It is clear that the prescribed authority has been vested with the power to charge fees under section 234E of the Act only with regard to levy of fees by the substitution made by Finance (No.2) Act, 2015 w.e.f. 01.06.2015. Once the power has been given, under which any levy has to be imposed upon tax payer, then such power comes into effect from the date of substitution and cannot be applied retrospectively. The said exercise of power has been provided by the statute to be from 01.06.2015 and hence, is to be applied prospectively. There is no merit in the claim of Revenue that even without insertion of clause (c) under section 200A(1) of the Act, it was incumbent upon the assessee to pay fees, in case there is default in furnishing the statement of tax deducted at source. Admittedly, the onus was upon the assessee to prepare statements and deliver the same within prescribed time before the prescribed authority, but the power to collect the fees by the prescribed authority vested in such authority only by way of substitution of clause (c) to section 200A(1) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2015 w.e.f. 01.06.2015. Prior to said substation, the Assessing Officer had no authority to charge the fees under section 234E of the Act while issuing intimation under section 200A of the Act. Before exercising the authority of charging any sum from any deductor or the assessee, the prescribed authority should have necessary power vested in it and before vesting of such power, no order can be passed by the prescribed authority in charging of such fees under section 234E of the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under section 200A of the Act. Thus, in the absence of enabling provisions, under which the prescribed authority is empowered to charge the fees, the Assessing Officer while processing the returns filed by the deductor in respect of tax deducted at source can raise the demand on account of taxes, if any, not deposited and charge interest. However, prior to 01.06.2015, the Assessing Officer does not have the power to charge fees under section 234E of the Act while processing TDS returns. In the absence of enabling provisions, levy of fees could not be effected in the course of intimation issued under section 200A of the Act prior to 01.06.2015
In the present case certain activities are carried out by the appellant which are not even concerned with the functioning of the permanent establishment therefore in our view only the activities which are performed by the permanent establishment are effectively connected with the permanent establishment and activities which are not carried on by the permanent establishment but are carried out by the head office of the appellant are not “effectively connected” with the permanent establishment. We are also of the view that the term “effectively connected” should not be understood to mean the opposite of “legally connected” but rather something in the sense of “really connected”. Therefore the activities mentioned in the contract should be connected to the permanent establishment not only in the form but also in substance. It is also interesting to note that the permanent establishment of the assessee has been admitted by the appellant only because of the reason that some of the employees of the appellant came to India from time to time for short visit and further certain freelancers were appointed for undertaking the own ground implementation related supervision activities in India. Therefore according to us there are minimum activities performed by the PE of appellant in India. Hence just performing such minimum activities it cannot be said that whole of the revenue of Rs. 33 crores involved in the contract is “effectively connected” with the activities of the permanent establishment in India. Hence we reject the contention of the assessee that the whole of the revenue involved in the contract should be considered as effectively connected with the permanent establishment of the appellant.
Now the legal issue qua the search is whether the block assessment as made by the AO was barred by limitation u/s 158BE(1)(b) of the Act. According to the provisions of section 158BE (1)(b) of the Act order in the block assessment has to be passed by the AO within two years from the end of the month in which the search was conducted and concluded. Now the issue to be adjudicated is whether the search concluded in 17.12.1999/23.12.1999 or 14.02.2000
It is generally seen that there may be several stages or events arising in a joint development arrangement made between owner of the land and the developer. For the purpose of determining the actual date of transfer of the land by the land owner, all these stages / events needs to be collectively analsysed and after evaluating overall effect of the same we can determine the actual date of transfer. These stages / events may be described as date of entering into JDA, date of executing power of attorney authorising the developer for taking various approvals / permissions etc., handing over the possession of the land to the developer for various purposes, receipt of part / full sale consideration from the developer, date of execution of power of attorney in favour of developer authorising him for the sale of developed units to the customers at his absolute discretion; and transfer of developed units to the customers etc. There may be few more stages / events to complete the transaction. Though, one single event may trigger the process of transfer but may not necessarily complete it also. Whether the transfer has, in substance, taken place, can be determined by analysing the inter-play and effect of all these stages / events combined and put together. For example, possession may be given for various purposes, viz. possession given to a contractor, or to a tenant also, but such an event in itself cannot be regarded as “transfer” of land. Possession of land may also be handed over as licensee only for the purpose of development of real estate on land. Here again, it shall not give rise to “transfer”. Thus, when the possession is given along with other legal rights to the developer resulting into entitlement of the developer for full use and enjoyment of the property as well as its further sale after converting it into developed units at its full, own and sole discretion, then it may result into ‘transfer’ provided other conditions also suggest so. Thus, handing over of the possession has to be necessarily coupled with the intention of transferring the rights of ownership and enjoyment of the property to the developer. Handing over of the possession for the limited purpose of developing the land while still retaining the ownership and control of various legal rights upon the property by the land owner would not fall in clause (v) of section 2(47)
