Search Results For: M S Syali


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DATE: September 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 3, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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Transfer Pricing: Steps to be undertaken in identification of comparable transactions/entities while fixing the ALP and the margin explained. Though the TNMM method allows broad flexibility tolerance in the selection of comparables, broad functionality is not sufficient to find the comparable entity. There must be similarity with the controlled transaction

In so far as identifying comparable transactions/entities is concerned, the same would not differ irrespective of the transfer pricing method adopted. In other words, the comparable transactions/entities must be selected on the basis of similarity with the controlled transaction entity. Comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions has to be judged, inter alia, with reference to comparability factors as indicated under rule 10B(2) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. Comparability analysis by the transactional net margin method may be less sensitive to certain dissimilarities between the tested party and the comparables. However, that cannot be the consideration for diluting the standards of selecting comparable transactions/entities. A higher product and functional similarity would strengthen the efficacy of the method in ascertaining a reliable arm’s length price. Therefore, as far as possible, the comparables must be selected keeping in view the comparability factors as specified. Wide deviations in profit level indicator must trigger further investigations/analysis

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DATE: August 30, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 2, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 115JB: As Insurance companies are required to prepare accounts as per the Insurance Act and not as per Schedule VI to the Companies Act, s. 115JB does not apply. Insurance companies are not taxed on commercial profits but on profits as computed under the Insurance Act. Accordingly, income earned on sale/redemption of investments is not chargeable to tax

The different benches of the ITAT have, in other cases, consistently held that during the period when Rule 5(b) was not operational the profit on sale of investments made by general insurance companies cannot be brought to tax. In Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax (2010) 130 TTJ (Pune) 398, the ITAT addressed the specific question of whether a logical conclusion could be drawn that an income that is not taxed in terms of Rule 5(b) could, even after such amendment was deleted, be taxed in the hands of the insurance company. It was held that income which was earlier taxable under one specific clause could not be brought to tax after the deletion of such clause

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DATE: May 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-99, 1999-00, 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 147/148 reassessment has to be based on "fresh material". A reopening based on reappraisal of existing material is invalid. The assessee's duty is only to disclose facts and not to make inferences. Consolidated Photo 281 ITR 394 (Del) is not good law

The reopening was not based on any fresh material. By revisiting the same materials the successor AO now concluded that the payments received by the Assessee pursuant to the O&M Agreements should be treated as FTS. In the circumstances, the view taken by a successor AO on the same material was indeed nothing but a mere change of opinion. It is a well-settled legal proposition, as explained in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191(SC) that once an Assessee has discharged the burden of not only producing the account books and other documents, but also the specific material relevant to the assessment, “it is for the Income-tax Officer to draw the proper inferences of fact and law therefrom and the Assessee cannot further be called upon to do so for him.” In Indian Oil Corporation v. ITO [1986] 159 ITR 956 the Court pertinently observed “it is for the taxing authority to draw inference. It is not necessary for the Assessee to draw inference.” These observations apply on all fours to the case on hand

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DATE: May 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07 to 2011-12
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S. 132/153A: Important law explained on the preconditions necessary for the department to initiate valid search and seizure action u/s 132 and whether the assessee is entitled to challenge the same. Consequences of the search being declared void on the s. 153A assessment also explained

The law in relation to searches under Section 132 of the Act has been explained in a large number of decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. The jurisdictional facts that have to be established before a search under Section 132 (1) of the Act can be authorised are that (i) the authority issuing the authorisation is in possession of some credible information, other than surmises and conjectures (ii) that the authority has reason to believe that the conditions stipulated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 132 (1) qua the person searched exist; and (iii) the said information has nexus to such belief. The Courts have laid emphasis on the mandatory nature of the above requirement to be fulfilled under Section 132 (1) of the Act

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 40(a)(i): The law in s. 40(a)(i) that failure to deduct TDS on payment to a non-resident will result in a disallowance violates the non-discrimination clause in Article 26 of the India-USA DTAA because a similar disallowance is not made on payments to residents (pre s. 40(a)(ia))

The argument of the Revenue overlooks the fact that the condition under which deductibility is disallowed in respect of payments to non-residents, is plainly different from that when made to a resident. Under Section 40 (a) (i), as it then stood, the allowability of the deduction of the payment to a non-resident mandatorily required deduction of TDS at the time of payment. On the other hand, payments to residents were neither subject to the condition of deduction of TDS nor, naturally, to the further consequence of disallowance of the payment as deduction. The expression “under the same conditions” in Article 26 (3) of the DTAA clarifies the nature of the receipt and conditions of its deductibility. It is relatable not merely to the compliance requirement of deduction of TDS. The lack of parity in the allowing of the payment as deduction is what brings about the discrimination

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DATE: April 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 27, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 15, 17, 192: Concept of "salary" explained. Held that as "tips" are paid to employees of the assessee from an outsider on a voluntary basis and the employees have no vested right to receive the same, the same is not "salary" and the assessee has no obligation to deduct TDS

