(622.9 KiB, 313 DLs)

Immunity from s.271AAA penalty available even if tax on undisclosed income unpaid till passing assmt order

Pursuant to a search u/s 132 the assessee disclosed additional income u/s 132(4) and offered the same to tax. However, the taxes due on the same were paid only after the passing of the assessment order. The AO held that as the taxes were not paid at the time of filing the ROI, the immunity from penalty u/s 271AAA was not available. This was reversed by the CIT (A) on the ground that u/s 271AAA (2), there was no precondition that the tax & interest had to be paid before filing of return or any other specified date. On appeal by the department, HELD dismissing the appeal:

S. 271 AAA makes a paradigm shift on the imposition of penalty in respect of unaccounted income unearthed as a result of search operation. Unlike s. 271(1)(c), s. 271 AAA penalty is imposable on undisclosed income without “concealment” or “furnishing inaccurate particulars” having to be shown. S. 271AAA(2) grants immunity from penalty if (i) in the s. 132(4) statement, the undisclosed income is admitted and the manner of deriving it is specified; (ii) the manner in which the undisclosed income was derived is substantiated; and (iii) the tax & interest on the undisclosed income is paid. While payment of taxes & interest is a condition precedent for availing immunity u/s 271AAA(2), there is no time limit for such payment. In the absence of a time limit for payment of tax & interest in the statute, the AO’s stand that it ought to have been paid at the time of filing the ROI is not acceptable. Further, though in the context of Explanation 5 to s. 271(1)(c) it has been held in Mahendra Shah 299 ITR 305 (Guj) that the conclusion of the assessment proceedings is the outer limit for making payment of tax & interest, that was in the context of s. 271(1)(c) which required the AO to record his satisfaction in the course of the assessment proceedings itself. As there is no such requirement in s. 271 AAA, there is no outer limit for payment of the due tax & interest. On facts, as the assessee had paid the due tax & interest within the time specified in the s. 156 notice of demand, s. 271AAA penalty was not imposable.

(210.8 KiB, 542 DLs)

Law on taxing non-compete fee u/s 28(va) & 55(2)(a) explained

In AY 2000-01, the assessee received Rs. 11 crores pursuant to a non-compete agreement which was for 5 years. The AO held that there was a “transfer” by way of relinquishment of the assessee’s “right to manufacture” and that the same was chargeable to capital gains by taking Nil cost u/s 55(2)(a). This was reversed by the CIT (A) on the ground that the personal skills of the assessee were placed under restraint and as the said personal skills were not a “capital asset”, capital gains was not chargeable. On appeal to the Tribunal, the matter was referred to the Special bench. HELD by the Special Bench:

(i) The taxability of a non-compete fee depends on the purpose for which it is paid. A non-compete fee can be divided into two categories: (a) consideration received by the transferor of a business for agreeing not to carry on the same business; (b) consideration received by other persons associated with the transferor to ensure that they do not indulge in competing business. For AY 2003-04 & onwards, non-compete fee received by the transferor of a business is taxable as a capital gains in view of s. 55(2)(a) which provides that the cost of a “right to carry on business” shall be Nil. Though s. 55(2)(a) as amended by the FA 1997 w.e.f. 1.4.1998 referred to a “right to manufacture, produce or process any article or thing“, that would not cover a non-compete covenant. For AY 2003-04 & onwards, a non-compete fee received by a person associated with the transferor is taxable as “business profits” u/s 28(va)(a) as being a payment for “not carrying out any activity in relation to any business“. A non-compete fee received in an earlier year is not chargeable to tax in view of Guffic Chem vs. CIT 320 ITR 602 (SC);

(ii) On facts, the consideration of Rs. 11 crores received by the assessee was not for sale of any business nor was it for not carrying on any business which he was carrying on, which he had transferred. It was also not a payment for a “right to manufacture, produce or process any article or thing“. The sum was not paid for transfer of any intangible right in respect of manufacture, production or process of cement. Accordingly, the capital gains provisions were not attracted. The amount was paid for “not carrying out any activity in relation to any business” and would fall within the ambit of s. 28(va)(a). However, as s. 28(va) came into effect in AY 2003-04, the receipts was not chargeable to tax in AY 2000-01.

