Category: All Judgements

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CIT vs. Raghuvir Synthetics Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: March 28, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1994-95
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CITATION:
S. 143(1)(a): Even though there was a raging controversy amongst the High Courts on whether expenditure for raising capital is capital or revenue in nature, the judgement of the jurisdictional High Court is binding on the assessee and any view contrary thereto is a "prima facie" mistake that requires adjustment

Even though it is a debatable issue but as Gujarat High Court in the case of Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico (P) Ltd. (supra) had taken a view that it is capital expenditure which was subsequently followed by Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. V. CIT (supra) and the registered office of the respondent assessee being in the State of Gujarat, the law laid down by the Gujarat High Court was binding. (See Taylor Instrument Com.(India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1998) 232 ITR 771, Commissioner of Gift Tax v. J.K. Jain (1998) 230 ITR 839, Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sunil Kumar (1995) 212 ITR 238, Commissioner of Income Tax v. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd. – (1994) 206 ITR 727, Indian Tube Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors. (1993) 203 ITR 54, Commissioner of Income Tax v. P.C. Joshi & B.C. Joshi (1993) 202 ITR 1017 and Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy (1957) 32 ITR 466). Therefore, so far as the present case is concerned, it cannot be said that the issue was a debatable one

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Pragati Financial Management Pvt. Ltd vs. CIT (Calcutta High Court)

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DATE: March 7, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Bogus share capital: Mere fact that payment was received by cheque or that the applicants were companies borne on the file of the Registrar of Companies does not prove that the transaction was genuine. Even under the unamended s. 68, the onus is on the assessee prove the creditworthiness of the subscribers. Argument that the amendment to s. 68 is not retrospective is not required to be considered

We have already observed that the judgment in the case of Rajmandir Estates Private Ltd. (supra) was delivered considering the unamended provision of Section 68 of the Act. In the case of the assessees before us, there is no differing feature so far as applicability of the said statutory provision is concerned, even though the Tribunal in Subhalakshmi Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. (supra) had held that the provisos to Section 68 of the Act are retrospective in their operation, and delivered the decision against the assessee in that case that reasoning. In the appeal of Rajmandir Estates Private Ltd. (supra), the Coordinate Bench did not consider it necessary to examine the question of retroactivity of the aforesaid provision. The Coordinate Bench found the order of the C.I.T. to be valid examining the order applying the unamended provision of Section 68 of the Act only. We do not find any other distinguishing element in these appeals which would require addressing the question as to whether the amendment to Section 68 of the Act was retrospective in operation or not. Neither do we need to address the issue that if the inquiries, as directed, revealed that share capital infused were actually unaccounted money, whether the same could be taxed in accordance with Section 56(2) (vii b) or not

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Pr CIT vs. Diana Builders & Contractors Pvt. Ltd (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: April 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Strictures passed regarding the "standard excuses" of the department for delay in filing appeals, namely, budgetary constraints, lack of infrastructure to make soft copies, change of standing counsel etc

The Court finds that the standard excuse that the Department is putting forth in all such applications for condonation of delay in re-filing the appeal is two-fold. The first is regarding the budgetary constraints of the Department which delayed payment of the differential court fees as a result of the Court Fees Delhi Amendment Act, 2012 which came into force on 1st August 2012. The second is regarding the practice directions issued by the Court pertaining to filing of soft copies of the paperbooks in tax matters

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

MIG Cricket Club vs. DIT (E) (ITAT Mumbai)

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DATE: April 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 2(15)/12AA: The activities of Banquet Hall Hiring, Hospitality (Restaurants) and Permit Room (Bar) are prima facie in the nature of carrying on trade, commerce, or business for consideration and are hit by the proviso to s. 2(15). If the receipts from these activities are in excess of the minimum prescribed threshold limit, the DIT is required to conduct detailed enquiry and examination as to the nexus between the activities and trade, commerce or business

