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DATE: October 10, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 18, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 68 Bogus share capital: The ITAT is an adjudicator and not an investigator. It has to rely upon the investigation / enquiry conducted by the AO. The Dept cannot fault the ITAT's order and seek a recall on the ground that an order of SEBI, though available, was not produced before the ITAT at the hearing. The negligence or laches lies with the Dept and for such negligence or laches, the order of the ITAT cannot be termed as erroneous u/s 254(2)

After the passing of the order of the Tribunal the Department has come forward with the final order of the SEBI by stating that, though, it was available at the time of hearing of appeal but it could not be brought to the notice of the Tribunal. Thus, as could be seen whatever negligence or laches for not bringing the final order of SEBI to the notice of the Tribunal lies with the Department and for such negligence or laches of the Department, the appeal order passed by the Tribunal cannot be termed as erroneous to bring it within the ambit of section 254(2) of the Act.

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DATE: July 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 28, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 254(2) Time limit for filing MA: Though the Tribunal has no power u/s 254(2) to condone delay in filing the MA, the High Court has power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to do substantial justice by condoning the delay. Injustice was done to the assessee because the Tribunal did not follow the binding judgement in Manjunatha Cotton and Ginning Factory 359 ITR 565 on the issue of levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c). Accordingly, the delay in fling the MA deserves to be condoned

Though under the provisions of Section 254 the Tribunal cannot go beyond the provisions of the said Section, the fact remains that the petitioner has substantiated that injustice is being done by not following the Division Bench decision of this Court. Therefore, in order to do substantial justice, this Court exercising the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can condone the delay as held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Practice Strategic Communications India Private Limited .vs. C.S.T., Domlur, reported in 2016(45) S.T.R. 47(Kar.)

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DATE: August 3, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 7, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 254(2): If there is no discussion whatsoever by the Tribunal of the various case laws detailed in the submissions filed by the assessee, the order is non-speaking and has to be recalled. The Tribunal should take into account the material and case laws relied upon by the assessee during the hearing

We find that, though the order dated 13th February, 2015 does render a finding that no positive material was brought on record, there is no discussion whatsoever of the various case laws detailed in the submissions which according to the petitioner clinches the issues in support of its case that the shareholding investment by the five Companies was genuine. In the above view, the Tribunal ought to have allowed the petitioner’s Rectification Application and considered the petitioner’s Appeal before it on merits, inter-alia, taking into account the material and case laws which has been already filed by the petitioner’s during the hearing leading to the order dated 13th February, 2015

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DATE: April 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 31, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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S. 254(2): The limitation period for filing a Rectification Application has to be computed from the date of "communication" of the order and not from the date of passing the order. The fact that the order was pronounced in open court is not relevant because the parties will not be aware of the mistakes therein until after perusal of the order.

So far as the arguments of the Ld. DR that the date of communication is to be taken either as ‘communication or knowledge, actual or constructive’ of the order sought to be reviewed’ is concerned, we are guided by the decision of the full Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘State of Punjab Vs. Mst.Qaisar Jehan Begum and Another’ AIR 1963 SC 1604: (1964) 1 SCR 971. (Full Bench), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the words ‘knowledge either actually or constructively’ has held that the knowledge of award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that the award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. The said proposition of law can be safely applied to the case in hand. Though the operative part of the order may be in the knowledge of the assessee, however, whether there is any mistake apparent on record in the contents of the order, it can be noticed only after going through the contents of the order

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DATE: May 11, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 254(2) r.w Rule 34(5): Excessive delay by the Tribunal in passing judgement shakes the confidence of the litigants. Under Rule 34(5) of the Tribunal Rules read with Shivsagar Veg. Restaurant 317 ITR 433 (Bom) & Otters Club (Bom), orders have to be passed invariably within three months of the completion of hearing of the case. The delay is incurable. Even administrative clearance cannot cure the delay. Such decisions rendered after 3 months reflect a mistake apparant from the record and have to be recalled and the appeals heard afresh

Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of a judgment, unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments. Justice, as we have often observed, must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done.

