Home › › Page 4

Search Results For: Vibhu Bakhru J

This section is now closed. Click here for new judgements


Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: October 16, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 20, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 17(3)(iii): Amount received by prospective employee for loss of employment offer is a capital receipt and is neither taxable as "salary" or as "other sources"

In other words, Section 17(3)(iii)(A) pre-supposes the existence of an employment, i.e., a relationship of employee and employer between the Assessee and the person who makes the payment of “any amount” in terms of Section 17(3)(iii) of the Act. Likewise, Section 17(3)(iii)(B) also pre-supposes the existence of the relationship of employer and employee between the person who makes the payment of the amount and the Assessee. It envisages the amount being received by the Assessee “after cessation of his employment”. Therefore, the words in Section 17(3)(iii) cannot be read disjunctively to overlook the essential facet of the provision, viz., the existence of ‘employment’ i.e. a relationship of employer and employee between the person who makes the payment of the amount and the Assessee

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — 1 Comment ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: October 8, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 147: Reopening only on the basis of information received that the assessee has introduced unaccounted money in the form of accommodation entries without showing in what manner the AO applied independent mind to the information renders the reopening void

Without forming a prima facie opinion, on the basis of such material, it was not possible for the AO to have simply concluded: “it is evident that the assessee company has introduced its own unaccounted money in its bank by way of accommodation entries”. In the considered view of the Court, in light of the law explained with sufficient clarity by the Supreme Court in the decisions discussed hereinbefore, the basic requirement that the AO must apply his mind to the materials in order to have reasons to believe that the income of the Assessee escaped assessment is missing in the present case

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: October 9, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1991-92, 1992-93
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 263: Claim that notional interest on funds placed by the s. 10A eligible unit with the H.O. is allowable as a deduction to the H.O. and is exempt in the hands of the s. 10A unit is an “unsustainable view” justifying revision action

The Assessee has not derived any interest income. Therefore, reducing such notional income – which has neither been accrued nor received – from the Assessee’s total income is completely alien to the scheme of the Act. Such notional interest could never form a part of the Assessee’s income and thus the Assessee’s claim that the same is to be excluded under Section 10A of the Act is flawed and wholly unsustainable in law. The view as canvassed on behalf of the Assessee is not, even remotely, plausible

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — 1 Comment ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: October 9, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 13, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 147: Laid laid down in ALA Firm v. CIT 189 ITR 285 (SC) does not mean that an assessment can be reopened merely because the AO omitted to apply a binding judgement

The Court is of the view that, in a case where the assessment is sought to be reopened in 2009, four years after it was originally made, i.e. 2005, the mere fact that there was a judgment of the Supreme Court of 1997 which was not noticed by the AO when he framed the original assessment cannot per se constitute the only material on the basis of which the assessment could have been reopened. When on the same material, four years after the assessment year for which the original assessment is finalised, the AO seeks to reopen the assessment on the basis of a judicial precedent delivered more than eight years earlier, it would be a case of mere ‘change of opinion’, something clearly held impermissible by CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. (supra), The threshold requirement of that the AO should, on the basis of some tangible material, conclude that there was escapement of income on account of the Assessee failing to disclose material particulars, is not fulfilled in the present case

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: October 6, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 12, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 10A/ 80HHE: Claiming deduction u/s 80HHE for one year does not debar the assessee from claiming deduction u/s 10A for another year. Fact that claim is not made via a revised return is no bar on the right of the appellate authority to consider it

Making of a claim under Section 80HHE of the Act in one assessment year will not preclude an Assessee from claiming the benefit under Section 10A of the Act in respect of the same unit in a succeeding assessment year. The purpose of the Section 80HHE(5) of the Act was to avoid double benefit but that would not mean that if for a particular assessment year the Assessee wants to claim a benefit only under Section 10A of the Act and not Section 80HHE, that would be denied to the Assessee

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — 1 Comment ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 28, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 9, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 44BB: Service tax & Customs duty collected by assessee from clients is not includible in gross receipt while computing income u/s 44BB

The Court concurs with the decision of the High Court of Uttarakhand in DIT v. Schlumberger Asia Services Ltd (2009) 317 ITR 156 which held that the reimbursement received by the Assessee of the customs duty paid on equipment imported by it for rendering services would not form part of the gross receipts for the purposes of Section 44 BB of the Act. The Court accordingly holds that for the purposes of computing the ‘presumptive income’ of the assessee for the purposes of Section 44 BB of the Act, the service tax collected by the Assessee on the amount paid by it for rendering services is not to be included in the gross receipts in terms of Section 44 BB (2) read with Section 44 BB (1). The service tax is not an amount paid or payable, or received or deemed to be received by the Assessee for the services rendered by it. The Assessee is only collecting the service tax for passing it on to the government

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 24, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 14A/ Rule 8D cannot be automatically invoked. It cannot be invoked if the AO does not record satisfaction as to why the assessee’s voluntary disallowance is not proper

The Court disapproves of the AO invoking Section 14A read with Rule 8D (2) of the Rules without recording his satisfaction. The recording of satisfaction as to why “the voluntary disallowance made by the assessee was unreasonable and unsatisfactory” is a mandatory re-quirement of the law

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: September 24, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1994-95
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Entire law on whether leasehold rights constitute a "capital asset" u/s 2(14), whether there is a "transfer" u/s 2(47) of such rights and whether "capital gains" u/s 45 can arise explained in detail

The Court is unable to agree with the above approach of the ITAT to interpreting what appear to be plain and unambiguous provisions of the Act. It is useful to recall that this entire discussion is in the backdrop of what constitutes “transfer” in relation to a capital asset. Further, the entire exercise is for ultimately determining if there has been any capital gains arising from the transaction. Under Section 45(1) ‘capital gains’ are any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year. When the word “transfer” itself has been defined under Section 2(47) (vi) and by virtue of Explanation 1 “shall” have the same meaning as Section 269UA(d) then it is not possible to ‘restrict’ Explanation 1 to only those transactions described in Chapter XXC. Explanation 1 is a deeming fiction and incorporates by way of reference the provisions of Section 269 UA (d) in order to understand the meaning of the word ‘transfer’ for the purposes of Section 2 (47) (vi). Therefore, that entire scheme has to be given effect to. In other words, it is not possible to omit the reference to Section 269UA(d) (i) which in turn brings in Section 269UA(f) (i). The ITAT has therefore erred in conveniently choosing to not apply the Explanation 1 to Section 2 (47) in order to arrive at the conclusion there was indeed a ‘transfer’ of a capital asset brought about by the lease agreement in question

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 14, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 28, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 2(14)(iii)(b): To determine whether the “agricultural land” is situated within 8 km of the municipal limits so as to constitute a “capital asset”, the distance has to be measured in terms of the approach road and not by the straight line distance on horizontal plane or as per crow's flight

The Court is of the view that for the purposes of Section 2 (14) (iii) (b) of the Income-tax Act, the distance had to be measured from the agricultural land in question to the outer limit of the municipality by road and not by the straight line or the aerial route. The distance has to be measured from the land in question itself and not from the village in which the land is situated

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — 1 Comment ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 11, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 14, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 54: To constitute purchase of new house, a registered sale deed is not necessary. Suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot partake the character of evidence

For the purpose of attracting the provisions of Section 54 of the IT Act, it is not necessary that the Assessee should become the owner of the property. Section 54 of the said Act speaks of purchase. Moreover, the ownership of the property may have different connotation in different statutes. It is wrong to hold that for the purpose of applicability of Section 54, registration of document is imperative

Read more ›