It is sufficient, for our purposes, to take note of the fact that the provisions of Section 23A(1)(i) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, “shall, with necessary modifications, apply in relation to such reference as they apply in relation to a reference made by the Assessing Officer under sub-section (1) of section 16A of that Act”. Section 23A(1)(i) of the Wealth Tax Act provides that “Any person……. objecting to any order of the Valuation Officer under section 35 having the effect of enhancing the valuation of any asset or refusing to allow the claim made by the assessee under the said section ……………may appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) against the assessment or order, as the case may be, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner …”. In effect thus, by the virtue of Section 23A(1)(i) being incorporated, with necessary modifications, in Section 50C, the correctness of a DVO’s report can indeed be challenged. It is, however, also important to note that the provisions of Section 23A(6) of the Wealth Tax Act shall, with necessary modifications, also apply in the present context- as has been provided in Section 50C(2) itself
The observations of Hon’ble High Court, disapproving the conclusions, are based on the proposition that the conclusion of the Tribunal was a way to bypass the minimum limit. That is, with respect, a wholly a highly subjective observation and all a matter of perception. The other way of looking at the conclusions of the Tribunal could possibly be, and that’s how we looked at it, that the explanation of the assessee was partly accepted and, as regards the element of income on which explanation was not accepted, the penalty was still one hundred percent of tax sought to be evaded. It was stated to be accepted past history of the case, as pleaded before the Tribunal, that all the cash deposits were not of income nature but in the nature of business receipts and that only income embedded therein could be brought to tax. Wrongly though, as we have learnt the hard way, we were in error in following the same path for the purpose of evaluating explanation extended before the Tribunal during the hearing, but then this was not altogether devoid of any basis or rationale. The rationale or basis of our approach has turned out to be incorrect but it clearly did exist. In any event, it was not something which was incapable of two opinions
“Coining of” the concept was in the course of the employment of the assessee, and, therefore, the plea that it belonged to the assessee, in his individual capacity, is too naïve to meet any judicial approval. In any case, there is no material on record to demonstrate that this coining of concept is such a valuable asset that it could fetch Rs 10 crores of consideration on a standalone basis, and, if that was so, it is simply beyond the human probabilities that such a valuable right could be given to someone for 7 years for commercial exploitation and development, with no strings attached, and without even finalizing as to how the fruits of such commercial exploitation will be shared by that person with the owner of this concept.
We share the anguish of the learned counsel. The sequence of events, as set out above, does clearly shows inordinate delay in the special bench case being taken up. It appears that despite specific requisition by the learned Judicial Member and for the reasons best known to the persons concerned, the Registry has not taken care to do the necessary follow up and ensure that the matter is listed for hearing expeditiously, so as to ensure timely disposal of appeals referred to the special benches. The importance of timely disposal of special bench cases and Third Member cases can hardly be over-emphasised. These cases deserve to be taken up on top priority basis. We are of the view that such an inordinate delay in fixation of hearing of special benches cases, particularly when stay is granted, is not only inappropriate and contrary to the scheme of the Act, but it does reduce the efficacy and utility of the mechanism of special benches to deal with important matters on which there is divergence of views by the division benches or which are otherwise of wider ramifications and national importance. Similarly, inordinate delays in disposal of Third Member cases, by itself, makes the expression of dissenting opinion less effective and useful. We, therefore, deem it fit and proper to formulate the following guidelines with a view to ensure the expeditious hearing of cases referred to Special Benches and Third Members
A perusal of the order of the lower authorities gives an infallible impression that such crucial aspect has not been addressed. Without understanding the fate of the goods purchased purportedly in the custody of or on behalf of the assessee, it will not be possible to determine the issue. Where the purchase with delivery is settled by cross contract of sale with delivery at future date against sale proceeds, the entire debt turning bad is rather innocuous
A development agreement was executed which enabled the assessee to utilize the land for construction and for sharing of profits. This right/advantage accrued to the assessee was sought to be taken away from the assessee by way of sale of land. The prospective purchaser as well as the defaulting party (owner) perceived threat of filing suit by developer and consequently paid damages/ compensation to shun the possible legal battle. The intrinsic point with respect to accrual of ‘right to sue’ has to be seen in the light of overriding circumstances as to how the parties have perceived the presence of looming legal battle from their point of view. I t is an admitted position that the defaulting party has made the assessee a confirming party in the sale by virtue of such development agreement and a compensation was paid to avoid litigation. This amply shows the existence of ‘right to sue’ in the perception of the defaulting party.
