Search Results For: Kerala High Court


Lal Products vs. Intelligence Officer (Kerala High Court)

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DATE: December 6, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 29, 2018 (Date of publication)
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Entire law on whether the situs of sale of intangible property like trademarks & patents is the place where the contract is entered into or where the intangible is registered or where the owner is resident explained in the context of s. 9(1)(i) of Income-tax Act & the law on sales-tax

Though intangible and incorporeal, it has an existence and its situs also has to be pinned down to a particular place with reference to the owner. The situs of the principal place of business, from where the owner of such trademark exercises his right to sell specified goods, under the trademark or enforces his patent rights, which has been obtained by them as a statutory right, is the place where the goods exist.

Kerala State Co-op Agricultural And Rural Development Bank Ltd vs. ITO (Kerala High Court)

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DATE: December 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 24, 2018 (Date of publication)
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S. 220(6) Stay of demand: If the assessee has exercised on time its statutory remedy of filing an appeal and also filed a stay petition, procedural fairness demands that the authorities may wait, before taking further steps, until the appellate authority decides on the stay petition

I reckon the petitioner has exercised on time its statutory remedy of filing an appeal. It appears that it has also filed a stay petition. Procedural fairness demands that the authorities may wait, before taking further steps, until the appellate authority decides on the stay petition

Sunrise Academy of Medical Specialities (India) (P.) Ltd vs. ITO (Kerala High Court) (DB)

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DATE: July 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
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S. 56(2)(viib) vs. s. 68: Any premium received by a Company, in which the public does not have substantial interest, on sale of shares, in excess of its face value, can be treated as income from other sources u/s 56(2)(viib). This is not controlled by s. 68 which provides that if the assessee does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the credit, the amount can be assessed as income. If S. 68 is applicable, and the proviso is not satisfied, then the entire amounts credited to the books would be treated as income. If satisfactory explanation is offered as to the source, then the premium paid as revealed from the books will be brought to tax as income from other sources

Any premium received by a Company on sale of shares, in excess of its face value; if the Company is not one in which the public has substantial interest, would be treated as income from other sources, as seen from Section 56(2) (viib) of the Act, which we do not think can be controlled by the provisions of Section 68 of the Act. Section 68 on the other hand, as substituted with the provisos, treats any credit in the books of accounts, even by way of allotment of shares; for which no satisfactory explanation is offered, to be liable to income-tax. Clause (viib) of Section 56(2) is triggered at the stage of computation of income itself when the share application money received, from a resident, by a Company, in which the public are not substantially interested; is above the face value. Then the aggregate consideration received for the shares as exceeds the fair market value will be included as income from other sources. However, when the resident investor is not able to explain the nature and source for the credit seen in the books of accounts of the Company or the explanation offered is not satisfactory then the entire credit would be charged to income tax for that previous year.

Sunrise Academy of Medical Specialities (India) Private Limited v. ITO (Kerala High Court)

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DATE: May 22, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 31, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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S. 143(2) Limited scrutiny: The CBDT Circulars which restrict the right of the AO in limited scrutiny cases apply only in cases where the AO seeks to do comprehensive scrutiny to find if there is potential escapement of income on other issues. However, if the s. 143(2) notice seeks information on whether the share premium is from disclosed sources and is correctly offered to tax, the AO can also inquire into whether the premium exceeds the FMV and is taxable u/s 56(2)(viib)

In a case of this nature, the assessee cannot be heard to contend that the assessing officer has exceeded its jurisdiction in the matter of passing the impugned order merely for the reason that the funds received by them in the form of share premium have been assessed as provided for under Section 56(2)(viib) of the Act. The circulars relied on by the petitioner have no application to the facts of this case and the same would apply only in cases where the assessing officer needs to take the case of the assessee for a comprehensive scrutiny on a finding that there is potential escapement of income on other issues

Kottakkal Wood Complex vs. DCIT (Kerala High Court)

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DATE: July 4, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 133A: While an assessment cannot be made on the basis of a statement recorded u/s 133A, if the maker of the statement has re-affirmed the statement and nothing has been produced to show that the contents of the statement are incorrect, the assessment is valid

Whatever statement is recorded under Section 133A of the Income-tax Act it is not given any evidentiary value obviously for the reason that the officer is not authorised to administer oath and to take any sworn statement which alone has evidentiary value as contemplated under law. Therefore, there is much force in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the statement elicited during the survey operation has not evidentiary value and the Income-tax Officer was well aware of this

Thomas George Muthoot vs. CIT (Kerala High Court)

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DATE: July 3, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06 to 2007-08
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S. 40(a)(ia): (a) The second provisio inserted by FA 2012 cannot be treated as retrospective in operation (b) The fact that the payees have already paid tax on the amounts paid does not mean that a disalliowance for failure to deduct TDS cannot be made, (c) S. 40(a)(ia) cannot be interpreted to mean that it applies only to amounts "paid" and not to those "payable"

The fact the second proviso was introduced with effect from 01.04.2013 is expressly made clear by the provisions of the Finance Act 2012 itself. A statutory provision, unless otherwise expressly stated to be retrospective or by intendment shown to be retrospective, is always prospective in operation. Finance Act 2012 shows that the second proviso to Section 40 (a)(ia) has been introduced with effect from 01.04.2013. Reading of the second proviso does not show that it was meant or intended to be curative or remedial in nature, and even the appellants did not have such a case. Instead, by this proviso, an additional benefit was conferred on the assessees. Such a provision can only be prospective

CIT vs. PVS Memorial Hospital Ltd (Kerala High Court)

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DATE: July 20, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 6, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06, 2006-07
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S. 40(a)(ia)/ 194C/ 194J: Deduction u/s 194C instead of u/s 194J renders the shortfall liable for disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia)

The expression “tax deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B” occurring in Section 40(a)(ia) has to be understood as tax deductible at source under the appropriate provision of Chapter XVII-B. Therefore, as in this case, if tax is deductible under Section 194J but is deducted under Section 194C, such a deduction would not satisfy the requirements of Section 40(a)(ia). The latter part of this Section that such tax has not been deducted, again refers to the tax deducted under the appropriate provision of Chapter XVII-B. Thus, a cumulative reading of this provision, therefore, shows that deduction under a wrong provision of law will not save an assessee from Section 40(a)(ia)

Cochin Stock Exchanges Limited vs. CIT (Kerala High Court)

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DATE: January 1, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 14, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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S. 2(47)(v): Execution of a Power of Attorney in favour of the builder constitutes part performance u/s 53A of TOP Act and a "transfer" for capital gains

(i) On a reading of the above provision itself, it is clear that possession of the property has been handed over to the builder immediately on receipt of the first installment of the payment from the builder. As per clause

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