Article 12(4) provides that, “The term “fees for technical included services” as used in this Article means payments of any kind to any person in consideration for services of a managerial, technical or consultancy nature (including the provision of such services through technical or other personnel) if such services : (a) are ancillary and subsidiary to the application or enjoyment of the right, property or information for which a payment described in paragraph 3 is received ; or (b) make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes, which enables the person acquiring the services to apply the technology contained therein”. In order to invoke article 12(4)(a) it is necessary that such services should “make available” technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design The services provided by BT Canada were simply management support or consultancy services which did not involve any transfer of technology. It is not even the case of the Assessing Officer that the services were such that the recipient of service was enabled to perform these services on its own without any further recourse to the service provider. It is in this context that we have to examine the scope of expression ‘make available’
Purchase and sale of shares outside the floor of Stock Exchange is not an unlawful activity. Off-market transactions are not illegal. It is always possible for the parties to enter into transactions even without the help of brokers. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the transactions reported by the assessee were quite sham on the legal proposition arrived at by the CIT(A) that off-market transactions are not permissible. The assessee has stated that the transactions were made with the help of professional mediators who are experts in off-market transactions. When the transactions were off-market transactions, there is no relevance in seeking details of share transactions from Stock Exchanges. Such attempts would be futile. Stock Exchanges cannot give details of transactions entered into between the parties outside their floor. Therefore, the reliance placed by the assessing authority on the communications received from the Stock Exchanges that the particulars of share transactions entered into by the assessee were not available in their records, is out of place. There is no evidential value for such reliance placed by the assessing authority. The assessee had made it very clear that the transactions were not concluded on the floor of the Stock Exchange. The matter being so, there is no probative value for the negative replies solicited by the assessing authority from the respective Stock Exchanges. We are of the considered view that the materials collected by the assessing authority from the Stock Exchanges are not valid to dispel or disbelieve the contentions of the assessee
The lower authorities have not brought on record any concrete evidence for disallowing the long term capital gain of the assessee. The AO should have issued notices and summons to M/s RFL and ACPL under section 133(6) and 131 of the Act for the production of the necessary financial information before rejecting the claim of the assessee. We find that all the necessary information which were available with the assessee had been brought on record by the assessee before the lower authorities. In case ACPL has not filed the financial statements with the stock exchange then the assessee for the fault of ACPL cannot be held guilty under the income tax proceedings. The assessee in the instant case has made the transactions for the sale and purchase of the shares through a valid stock broker who was in existence at the relevant time with the stock exchange and this fact has not been doubted by the lower authorities. In view of the above we hold that the lower authorities had not brought on record sufficient reasons for disallowing the claim of the assessee
There is a difference between ‘Contract of work and ‘Contract of service’. The two words convey different ideas. In the ‘Contract of work’ the activity is predominantly physical; it is tangible. In the activity referred as ‘Contract of service’, the dominant feature of the activity is intellectual, or at least, mental. Certainly, ‘Contract of work’ also involves intellectual exercise to some extent. Even a gardener has to bestow sufficient care in doing his job; so is the case with a mason, carpenter or a builder. But the physical (tangible) aspect is more dominant than the intellectual aspect. In contrast, in the case of rendering any kind of ‘service’, intellectual aspect plays the dominant role. In the case under consideration, the scope of work mentioned in the agreement clearly explains that it is ‘contract of work’ to dismantle the machinery, therefore, it is not a ‘contract of service’ hence payment by the assessee is not for technical services, therefore, the assessee company is not liable to deduct TDS
Whether, omission if assessing officer to explicitly mention that penalty proceedings are being initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars or that for concealment of income makes the penalty order liable for cancellation even when it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the assessee had concealed income in the facts and circumstances of the case?