The AO has not conducted any independent enquires for making the addition especially since the assessee has discharged its primary onus of showing books of account, payment by way of account payee cheque and producing bills for purchase of goods. (i) By relying on the official website of the Sales Tax Department, Government of Maharashtra regarding suspicion parties providing accommodation entries, the AO has made an addition. In response to the show cause notice issued by the AO, the assessee has supplied copy of bills, cop of the bank statement to prove that payment made for purchases, and copy of ledger accounts of all eight parties. The assessee is an individual carrying on a proprietary business in the name of M/s Noble Construction Company, undertaking construction work of dams and canals on behalf of Government of Maharashtra in the interior part of the State. In the interior parts the goods are not available easily. The Government contracts are time barring contract and the work is required to be completed on time. Accordingly, when the material is required in emergency the telephonic orders are placed upon the parties who supply the materials at site. The corresponding consumption of materials in respect of which the purchases were affected by the assessee firm have not been doubted by ld. AO. Neither any document information has been provided by the AO nor he has given any opportunity to the assessee to cross examine the said party and AO has concluded that the purchases by assessee company from the said party is bogus merely on the basis of information from Sales Tax Department.
The income is offered by appellant on ad hoc basis without co-relating the amount of year wise disclosure without any corroborating evidence. The above disclosure has been accepted by assessing officer without referring to any incriminating material pertaining to respective years. The assessing officer as well as the 1st appellate authority has also not referred to any material based on which disclosure is made and assessed by the assessing officer. In view of this it is apparent that disclosure is without any material but merely on the statement of appellant. In our view, there may be several reasons for making surrender by an assessee and merely on this basis an inference beyond doubt cannot be drawn that there was concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars thereof on the part of the assessee towards the surrendered income to attract penal provisions under sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act
The Supreme Court in the case of Totagar’s Co-operative Sale Society Ltd held that a society has surplus funds which are invested in short term deposits where the society is engaged in the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members in that case the said income from short term deposits shall be treated and assessed as income from other sources and deduction u/s 80(P)(2)(a)(i) would not be available meaning thereby that deduction u/s 80(P)(2)(a)(i) is available only in respect of income which is assessable as business income and not as income from other sources. Whereas in distinction to this , the provisions of section 80(P)(2)(d) of the Act provides for deduction in respect of income of a coop society by way of interest or dividend from its investments with other coop society if such income is included in the gross total income of the such coop society
The assessee has, by use of the legal database compiled by it over a period of more than 60 years (firm is in practice of law since 1943), earned reasonable amount of valuable foreign exchange for our country, thereby fulfilling the most core intention of the law for introduction of EOU Scheme under EXIM Policy and Section 10B of the Act. The assessee has also fulfilled the specific requirements of Section 10B of the Act, by providing Legal Services using Legal database
The RBI approval/FIPB approval is not determinative of ALP and cannot be considered to be a valid CUP. Automatic route under which FIPB approvals or RBI approvals are granted have been devised for the “ease of doing business”. These approvals emanate from other legislation or policy and are not in relation to determination of Arm’s Length Price. The purpose of the RBI approval/FIPB approval is entirely different and cannot be equated with the arm’s length principle. The approvals of rates given by the DIPP and the RBI are for different purposes, like for promotion of industries, management of foreign exchange etc. and it varies in accordance with the business practices prevalent at different times which are clear from the RBI approvals themselves. Going by the relevant TP provisions as enshrined under the Act and relevant Rules, it is mandatory that the appellant has to independently benchmark its international transaction with independent comparables so as to arrive at arm’s length price
The delay made by the assessee firm in filing the return of income is for the first time i.e. in A.Y. 2008-09 which was on account of dispute of audit fee between the assessee and the auditor. Hence, it appears that the dispute with the statutory auditor is a reasonable cause within the meaning of Section 273B as held in the case of Kripa Industries (I) Ltd. vs. JCIT by ITAT Pune Bench (2002) 76 TTJ 502 (Pune) that there is no mala fide reason for not obtaining the accounts audited in time and penalty u/s 271B should not be imposed