||Mahavir Prasad (JM), Pradip Kumar Kedia (AM)
||Revision u/s 263
||August 8, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
||August 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
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S. 263 Revision: Even after the insertion of Explanation 2, the CIT has to show that the view of the AO is wholly unsustainable in law. It is only in a very gross case of inadequacy in inquiry or where inquiry is per se mandated on the basis of record available before the AO and such inquiry was not conducted, the revisional power so conferred can be exercised to invalidate the action of AO. Otherwise, every order of the AO would become susceptible to S. 263 and, in turn, will cause serious unintended hardship to the tax payer concerned for no fault on his part
The Revisional Commissioner is expected show that the view taken by the AO is wholly unsustainable in law before embarking upon exercise of revisionary powers. The revisional powers cannot be exercised for directing a fuller inquiry to merely find out if the earlier view taken is erroneous particularly when a view was already taken after inquiry. If such course of action as interpreted by the Revisional Commissioner in the light of the Explanation 2 is permitted, Revisional Commissioner can possibly find fault with each and every assessment order without himself making any inquiry or verification and without establishing that assessment order is not sustainable in law. This would inevitably mean that every order of the lower authority would thus become susceptible to Section 263 of the Act and, in turn, will cause serious unintended hardship to the tax payer concerned for no fault on his part. Apparently, this is not intended by the Explanation. Howsoever wide the scope of Explanation 2(a) may be, its limits are implicit in it. It is only in a very gross case of inadequacy in inquiry or where inquiry is per se mandated on the basis of record available before the AO and such inquiry was not conducted, the revisional power so conferred can be exercised to invalidate the action of AO
Section 90(4), in the absence of a non-obstante clause, cannot be read as a limitation to the treaty superiority under Section 90(2), we are of the considered view that an eligible assessee cannot be declined the treaty protection under section 90(2) on the ground that the said assessee has not been able to furnish a Tax Residency Certificate in the prescribed form. De hors the statutory provision under Section 90(4), the assessee has to satisfy his eligibility for treaty protection nevertheless and the onus of satisfying the same by any other mode, i.e. other than a TRC, appears to be much more demanding than furnishing of a TRC. To be entitled for Indo US tax treaty benefits in India, a foreign enterprise has to establish that it is a resident of the other contracting state, i.e. the United States
The expression used in the statute is “cost of the residential house so purchased” and it does not necessarily mean that the cost of the residential house must remain confined to the cost of civil construction alone. A residential house may have many other things, other than civil construction and including things like furniture and fixtures, as its integral part and may also be on sale as an integral deal. There are, for example, situations in which the residential units for sale come, as a package deal, with things like air-conditioners, geysers, fans, electric fittings, furniture, modular kitchens and dishwashers. If these things are integral part of the house being purchased, the cost of house has to essentially include the cost of these things as well
When we interpose the aforesaid statutory definition in Section 92C(1), we find that the expression ‘international transaction’ means “an arrangement, understanding or action in concert etc between two or more associated enterprises, either or both of whom are non-residents, in the nature of purchase, sale or lease of tangible or intangible property, or provision of services, or lending or borrowing money, or any other an arrangement, understanding or action in concert having a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets of such enterprises ……..”. Therefore, in order to ascertain whether a particular transaction or not is an international transaction or not, the necessary preconditions which are to be satisfied are (a) that it is in the nature “an arrangement, understanding or action in concert etc”; (b) that it is between two or more associated enterprises, either or both of whom are non-residents; and (c) that it has a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets of such enterprises