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Posted on by Ankul Goyal — No Comments ↓
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DATE: May 4, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 5, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06
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CITATION:
Important principles laid down whether profits arising from off-shore supply of goods can be taxed in India on basis that (a) the goods continued in the possession of seller till acceptance of the goods by buyer in India, (b) the seller had a liaison office in India, (c) the seller had a wholly-owned subsidiary in India which negotiated contacts with the buyer, (d) installation, commissioning etc services were provided in India etc

The controversy whether the Assessee has a PE in India is interlinked to the finding that Nortel India had discharged some of the obligations of the Assessee under the Equipment Contract. Whilst, the Income Tax Authorities have held that the contracts entered into with Reliance – the Equipment Contact, Software Contract and Services Contract – are essentially a part of the singular turnkey contract, the Assessee contends to the contrary. Further, the Income Tax Authorities have held that a part of the Equipment Contract assigned to the Assessee was, in fact, performed by Nortel India. This too, is stoutly disputed by the Assessee. The question whether the Assessee has a PE in India is clearly interlinked with the issue whether Nortel India or Nortel LO had performed any of the functions or discharged any of the obligations assumed by the Assessee. Assessee argued that agreement for supply of hardware (Equipment Contract) could have been directly executed between Reliance and the Assessee but owing to relaince’s insistence on an Indian company being responsible for the entire works, agreements were executed between Nortel India and Reliance, with Nortel Canada as a surety.

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DATE: April 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-99, 1999-00
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CITATION:
S. 153A assessment cannot be made for the AYs in which incriminating material is not recovered even though incriminating material may be recovered for other years in the block of 6 years

It has been noticed by the ITAT in the impugned order that for the AYs in question no incriminating material qua the Assessee was found. In that view of the matter, and in light of the decision of this Court in CIT v. Kabul Chawla [2016] 380 ITR 573 (Delhi), the Court is of the view that the impugned order of the ITAT suffers from no legal infirmity and no substantial question of law arises for determination

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DATE: April 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 27, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 245: Approach of the department of setting off / adjusting refund against demand without serving a prior s. 245 intimation to the assessee and without providing opportunity of hearing to assessee & without arriving at a satisfaction to the effect that such adjustment of refund can only be the mode of recovery of demand is bad in law. Dept directed to refund the amount set off / adjusted together with interest

In our view, the power under Section 245 of the Act, is a discretionary power given to each of the tax officers in the higher echelons to “set off the amount to be refunded or any part of that amount against the same, if any, remaining payable under this Act by the person to whom the refund is due.‟ That this power is discretionary and not mandatory is indicated by the word “may”. Secondly, the set off is in lieu of payment of refund. Thirdly, before invoking the power, the officer is expected to give an intimation in writing to the Assessee to whom the refund is due informing him of the action proposed to be taken under this Section

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DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Section 147, reopening, reopening on factually erroneous premise, not permissible, change of opinion

Since the action of the Revenue was based on a factually erroneous premise, the Court is of the view that the reopening of the assessments for the said AYs is not sustainable in law. The Court is also satisfied that the requirement of the law, as explained by the Court in Commissioner of Income Tax. v. Kelvinator of India Limited (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC), and reiterated in the later decisions, has not been fulfilled in the present case

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DATE: March 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 2, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1991-92
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(iii): Salaries paid to expatriate employees overseas on which tax was paid in accordance with CBDT Circular dated 685 dated 17/20.06.1994 and Circular 686 dated 12.8.94 is permissible as a deduction even though the tax is not paid within the time limit but is paid subsequently

An absence of a provision similar to the proviso to sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act cannot be read as to disentitle an Assessee to claim a deduction even though it has complied with the condition under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act. A plain reading of proviso to sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act indicates that where an Assessee has not deducted or paid the tax at source in terms of Chapter XVII B in respect of any sum as specified under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act, the Assessee can, nonetheless, claim a deduction in the year in which the assessee deposits the tax. This benefit is not available to an assessee in respect of payments chargeable under the head “Salaries” which fall within sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Section 40 and not sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act. Thus, an assessee would not be entitled to claim deduction on account of salaries if it fails to deduct or pay the amount under Chapter XVII B of the Act. In cases where such assessee deposits the amount in a subsequent year, the Assessee would still not be able to claim the deduction in the year in which such tax is deposited; his claim for deduction can be considered only in respect of the year to which such expense relates. Therefore, in cases where the assessments stand concluded, the Assessee would lose the benefit of deduction for the expenses incurred on account of its failure to have deposited the tax at source. Thus, concededly, in the present case the Assessee has lost its right to claim a deduction for a period of six years – AY 1985-86 to AY 1990-91- even though the Assessee has paid the TDS on the expenses pertaining to said period

