the order of assessment does not address itself to a given aspect sought to be examined in the re-assessment proceedings.

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DATE: March 28, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1994-95
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S. 143(1)(a): Even though there was a raging controversy amongst the High Courts on whether expenditure for raising capital is capital or revenue in nature, the judgement of the jurisdictional High Court is binding on the assessee and any view contrary thereto is a "prima facie" mistake that requires adjustment

Even though it is a debatable issue but as Gujarat High Court in the case of Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico (P) Ltd. (supra) had taken a view that it is capital expenditure which was subsequently followed by Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. V. CIT (supra) and the registered office of the respondent assessee being in the State of Gujarat, the law laid down by the Gujarat High Court was binding. (See Taylor Instrument Com.(India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1998) 232 ITR 771, Commissioner of Gift Tax v. J.K. Jain (1998) 230 ITR 839, Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sunil Kumar (1995) 212 ITR 238, Commissioner of Income Tax v. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd. – (1994) 206 ITR 727, Indian Tube Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors. (1993) 203 ITR 54, Commissioner of Income Tax v. P.C. Joshi & B.C. Joshi (1993) 202 ITR 1017 and Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy (1957) 32 ITR 466). Therefore, so far as the present case is concerned, it cannot be said that the issue was a debatable one

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DATE: March 28, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 8, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Capital gains: An amount received from a wholly-owned subsidiary in consideration of transfer of shares of the WOS to a group of shareholders is not taxable as capital gains. The Department cannot subject a transaction under the Gift-tax Act and also levy tax under the Income-tax Act.

It is not in dispute that M/s Annamalaiar Textiles (P) Ltd. did not pay any amount to the shareholders who ultimately got the shares transferred in their names. The respondent was holding 100 per cent shares of M/s Annamalaiar Textiles (P) Ltd., before it was transferred to Group B. No payment was made to the shareholders belonging to Group B and, therefore, the question of there being any capital gains at the hands of the respondent herein does not arise

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