In the light of the above observation and respectfully following the same, we are prima facie of the opinion that the activities of the assessee of Banquet Hall Hiring, Hospitality (Restaurants) and Permit Room (Bar) are in the nature of carrying on trade, commerce, or business for consideration, which are hit by proviso to Section 2(15) of 1961 Act. We further observe that the receipts from these activities, during the previous year relevant to the impugned assessment year 2009-10, are far in excess of minimum prescribed threshold limit. This requires detailed enquiry and examination by the Ld. DIT(Exemption) as to the various activities undertaken by the assessee over a period of time and its nexus with activity of rendering of trade commerce or business as contemplated and mandated by amended Section 2(15) of 1961 Act read in conjunction with significant observations made in the above order dated 14-2-2017 in North Indian Association(supra). Thus, enquiry and examination by learned DIT(E) is further required to arrive at a conclusion whether activities of the assessee are genuine or not in context of Section 11 of the Act read with amended Section 2(15) of the Act and breach of threshold limit over a period of time

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Formula One World Championship Limited vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 24, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 26, 2017 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
Article 5 India-UK DTAA: Entire law on what constitutes a "permanent establishment" in the context of the 'Formula One Grand Prix of India' event explained after extensive reference to case laws, OECD Model Convention and commentary by Philip Baker, Klaus Vogel and other experts

The term “place of business” is explained as covering any premises, facilities or installations used for carrying on the business of the enterprise whether or not they are used exclusively for that purpose. It is clarified that a place of business may also exist where no premises are available or required for carrying on the business of the enterprise and it simply has a certain amount of space at its disposal. Further, it is immaterial whether the premises, facilities or installations are owned or rented by or are otherwise at the disposal of the enterprise. A certain amount of space at the disposal of the enterprise which is used for business activities is sufficient to constitute a place of business. No formal legal right to use that place is required. Thus, where an enterprise illegally occupies a certain location where it carries on its business, that would also constitute a PE. Some of the examples where premises are treated at the disposal of the enterprise and, therefore, constitute PE are: a place of business may thus be constituted by a pitch in a market place, or by a certain permanently used area in a customs depot (e.g. for the storage of dutiable goods). Again the place of business may be situated in the business facilities of another enterprise. This may be the case for instance where the foreign enterprise has at its constant disposal certain premises or a part thereof owned by the other enterprise. At the same time, it is also clarified that the mere presence of an enterprise at a particular location does not necessarily mean that the location is at the disposal of that enterprise

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Vikram Singh vs. UOI (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: April 11, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 279: As there is no time limit prescribed for filing an application for compounding of an offense, the CBDT is not entitled to reject an application on the ground of 'inordinate delay'. The CBDT has no jurisdiction to demand that the assessee pay a 'pre-deposit' as a pre-condition to considering the compounding application. The larger question as whether in the garb of a Circular the CBDT can prescribe the compounding fee in the absence of such fee being provided for either in the statute or prescribed under the rules is left open

The Court finds nothing in Section 279 of the Act or the Explanation thereunder to permit the CBDT to prescribe such an onerous and irrational procedure which runs contrary to the very object of Section 279 of the Act. The CBDT cannot arrogate to itself, on the strength of Section 279 of the Act or the Explanation thereunder, the power to insist on a ‘pre-deposit’ of sorts of the compounding fee even without considering the application for compounding. Indeed Mr Kaushik was unable to deny the possibility, even if theoretical, of the application for compounding being rejected despite the compounding fee being deposited in advance. If that is the understanding of para 11(v) of the above Circular by the Department, then certainly it is undoubtedly ultra vires Section 279 of the Act. The Court, accordingly, clarifies that the Department cannot on the strength of para 11(v) of the Circular dated 23rd December 2014 of the CBDT reject an application for compounding either on the ground of limitation or on the ground that such application was not accompanied by the compounding fee or that the compounding fee was not paid prior to the application being considered on merits

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

M/s Beauty Tax vs. DCIT (ITAT Jaipur)

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DATE: April 10, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Bogus purchases: Merely non-appearance of the supplier in absence of any other corroborate evidence cannot be a basis to justify the stand of the Revenue that the transaction of purchase is bogus