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DATE: February 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 to 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 147: The reopening of the assessment is not valid if the reasons recorded are incoherent and do not indicate what the basis for reopening is

A plain reading of the reasons recorded for reopening reveals that the reasons are totally incoherent. In fact, a plain reading of it gives rise to doubts whether some lines have gone missing or some punctuation marks have been left out. Grammatically also the reasons recorded make little sense. However, this is the least of the problems. Essentially, the reasons recorded do not indicate what the basis for the reopening of the assessments is

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DATE: January 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 147: Reopening of assessment to take remedial action pursuant to audit objections as per Instruction No. 9 of 2006 is not valid if AO disagrees with the objections. Instruction No. 9 cannot override the requirement in s. 147 that AO should form his own belief that income has escaped assessment

The Court holds instruction No. 9 of the CBDT dated 7th November, 2006 cannot possibly override the statutory powers to be exercised by an AO in terms of Section 147 of the Act. In other words the said instruction has to be read consistent with proviso (a) to Section 119 (1) of the Act and cannot, as was erroneously understood by the Respondent, compel the AO to issue the notice u/s 148. If the CBDT Instruction No. 9/2006 is read to the contrary, it would fall foul of Section 119 of the Act.

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DATE: January 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi): While consideration paid to acquire the right to use software is assessable as "royalty", payments made for purchase of software as a product is not for use or the right to use the software and is not assessable as "royalty"

In the cases where an Assessee acquires the right to use a software the payment so made would amount to royalty. However in cases where the payments are made for purchase of software as a product, the consideration paid cannot be considered to be for use or the right to use the software. It is well settled that where software is sold as a product it would amount to sale of goods. In the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 271 ITR 401 (SC), the Supreme Court examined the transactions relating to the purchase and sale of software recorded on a CD in the context of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The court held the same to be goods within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the said Act and consequently exigible to sales tax under the said Act. Clearly, the consideration paid for purchase of goods cannot be considered as ‘royalty’. Thus, it is necessary to make a distinction between the cases where consideration is paid to acquire the right to use a patent or a copyright and cases where payment is made to acquire patented or a copyrighted product/ material. In cases where payments are made to acquire products which are patented or copyrighted, the consideration paid would have to be treated as a payment for purchase of the product rather than consideration for use of the patent or copyright

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DATE: January 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 50B/43(6)(c): In computing the net worth for computing capital gains from a slump sale, depreciation on assets have to be deducted even if not claimed by the assessee

Plainly, the purpose of clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act is to provide a methodology to compute the written down value of the block of assets transferred by an Assessee as a part of the undertaking or division sold by way of a slump sale. The reference to Clause C is clearly not for the purposes of computing the block of assets remaining with the Assessee after the slump sale. It is apparent from the above that the intended object and scope of Clause C as used in Section 50B of the Act is totally different than the purpose of the said provision when read as a part of Section 43 of the Act. In the circumstances, clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act must be read in a manner to expressly include the computation provisions of Clause C without reference to other the import of the said provisions of Section 43 of the Act. In our view, the ITAT fell into error in importing the interpretation of Clause C read as a part of Section 43 of the Act, to interpret the scope of clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act

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DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 79: The transfer of shares of an Indian company by a holding Co (Yum Asia) to another holding Co (Yum Singapore) results in change of “beneficial ownership” of shares and results in disallowance of b/fd losses even though the ultimate beneficial owner remains Yum USA. The corporate veil cannot be pierced to regard the ultimate holding Co as the beneficial owner

Having examined the facts as well as the concurrent orders of the AO and the ITAT, the Court finds that there was indeed a change of ownership of 100% shares of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore, both of which were distinct entities. Although they might be AEs of Yum USA, there is nothing to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. The question of ‘piercing the veil’ at the instance of Yum India does not arise. In the circumstances, it was rightly concluded by the ITAT that in terms of Section 79 of the Act, Yum India cannot be permitted to set off the carry forward accumulated business losses of the earlier years

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