Search Results For: Domestic Tax


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DATE: January 1, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 2, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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Disallowance u/s 14A r.w. Rule 8D cannot exceed the exempt income

The assessee only received Rs.1,82,362 as dividend income, therefore, there is no question of disallowance of Rs.14,58.412 by invoking section 14A r.w. Rule 8D. Disallowance u/s 14A r.w. Rule 8D cannot exceed the exempt income.

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DATE: January 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 2, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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Entertainment tax subsidy is a capital receipt even though the source is the public who visit the cinema hall after it becomes operational

A subsidy of such nature cannot possibly be granted by the Government directly. Entertainment tax is leviable on the admission tickets to cinema halls only after the facility becomes operational. Since the source of the subsidy is the public at large which is to be attracted as viewers to the cinema halls, the funds to support such an incentive cannot be generated until and unless the cinema halls become functional

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DATE: January 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 2, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 54F is a beneficial provision which has to be construed liberally. Even if construction/ purchase of new house is not completed within stipulated period, deduction is admissible if investment is made

If the assessee has invested the money in construction of residential house, merely because the construction was not complete in all respects and it was not in a fit condition to be occupied within the period stipulated, that would not disentitle the assessee from claiming the benefit under section 54F

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DATE: January 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 2, 2015 (Date of publication)
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S. 2(15): Receiving fees simplicitor is not reason enough to hold that the activity is not a charitable activity. The fundamental essence of the activity has to be seen

The true test for deciding whether an activity is business activity is (i) whether the said activity undertaken with a profit motive, or (ii) whether the said activity has continued on sound and recognized business principles, and pursued with reasonable continuity. In a situation in which an activity is not undertaken with a profit motive or on sound and recognized business principles, such an activity cannot be considered to be a business activity

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DATE: January 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 2(15)/ 10(23C)(iv): If the definition of "charitable purpose" is construed literally, it is violative of the principles of equality & unconstitutional. If the dominant object is not to carry on business or trade or commerce, then an incidental or ancillary activity for which a fee is charged does not destroy the character of a charitable institution

The expression “charitable purpose”, as defined in Section 2(15) cannot be construed literally and in absolute terms. It has to take colour and be considered in the context of Section 10(23C)(iv) of the said Act. It is also clear that if the literal interpretation is given to the proviso to Section 2(15) of the said Act, then the proviso would be at risk of running foul of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution India. In order to save the Constitutional validity of the proviso, the same would have to be read down and interpreted in the context of Section 10(23C)(iv) because, in our view, the context requires such an interpretation. The correct interpretation of the proviso to Section 2(15) of the said Act would be that it carves out an exception from the charitable purpose of advancement of any other object of general public utility and that exception is limited to activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business for a cess or fee or any other consideration. In both the activities, in the nature of trade, commerce or business or the activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, the dominant and the prime objective has to be seen. If the dominant and prime objective of the institution, which claims to have been established for charitable purposes, is profit making, whether its activities are directly in the nature of trade, commerce or business or indirectly in the rendering of any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, then it would not be entitled to claim its object to be a ‘charitable purpose’. On the flip side, where an institution is not driven primarily by a desire or motive to earn profits, but to do charity through the advancement of an object of general public utility, it cannot but be regarded as an institution established for charitable purposes

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DATE: January 20, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 2(22)(e) has to be construed strictly. If assessee is not a shareholder of lending co, s. 2(22)(e) does not apply even if funds are ultimately paid by Co in which assessee is a shareholder

The submission on behalf of the Revenue made before us is that one has to look at the substance of the transaction and that if one looks at the substance, then the Assessee would be chargeable to tax. This is not acceptable as fiscal status have to be interpreted strictly. Section 2 (22)(e) of the Act creates a fiction by bringing to tax an amount as dividend when the amount so received is otherwise then dividend. On a strict interpretation of Section 2(22)(e) of the Act, unless the Assessee is the shareholder of the company lending him money, no occasion to apply it can arise

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DATE: January 19, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 22, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 14A/ Rule 8D: (i) Expenditure (like audit fees) required to be incurred irrespective of income cannot be disallowed, (ii) investments in subsidiaries are not to earn dividend income and cannot be considered for disallowance

It is also evident from the balance sheet of the Appellant Co., its investments in shares were only in two subsidiary companies. Such investments in subsidiary companies were made by the Appellant to acquire/promote the subsidiary companies which are in the media business and were not made purely for earning dividend income. Neither any dividend income has been earned since the time such investments were made in the shares of the subsidiary companies. Hence, such investments cannot be considered for disallowance u/s 14A read with Rule 8D

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DATE: January 13, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
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S. 11 (charity) and 12AA (cancellation of registration): Important propositions of law laid down

s.12AA(3) has no retrospective effect as it is neither explanatory nor clarificatory in nature and the CIT has no power to rescind the order passed by the CIT prior to 1st Oct.2004. For an assessee to be classified as charitable under the residuary category i.e. “advancement of any other object of general public utility” u/s 2(15) of the Act, the following four factors have to be satisfied

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DATE: January 16, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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(i) ALP of interest on loan granted to European AE has to be based on Euribor, (ii) If technical know-how is transferred by reserving certain rights, there is no "transfer" for s. 2(47) capital gains, (iii) interest u/s 244A is not taxable if withdrawn

Though, technical know-how is a capital asset, it does not necessarily follow that all receipts from exploitation of such asset are to be treated as capital receipts. Revenue receipts can also be generated by exploiting capital assets

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DATE: January 14, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Important law on recognition of revenue in the context of taxability of advance received for transfer of home video & satellite broadcasting for a period of five years explained

In CIT Vs Birla Gwalior Pvt. Ltd. 89 ITR 266, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of accrual and the effect of subsequent events thereon. In this case Supreme Court made a distinction between “Real Income” and “hypothetical income” and stated that it is the real accrual of income that has to be taken into consideration and not a hypothetical accrual of income