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CIT vs. Reliance Infocomm Ltd (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: February 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 8, 2019 (Date of publication)
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S. 9(1)(vi) 'Royalty': The insertions of Explanations 5 & 6 to s. 9(1)(vi) by the Finance Act 2015 w.r.e.f. 01.04.1976, even if declaratory and clarificatory of the law, will not apply to the DTAAs. The DTAAs are a bilateral agreement between two Countries and cannot be overridden by a unilateral legislative amendment by one Country (New Skies Satellite BV 382 ITR 114 (Del) & Siemens AG 310 ITR 320 (Bom) followed)

India’s change in position to the OECD Commentary cannot be a fact that influences the interpretation of the words defining royalty as they stand today. The only manner in which such change in position can be relevant is if such change is incorporated into the agreement itself and not otherwise. A change in executive position cannot bring about a unilateral legislative amendment into treaty concluded between two sovereign states. It is fallacious to assume that any change made to domestic law to rectify a situation of mistaken interpretation can spontaneously further their case in an international treaty.

CIT vs. Union Bank Of India (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 30, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 115JB (pre amendment by Finance Act, 2012) is not applicable to a banking company (also insurance & electricity cos) . The mechanism provided for computing book profit in terms of S. 115JB(2) is wholly unworkable for a banking company. When the machinery provision fails, the charging section also fails. The anomaly was removed by the Finance Act, 2012. However, the amendments are neither declaratory nor clarificatory but make substantive and significant legislative changes which are applicable prospectively (Kerala State Electricity Board 329 ITR 91 (Ker) followed)

These amendments in section 115JB are neither declaratory nor classificatory but make substantive and significant legislative changes which are admittedly applied prospectively. The memorandum explaining the provision of the Finance Bill, 2012 while explaining the amendments under Section 115JB of the Act notes that in case of certain companies such as insurance, banking and electricity companies, they are allowed to prepare the profit and loss account in accordance with the sections specified in their regulatory Acts. To align the Income Tax Act with the Companies Act, 1956 it was decided to amend Section 115JB to provide that the companies which are not required under Section 211 of the Companies Act, to prepare profit and loss account in accordance with Schedule VI of the Companies Act, profit and loss account prepared in accordance with the provisions of their regulatory Act shall be taken as basis for computing book profit under Section 115 JB of the Act.

The Chamber of Tax Consultants vs. CBDT (Bombay High Court) (Final Order)

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DATE: April 11, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 23, 2019 (Date of publication)
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S. 250: The CBDT is empowered to lay down broad guidelines for disposal of appeals by CsIT(A). However, it cannot offer 'incentives' to CsIT(A) for making enhancement and levying penalty. Such policy transgresses the exercise of quasi-judicial powers & is wholly impermissible and invalid u/s 119. The 'Incentives' have the propensity to influence the CsIT(A) and they will be tempted to pass an order in a particular manner so as to achieve a greater target of disposal

All these contingencies necessarily point to circumstances where the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) is in favour of the revenue. For example this policy refers to the enhancement made by the Commissioner or a case where the Commissioner has levied penalty under section 271(1) of the Act. This necessarily refers to enlargement of the assessee’s liability before the Commissioner as compared to what may have been determined by the Assessing Officer. In our opinion, such policy is wholly impermissible and invalid. Any directives by the CBDT which gives additional incentive for an order that the Commissioner (Appeals) may pass having regard to its implication, necessarily transgresses in the Commissioner’s exercise of discretionary quasi judicial powers.

PCIT vs. Mohommad Haji Adam (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: February 11, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 23, 2019 (Date of publication)
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S. 68/69 Bogus Purchases: Even if the purchases are bogus, the entire purchase amount cannot be added. As the department had not disputed the assessee's sales & there was no discrepancy between the purchases and the sales, the purchases cannot be rejected without disturbing the sales in case of a trader. The addition has to be restricted to the extent of the G.P. rate on purchases at the same rate of other genuine purchases (N.K .Industries 292 CTR 354 (Guj), N. K. Proteins 250 TM 22 (SC) distinguished)

In the present case, as noted above, the assessee was a trader of fabrics. The A.O. found three entities who were indulging in bogus billing activities. A.O. found that the purchases made by the assessee from these entities were bogus. This being a finding of fact, we have proceeded on such basis. Despite this, the question arises whether the Revenue is correct in contending that the entire purchase amount should be added by way of assessee’s additional income or the assessee is correct in contending that such logic cannot be applied. The finding of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal would suggest that the department had not disputed the assessee’s sales. There was no discrepancy between the purchases shown by the assessee and the sales declared. That being the position, the Tribunal was correct in coming to the conclusion that the purchases cannot be rejected without disturbing the sales in case of a trader. The Tribunal, therefore, correctly restricted the additions limited to the extent of bringing the G.P. rate on purchases at the same rate of other genuine purchases