The objective of ATAG was undertaking sales and marketing related activities for the brand of the appellant in Singapore. The said factual assertion has not been rebutted by the AO in the impugned assessment order. There is nothing on record to show that the said subsidiary company was doing any activity completely independent and unrelated to the activities carried out by the appellant company. Thus, the claim of the appellant that the investment was made for commercial purposes and not for purpose of accretion of investment cannot be rejected
Now the issue which requires our consideration is whether the addition can be sustained solely on the basis of the statement of Shri Hanuman Yadav, when there is no material placed on record that Shri Hanuman Yadav has made any claim against the assessee in any court of law seeking cancellation of sale deed or filing a recovery suit. The Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal after following the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court under the similar circumstances in Union of India vs. T. R. Verma 1957 SC 882 and Kishan Chand Chellaram vs. CIT, 125 ITR 713 (SC) has held in the case of Ghanshyam Das Agarwal vs. ITO in ITA No. 1161/JP/2010 that in the absence of any conclusive evidence the document could not have been disbelieved. The D/R could not point out any binding precedent wherein it has been held that the oral statement would over ride the documentary evidence. Therefore, respectfully following the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Ghanshyam Das Agarwal vs. ITO in ITA No. 1161/JP/2010, we are of the view that the AO was not justified to make addition solely on the basis of the statement of Shri Hanuman Yadav when there was a registered sale deed and more particularly when the maker of statement has not challenged the sale deed before any court of law. It is also not placed on record whether the sale deed was executed under coercion.
The facts relating to the market value as on the date of agreement to sale and as on the date of sale deed is not disputed. The only dispute is whether the stamp duty value as on the date of agreement to sale or sale deed to be considered for the purpose of computation of capital gain. The purpose of introducing section 50C of the Act was to counter suppression of sale consideration of sale of immovable properties. Before insertion of section 50C of the Act to the statute, there are lot of litigations as to consideration shown in document conveying title and payment of stamp duty. To overcome the litigations, the provision of section 50C of the Act has been inserted to the statute w.e.f. 1.6.2003 wherein it is made mandatory to adopt value u/s 50C of the Act for the purpose of determination of consideration. A proviso to section 50C of the Act has been inserted by the Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1.4.2017 to resolve the genuine and intended hardship, in the case in which the date of agreement to sale is prior to the date of sale and market value of the property as on the date of agreement to sale and date of sale deed is different
If we analyse and compare various provisions of the Copyright Act with the relevant clauses of the master agreement, it is noted that the said agreement does not permit HLL to carry out any alteration or conversion of any nature, so as to fall within the definition of ‘adaptation’ as defined in Copyright Act, 1957. The right given to the customer for reproduction was only for the limited purpose so as to make it usable for all the offices of HLL in India and no right was given to HLL for commercial exploitation of the same. It is also noted that the terms of the agreement do not allow or authorise HLL to do any of the acts covered by the definition of ‘copyright’. Under these circumstances, the payment made by HLL cannot be construed as payment made towards ‘use’ of copyright particularly when the provisions of Indian Income-tax Act and DTAA are read together with the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957
The contention of the AR was that Shri M.Sankar is not a concerned person representing the assessee to receive such notice and the notice was served on improper person. We also find from the assessment order that Shri Sanjib Sarkar being one of the partners appeared on 10-12- 2010 before the AO for first time and the order sheet at page no-1 of paper book supports the same. We further find that the AO recorded the issuance of notice u/s. 142(1) on 19-7-2010 for fixing the hearing on 02-08-2010 and thereafter, according to assessment order, probably, after 26-08-2010 another notice for initiation of penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(b)of the Act was issued. Therefore, it goes to show that a person claiming to be representing the assessee as partner appeared before the AO for the first time on 10-12-2010 in response to notice issued u/s. 271(1)(b) of the Act and it concluded that the service of notice u/sec 143(2) on 30-09-09 and issuance of notice thereafter u/sec 142(1) of the Act was not in the knowledge of the assessee and as rightly contended by the AR notice u/sec 143(2) of the Act was not properly served on the assessee