Search Results For: Atul Jasani


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DATE: April 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
An additional ground (relating to claim u/s 80-IA) cannot be permitted to be raised if the necessary evidence that the assessee is entitled to the claim is not on record. The fact that claim has been allowed by the AO in a subsequent year and that there is no reason why the claim should not be allowed in the present year is irrelevant. Also, the assessee must satisfy the appellate authority that the ground now raised was bona fide and the same could not have been raised earlier for good reasons

We note that it is an undisputed position before us that for the subject assessment year, the appellant assessee had not claimed benefit of Section 80IA of the Act in respect of its Jetty / Port either before the Assessing Officer or before the CIT(A). A claim for benefit under Section 80IA of the Act can only be made if the infrastructure facility such as Jetty / Port is, among other things, being run on the basis of an agreement for either developing or operating and maintaining or developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility. The sine qua non provided in SubSection (7) of Section 80IA of the Act is the furnishing along with its Return of Income, a report of audited accounts in Form 10CCB as required under Rule 18BBB(3) of the Act. The Form 10CCB which is required to be filed along with Return of Income has various details to be filled in, including the initial assessment year from which the deduction is being claimed, the nature of the activity carried out with regard to the infrastructure facility, namely, whether it is for developing or developing and operating or for developing, operating and maintaining the new infrastructure facility. It is only on examination of those details as submitted by the auditor in Form 10CCB that the claim of deduction can be considered. It is undisputed that for the subject assessment year, no Form 10CCB has been filed by the appellant assessee. Therefore, there is no evidence on record for subject assessment year to allow the claim. The submission of Mr.Agrawal for the appellant that primary evidence in the form of jetty is on record is not acceptable. Mere ownership or existence of jetty is not evidence of eligibility to the benefit of Section 80IA of the Act, which is admittedly conditional upon satisfaction of certain requirements as provided therein

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DATE: March 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Bogus share capital/ premium: The proviso to s. 68 (which creates an obligation on the issuing Co to explain the source of share capital & premium) has been introduced by the Finance Act 2012 with effect from 01.04.2013 and does not have retrospective effect. Prior thereto, as per Lovely Exports 317 ITR 218 (SC), if the AO regards the share premium as bogus, he has to assess the shareholders but cannot assess the same as the issuing company's unexplained cash credit

The proviso to Section 68 of the Act has been introduced by the Finance Act 2012 with effect from 1st April, 2013. Thus it would be effective only from the Assessment Year 2013-14 onwards and not for the subject Assessment Year. In fact, before the Tribunal, it was not even the case of the Revenue that Section 68 of the Act as in force during the subject years has to be read/understood as though the proviso added subsequently effective only from 1st April, 2013 was its normal meaning. The Parliament did not introduce to proviso to Section 68 of the Act with retrospective effect nor does the proviso so introduced states that it was introduced “for removal of doubts” or that it is “declaratory”. Therefore it is not open to give it retrospective effect, by proceeding on the basis that the addition of the proviso to Section 68 of the Act is immaterial and does not change the interpretation of Section 68 of the Act both before and after the adding of the proviso

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DATE: January 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 68: Even if the premium at which the shares are issued defies commercial prudence, the receipt cannot be assessed as "unexplained credit" if the identity of the payer, genuineness of the transaction and capacity of the subscriber are not disputed. Interest earned on short-term fixed deposits is assessable as "profits and gains of business" and not as "income from other sources"

Mr.Chhotaray the learned counsel for the Revenue states that the impugned order itself holds that share premium of Rs.490/per share defies all commercial prudence. Therefore it has to be considered to be cash credit. We find that the Tribunal has examined the case of the Revenue on the parameters of Section 68 of the Act and found on facts that it is not so hit. Therefore, Section 68 of the Act cannot be invoked. The Revenue has not been able to show in any manner the factual finding recorded by the Tribunal is perverse in any manner

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DATE: January 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(1)/ Rule 34(5)(c): The Tribunal is mandated to pass orders within 90 days of the hearing. Delay is not justified on the ground that 'administrative clearance' was obtained. The aggrieved party is entitled to seek recall of such an order

The order of the Tribunal while rejecting the rectification application does not dispute the fact that the order dated 3rd February, 2016 passed under Section 254(1) of the Act was passed beyond the period of 90 days from the date of conclusion of its hearing on 22nd September, 2015. However, it records that administrative clearance had been taken to pass such an order beyond the period of 90 days. We are at a loss to understand what is meant by ‘administrative clearance’ and the basis for the same. Besides when, how and from whom the administrative clearance was received, are all questions still at large

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DATE: July 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 30, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay: An appeal wrongly filed before the AO and not CIT(A) is an unintentional lapse of the assessee. The AO ought to have returned the appeal to enable the assessee to take corrective steps. The likelihood of error is inherent in human nature The power of condonation is in view of human fallibility and must be exercised in cases of bona fide lapses