Rajbhushan Omprakash Dixit vs. DCIT (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 20, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 147/ 148: The fact that the assessee did not disclose the material is not relevant if the AO was otherwise aware of it. If the AO had the information during the assessment proceeding, irrespective of the source, but chooses not to utilize it, he cannot allege that the assessee failed to disclose truly and fully all material facts & reopen the assessment (Scope of Explanation 1 to S. 147 explained)

As per this Explanation thus, production before the Assessing Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the Assessing Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the first proviso to Section 147. Here is not a case where the Assessee is seeking to rely on a disclosure which the Revenue can seek to bring within the fold of the said Explanation. Here is a case where the Department already had collected certain documents and materials which were before the Assessing Officer at the time of framing assessment. If the Assessing Officer did not, for some reason, advert to such material or did not utilize the same, he surely cannot allege that the Assessee failed to disclose truly and fully all material facts.

Rupa Shyamsundar Dhumatkar vs. ACIT (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 20, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 148 Reopening: As per settled law, notice for reopening of assessment against a dead person is invalid. The fact that the AO was not informed of the death before issue of notice is irrelevant. Consequently, the s. 148 notice is set aside and order of assessment stands annulled (Alamelu Veerappan 257 TM 72 (Mad) followed)

There are several judgments of different High Courts holding that the notice or reopening of assessment is invalid in law. It is not necessary to refer to all the judgments on the point. Suffice it to say, as per the settled law, notice for reopening of assessment against a dead person is invalid

Jagdish C. Dhabalia vs. ITO (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: March 12, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 13, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 50C Capital Gains: The assessee cannot avoid the impact of s. 50C by claiming that his s. 54EC investment is large enough to cover the deemed consideration based on stamp duty valuation. Such interpretation renders s. 50C redundant

The deeming fiction under section 50C of the Act, must be given its full effect and the Court should not allow to boggle the mind while giving full effect to such fiction. We are not opposing the proposition canvassed by the Counsel of the Assessee that deeming fiction must be applied in relation to the situation for which it is created. However, while giving full effect to the deeming fiction contained under section 50C of the Act for the purpose of computation of the capital gain under section 48, for which section 50C is specifically enacted, the automatic fallout thereof would be that the computation of the assessee’s capital gain and consequently the computation of exemption under section 54EC, shall have to be worked out on the basis of substituted deemed sale consideration of transfer of capital asset in terms of section 50C of the Act

PCIT vs. Bajaj Finance Limited (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 2, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 43D Interest on NPAs: Even though the special provision in s. 43D for taxing interest income on NPAs on receipt basis does not apply to NBFCs, it does not mean that NBFCs have to offer interest on bad or doubtful debts to tax on accrual basis. Such interest is not taxable on the real income theory

Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that the assessee had to offer the interest income to tax on accrual basis. The special provision for taxing interest income on NPAs on the basis of receipt has been made under Section 43D of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act” for short) which does not apply to NBFC. By necessary implication, therefore, the legislature desired that such benefit would be restricted only to such of the entities as are referred to in Section 43D of the Act

Milestone Real Estate Fund vs. ACIT (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
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CITATION:
S. 220(6)/ 281B Tax Recovery: Dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue. They should apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as binding decisions. The petitioner is being singled out for unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000 to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment

We have to express our dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue in this matter. We pride ourselves as a State which believes in rule of law. Therefore, the least that is expected of the Officers of the State is to apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect the revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as the binding decisions of this Court. The action of respondent nos.1 and 2 as adverted to in para 14 herein above clearly indicates that a separate set of rules was being applied by them in the case of the petitioner. Equal protection of law which means equal application of law has been scarified in this case by the Revenue. It appears that the S.R.JOSHI 21 of 22 WP-543-2018 petitioner is being singled out for this unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. In the above view, we direct the Respondent-Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only) to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment, it had to undergo at the hands of the Revenue

PCIT vs. Electroplast Engineers (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 3, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 45(4): If new partners come into the partnership and bring cash by way of capital contribution and the retiring partners take cash and retire, the retiring partners are not relinquishing their interest in the immovable property. What they relinquish is their share in the partnership. As there is no transfer of a capital asset, no capital gains or profit can arise & s. 45(4) has no application (A. N. Naik 265 ITR 346 (Bom) distinguished, Dynamic Enterprises 359 ITR 83 (Karn) [FB] followed)

The property belongs to the partnership firm. It did not belong to the partners. The partners only had a share in the partnership asset. When the five partners came into the partnership and brought cash by way of capital contribution to the extent of their contribution, they were entitled to the proportionate share in the interest in the partnership firm. When the retiring partners took cash and retired, they were not relinquishing their interest in the immovable property. What they relinquished is their share in the partnership. Therefore, there is no transfer of a capital asset, as such, no capital gains or profit arises in the facts of this case. In that view of the matter, Section 45(4) has no application to the facts of this case

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