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DATE: March 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 21, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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S. 254(2): Tribunal orders (in sister concern's case) are binding on the Tribunal unless set-aside or stayed. A rectification application on the ground that the orders in the sister concern's case are not correct is not permissible as it amounts to a review

The Revenue has filed appeals in the sister concern case for the Assessment Years 199697 to 200001 under Section 260A of the Act to this Court. The question raised therein is on the issue of appropriate classification of the rent/ compensation under the head ‘income from the other sources’ or under the head ‘income from the house property’. The aforesaid appeals have been admitted and are awaiting consideration for final disposal. Till such time, as the orders of the Tribunal of its Coordinate Bench in respect of the Assessment Years 1996-97 to 2000-01 are set aside or are stayed pending the final disposal, its ratio would, prima facie, continue to be binding. Therefore, even if the Revenue seek to contend to the contrary it would be a debatable issue. This cannot be a subject matter of rectification

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DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 254(2) Limitation period: The amendment to s. 254(2) to curtail the limitation period for filing rectification applications to six months from four years is prospective and applicable to appeal orders passed after 01/06/2016 and not the orders passed prior to 01/06/2016. The contrary view in Lavanya Land (Mum ITAT) is not good law in view of K. Ravindranathan Nair (SC)

We found that Tribunal in the case of Lavanya Land Private Limited vide order dated 25/04/2017 have held that since miscellaneous application was filed beyond a period of six months from the date of the order of the Tribunal which was sought to be rectified, the miscellaneous application was barred by limitation. We observe that while rendering the decision, the Co-ordinate Bench has not considered the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Ravindranathan Nair (Supra) where Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that right to appeal is vested in the litigant at the commencement of Lis and therefore, such vested right cannot be taken away and cannot be impaired or made more stringent by any subsequent legislation unless the subsequent legislation said so either expressly or by necessary intendment. An intention in interfere or impair a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by the express words or by necessary implication

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DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 14, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 254(2) Limitation period: The amendment to s. 254(2) w.e.f. 01.06.2016 to curtail the period available to file rectification applications from four years to six months cannot apply to appellate orders passed prior to that date because that would take away a vested right

The reason for the said principle is not far to seek. Though periods of limitation, being procedural law, are to be applied retrospectively, yet if a shorter period of limitation is provided by a later amendment to a statute, such period would render the vested right of action contained in the statute nugatory as such right of action would now become time barred under the amended provision

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DATE: January 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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For purposes of filing a rectification application, the period of limitation of six months commences from the date of receipt of the order sought to be rectified by the assessee and not from the date of passing of the order

The second part of the Section requires that the Tribunal shall make such amendments if the mistake is brought to its notice by either party to the appeal before it. The party to the appeal can bring the fact of apparent mistake on record only after going through the order made by the tribunal. Therefore, to read that the period of limitation has to computed at any time within six months from the date of the order does not fit in either with legislative intent or the language employed by the provision.

15. There is another angle from which the matter can be approached. It is only the party to the appeal who finds that the order contains a mistake apparent from the record and is aggrieved by such mistake, would be in a position to move an application seeking rectification of the order. Therefore also, unless and until a party to the appeal is in a position to go through and study the order it would not be possible, nor can it be envisaged, that a party can claim to be aggrieved by the mistake apparent from the record. Hence, even on this count the period of limitation has to be read and understood so as to mean from the date of the receipt of the order

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DATE: April 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): The amendment by the Finance Act 2016 w.e.f. 01.06.2016 to specify the time limit of 6 months to file a rectification application applies even to applications filed with respect to appeal orders passed prior to the date of the amendment. The Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing a Miscellaneous Application

It is to be noted that the earlier period of ‘four years’ has been substituted with ‘six months’ by the Finance Act, 2016 with effect from 01/06/2016. However, we find that no distinction has been made in this section between orders passed before 01/06/2016 and orders passed after 01/06/2016. Moreover, the Tribunal order was dated 22/03/2013 and therefore, the Revenue had ample time to go through the same and pin point the mistakes in the order but it has failed to do so. Therefore, we find no force in these miscellaneous petitions primarily because of the reason that the Statute does not authorize us to entertain any petition which has been filed u/s 254(2) at any time beyond a period of six months from the date of the order

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