The only grievance of the Assessing Officer is that the assessee has failed to produce the party so as to establish genuineness of the transaction and secondly, no payment has been made to the party till the year end. The ld.CIT(A) while confirming the disallowance has stated that though confirmation has been obtained from the party, however, a simple confirmation is not sufficient to establish the fact of purchase without elaborating what more is required from the assessee to justify its claim

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Small Wonder Industries vs. CIT (ITAT Mumbai)

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DATE: February 24, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 263: There is a distinction between “lack of enquiry” and “inadequate enquiry”. If the AO has called for the necessary details and the assessee has furnished the same, the fact that the AO is silent in the assessment order does not mean that he has not applied his mind so as to justify exercise of revisional powers by the CIT u/s 263

We are of the view, that there is a distinction between “lack of enquiry” and “inadequate enquiry”. In the present case the Assessing Officer collected necessary details, examined the same and then framed the assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act. Therefore, in such a situation the decision from Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in CIT vs. Anil Kumar Sharma (2011) 335 ITR 83 (Del.)(supra), clearly comes to the rescue of the assessee . We are expected to ascertain whether the Assessing Officer had investigated/examined the issue and applied his mind towards the whole record made available by the assessee during assessment proceedings. Uncontrovertedly, necessary details/reply to the questionnaire were filed/produced by the assessee and the same were examined by the Assessing Officer, therefore, it is not a case of lack of enquiry by the Assessing Officer

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

CIT vs. Equinox Solution Pvt. Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1991-92
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CITATION:
S. 45/ 50(2): If an undertaking is sold as a running business with all assets and liabilities for a slump price, no part of the consideration can be attributed to depreciable assets and assessed as a short-term capital gain u/s 50(2). If the undertaking is held for more than three years, it constitutes a "long-term capital asset" and the gains are assessable as a long-term capital gain

In our considered opinion, the case of the respondent (assessee) does not fall within the four corners of Section 50 (2) of the Act. Section 50 (2) applies to a case where any block of assets are transferred by the assessee but where the entire running business with assets and liabilities is sold by the assessee in one go, such sale, in our view, cannot be considered as “short-term capital assets”. In other words, the provisions of Section 50 (2) of the Act would apply to a case where the assessee transfers one or more block of assets, which he was using in running of his business. Such is not the case here because in this case, the assessee sold the entire business as a running concern

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Ultratech Cement Ltd vs. ACIT (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
An additional ground (relating to claim u/s 80-IA) cannot be permitted to be raised if the necessary evidence that the assessee is entitled to the claim is not on record. The fact that claim has been allowed by the AO in a subsequent year and that there is no reason why the claim should not be allowed in the present year is irrelevant. Also, the assessee must satisfy the appellate authority that the ground now raised was bona fide and the same could not have been raised earlier for good reasons

We note that it is an undisputed position before us that for the subject assessment year, the appellant assessee had not claimed benefit of Section 80IA of the Act in respect of its Jetty / Port either before the Assessing Officer or before the CIT(A). A claim for benefit under Section 80IA of the Act can only be made if the infrastructure facility such as Jetty / Port is, among other things, being run on the basis of an agreement for either developing or operating and maintaining or developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility. The sine qua non provided in SubSection (7) of Section 80IA of the Act is the furnishing along with its Return of Income, a report of audited accounts in Form 10CCB as required under Rule 18BBB(3) of the Act. The Form 10CCB which is required to be filed along with Return of Income has various details to be filled in, including the initial assessment year from which the deduction is being claimed, the nature of the activity carried out with regard to the infrastructure facility, namely, whether it is for developing or developing and operating or for developing, operating and maintaining the new infrastructure facility. It is only on examination of those details as submitted by the auditor in Form 10CCB that the claim of deduction can be considered. It is undisputed that for the subject assessment year, no Form 10CCB has been filed by the appellant assessee. Therefore, there is no evidence on record for subject assessment year to allow the claim. The submission of Mr.Agrawal for the appellant that primary evidence in the form of jetty is on record is not acceptable. Mere ownership or existence of jetty is not evidence of eligibility to the benefit of Section 80IA of the Act, which is admittedly conditional upon satisfaction of certain requirements as provided therein

Posted in All Judgements, High Court