Human interaction is influenced by human nature. Inherent in human nature is the likelihood of error. Therefore, the adage “to err is human”. Thus, the power to condone delay while applying the law of limitation. This power of condonation is only in view of human fallibility. The laws of nature are not subject to human error, thus beyond human correction. In fact, the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradip Kumar 2000(7) SCC 372 has observed to the effect that although the law assists the vigilant, an unintentional lapse on the part of the litigant would not normally close the doors of adjudication so as to be permanently closed, as it is human to err

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DATE: March 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 14A/ Rule 8D: Non-consideration by the ITAT of a judgement of the co-ordinate Bench makes the order a non-speaking one and breaches the principles of natural justice

In fact the impugned order of the Tribunal ought to have dealt with its decision in J. K. Investors (supra) and considered its applicability to the present facts. In view of the fact that the impugned order of the Tribunal does not deal with its decision in J. K. Investors (supra) relied upon by the assessee in support of its submission as recorded in the impugned order itself makes the impugned order a nonspeaking order and, therefore, in breach of principles of natural justice. The substantial question of law is answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the revenue

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DATE: April 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 147: Though assessee claims that she is a non-resident & that onus is on the revenue to show that the money in the HSBC Geneva account is taxable in India, the non-cooperation with the Revenue by signing the consent waiver form shows that she has something to hide and makes it an unfit case for exercise of writ jurisdiction

In the normal course of human conduct if a person has nothing to hide and serious allegations /questions are being raised about the funds a person would make available the documents which would put to rest all questions which seem to arise in the mind of the Authorities. The conduct on the part of the Petitioner and her uncle, in not being forthcoming, to our mind leads us to the conclusion that this is not a fit case where we should exercise our extra ordinary writ jurisdiction and/or interfere with the orders passed by the authorities under the Act. If a person has nothing to hide, we believe the person would have cooperated in obtaining the Bank Statements

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DATE: March 17, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
Strictures passed against high-handed and unfair approach of AO (IRS Officer) in refusing to give an acknowledgement of stay application. Chief CIT directed to ensure such behaviour is not repeated. Dept directed to nominate another AO to hear stay application

We find this conduct on the part of the Assessing Officer to accept a stay application and not immediately give acknowledgement of its receipt is unacceptable. The least that is expected of a civil servant is to be fair and civil. In the absence of the above, his conduct is not one becoming of an Officer belonging to the prestigious Indian Revenue Service. The least that is expected of an Officer is that when a person files an application / letter, which is accepted by him, an acknowledgement should be forthwith given to the party filing the application or letter. In case he refuses to accept the letter he should endorse on the letter / application the reason why it is not being accepted with a line or two for the refusal to accept. In case he does accept it and give an acknowledgment he can deal with the applications/ letters as is appropriate in accordance with law. We believe that what has happened in this case is an aberration. However, the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax would ensure that his Officers do not behave in such an high handed and unfair manner, not expected of civil servants

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DATE: March 17, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 220(6): Dept directed to redeposit moneys collected illegally by attachment of assessee’s bank account during pendency of stay application. A order passed on a stay application must give reasons for the refusal to stay the demand

Thus, any action to recover taxes adopting coercive means is not permissible till the petitioner’s application for stay under Section 220(6) of the Act is disposed of. Therefore, the action of the Assessing Officer in attaching the petitioners’ bank accounts under Section 226(3) of the Act as well as subsequent withdrawal of the attached amounts from the bank accounts is without jurisdiction and bad in law. The petitioners have a statutory right to its stay application being heard and disposed of before the Revenue can adopt any coercive proceedings on the basis of the Notice of demand under Section 156 of the Act issued to the assessee. This action on the part of the Assessing Officer, if permitted, would lead Section 220(6) of the Act becoming redundant. In the above view, the Notice under Section 226(3) of the Act issued by the Assessing Officer to the petitioners’ bankers are quashed and set aside. Further, the Assessing Officer is directed to deposit the amount of Rs.7,59,185 in HDFC Bank, Fort, Mumbai and Rs.34,265/in State Bank of India, Byculla, Mumbai within a period of one week from today

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DATE: December 2, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing: An adjustment with respect to transfer pricing has to be confined to transactions with Associated Enterprises and cannot be made with respect to transactions with unrelated third parties

In terms of Chapter X of the Act, re-determination of the consideration is to be done only with regard to income arising from International Transactions on determination of ALP. The adjustment which is mandated is only in respect of International Transaction and not transactions entered into by assessee with independent unrelated third parties. This is particularly so as there is no issue of avoidance of tax requiring adjustment in the valuation in respect of transactions entered into with independent third parties. The adjustment as proposed by the Revenue if allowed would result in increasing the profit in respect of transactions entered into with non-AE. This adjustment is beyond the scope and ambit of Chapter X of the Act