It can be seen, on an analysis of Section 15, that for the said Section to apply, there should be a vested right in an employee to claim any salary from an employer or former employer, whether due or not if paid; or paid or allowed, though not due. In CIT v. L.W. Russel reported in 53 ITR 91 (SC), this Court dealt with the provisions of Section 7(1) of the 1922 Act, which preceded Sections 15 and 17 of the present Act and held that it is necessary for the employee to have a vested right to receive an amount from his employer before he could be brought to tax under the head “salaries”; Tips being purely voluntary amounts that may or may not be paid by customers for services rendered to them would not, therefore, fall within Section 15(b) at all. Also, it is clear that salary must be paid or allowed to an employee in the previous year “by or on behalf of” an employer. Even assuming that the expression “allowed” is an expression of width, the salary must be paid by or on behalf of an employer. It must first be noticed that the expression “employer” is different from the expression “person”. An “employer” is a person who employs another person under a contract of employment, express or implied, to perform work for the employer. Therefore, Section 15(b) necessarily has reference to the contract of employment between employer and employee, and salary paid or allowed must therefore have reference to such contract of employment.

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DATE: February 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 9(1)(vi) vs. Article 12 of DTAA: The retrospective amendment to s. 9(1)(vi) so as to supersede the law laid down in Asia Satellite 332 ITR 340 (Del) and assess transmission fees as “royalty” has no impact on assessees covered by DTAA because a corresponding amendment has not been made to the definition of “royalty” therein. Amendments to domestic law do not affect the DTAA

This Court is of the view that no amendment to the Act, whether retrospective or prospective can be read in a manner so as to extend in operation to the terms of an international treaty. In other words, a clarificatory or declaratory amendment, much less one which may seek to overcome an unwelcome judicial interpretation of law, cannot be allowed to have the same retroactive effect on an international instrument effected between two sovereign states prior to such amendment. In the context of international law, while not every attempt to subvert the obligations under the treaty is a breach, it is nevertheless a failure to give effect to the intended trajectory of the treaty. Employing interpretive amendments in domestic law as a means to imply contoured effects in the enforcement of treaties is one such attempt, which falls just short of a breach, but is nevertheless, in the opinion of this Court, indefensible

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DATE: January 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 29, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05 to 2011-12
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S. 245F: The Settlement Commission does not have the power to direct a special audit u/s 142(2A)

The exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement commission to exercise the powers and perform the functions of an income tax authority, in terms of section 245F(2) of the said Act, is to be exercised and performed for the purpose of settlement of the case under Chapter XIX-A and not for assessment under Chapter XIV. That being the case, the powers and functions which are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement commission are circumscribed by the object and role which has been ascribed to the settlement commission, which is to settle the case in terms of the procedure stipulated in Chapter XIX-A. Since assessment of the type contemplated under section 143(3) is outside the purview of settlement proceedings, a special audit under section 142(2A), which is in aid of assessment, would also be beyond the scope of settlement proceedings

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DATE: January 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 147: Reopening of assessment to take remedial action pursuant to audit objections as per Instruction No. 9 of 2006 is not valid if AO disagrees with the objections. Instruction No. 9 cannot override the requirement in s. 147 that AO should form his own belief that income has escaped assessment

The Court holds instruction No. 9 of the CBDT dated 7th November, 2006 cannot possibly override the statutory powers to be exercised by an AO in terms of Section 147 of the Act. In other words the said instruction has to be read consistent with proviso (a) to Section 119 (1) of the Act and cannot, as was erroneously understood by the Respondent, compel the AO to issue the notice u/s 148. If the CBDT Instruction No. 9/2006 is read to the contrary, it would fall foul of Section 119 of the Act.

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DATE: May 26, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 29, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(i): As there is no requirement in the Act to deduct TDS on purchases made from Indian residents, imposing such a condition while making payments to non-residents violates the non-discrimination provision in Article 24 of the DTAA

Article 24 provides in unequivocal terms that for the purposes of determining the taxable profits of an Indian enterprise, any disbursements made to a Japanese enterprise shall be deductible in the same manner as if it had been made to an Indian resident. When we examine the TDS provisions, it is noticed that no provision under the Chapter XVII of the Act stipulates for deduction of tax at source from payment made for the purchases made from an Indian resident. This position when contrasted with purchases made from a non-resident, imposes liability on the purchaser for deducting tax at source under section 195, subject to the fulfilment of other conditions. When we compare an Indian enterprise purchasing goods from an Indian party vis-a-vis from a Japanese party, there is possibility of an obvious discrimination in terms of disallowance of purchase consideration under section 40(a)(i) in so far as the purchases from a Japanese enterprise are concerned. It is this discrimination which is sought to be remedied by para 3 of Article 24