(147.2 KiB, 498 DLs)

Software Royalty: View in favour of assessee should be followed

The assessee sold “shrink-wrap application software” called “Solidworks 2003″ to customers in India and claimed that the same was “business profits” and not assessable to tax as it did not a PE in India. The AO held that the income was assessable to tax as “royalty” u/s 9(1)(vi)/ Article 12(3) though the Tribunal (for an earlier year) reversed it on the ground that the product was a “copyrighted article” and not “copyright“. Before the Tribunal, the department claimed that the earlier view should not be followed in view of Samsung Electronics 203 Taxman 477(Kar) while the assessee relied on Ericsson AB 204 Taxman 192 (Del). HELD by the Tribunal:

The department’s argument that Ericsson AB 204 TM 192 was confined to a case where the software was embedded to the equipment is not correct. The Court did hold that consideration paid merely for right to use cannot be held to be royalty and the ratio would also apply when “shrink wrap” software is sold. Where two views are possible, the view in favour of the assessee has to be preferred. This principle is applicable to non-resident assessees as well in view of Article 24(1) of the DTAA (non-discrimination) which provides that nationals of a Contracting State shall not be treated less favourably than the nationals of the other Contracting State.

(95.6 KiB, 348 DLs)

S. 148 notice “issued” within limitation period is valid even if “service” is later

For AY 1998-99, the AO issued a notice u/s 148 dated 28.3.2005 (within the limitation period of 6 years). However, as this notice was returned un-served, a second notice dated 17.6.2005 (beyond 6 years) which issued & served. The assessee contended that since the AO had issued a second notice, the first one was non-est and as the second notice was issued beyond limitation period, the assessment proceedings were null and void. The CIT (A) upheld the plea. Before the Tribunal, the AM held that there was a difference between “issue” of the notice and its “service” and that the notice dated 28.3.2005 was valid, though not served, and the second notice was invalid and non-est. The JM took a contrary view and held that the first notice was invalid and the second notice having been issued after the limitation period did not give jurisdiction to make the assessment. On a reference to the Third Member, HELD:

The Act makes a clear distinction between “issue of notice” and “service of notice”. S. 149 which prescribes the period of limitation provides that no notice u/s 148 shall be “issued” after the expiry of the limitation period. The “service” of the notice is necessary u/s 148 only to make the order of assessment. Once a notice is “issued” within the period of limitation, the AO has jurisdiction to make the assessment. A notice is considered to have been “issued” if it is placed in the hands of a person authorized to serve it, and with a bona fide intent to have it served. Service of the notice is not a condition precedent to conferment of jurisdiction on the AO but it is a condition precedent to the making of the order of assessment. On facts, as the AO had issued the notice within the period of limitation, he had jurisdiction to reopen the assessment (R.K.Upadhyay vs. Patel 166 ITR 163 (SC) followed)

(184.6 KiB, 512 DLs)

TDR is “improvement” of land & if it has no cost, then, even if the land has a “cost”, no part of the gain on transfer of land is taxable

The assessee was the owner of land acquired in 1963. Pursuant to the Development Control Regulations, 1991, the assessee was entitled to construct up to 1:1 FSI on the property. The assessee was also entitled to load Transferable Development Rights (“TDR”) on the property. The assessee entered into a development agreement with a developer pursuant to which the developer agreed to develop on the said land by utilizing the FSI & TDR and paid compensation to the assessee. The assessee claimed that the TDR was an “improvement” of the land and as a “cost of improvement” of the land could not be determined, no capital gains was chargeable. In appeal, the CIT (A) held that the FSI and TDR were separate & distinct assets and that while the TDR did not have a cost, the FSI did and if both were transferred together, there was a “cost” for the “asset” and capital gains was chargeable. On appeal by the assessee, HELD allowing the appeal:

The assessee transferred “Development Rights” being the FSI and the “right to load TDR” on the land. While the right to construct on the land by consuming FSI was a capital asset which was acquired at a cost, the right to load TDR arose pursuant to the DC Regulations, 1991 without payment of any cost. The said right to “load TDR” was an improvement to the “capital asset” held by the assessee. If the “cost of improvement” of an asset is not determinable, capital gains are not chargeable. The result was that even the consideration attributable to the FSI (which had a cost) was not assessable to tax (Principle laid down in Jethalal D. Mehta 2 SOT 422 (Mum) & Maheshwar Prakash CHS 24 SOT 366 (Mum) in the context of transfer of only TDR followed).

(90.3 KiB, 392 DLs)

S. 143(3) assessment order without AO’s signature is Void

The AO passed an assessment order u/s 143(3) and issued the Income-tax Computation Form (ITNS 150), Demand Notice u/s 156 and Penalty Notice u/s 271(1)(c). While all the other documents were signed by the AO, the assessment order was not. In reply to the assessee’s contention that the assessment order was invalid, the department relied on s. 292B and Kalyankumar Ray vs. CIT 191 ITR 634 (SC) and argued that the Act does not require the service of an assessment order and the service of a valid ITNS 150 & demand notice was sufficient. HELD rejecting the department’s plea:

S.143(3) contemplates that the AO shall pass an order of assessment in writing. If the assessment order is signed then because the computation of tax is a ministerial act, ITNS-150 need not be signed by the AO. However, if the assessment order is not signed, then the fact that he has signed the tax computation form and the notice of demand is irrelevant. The omission to sign the assessment order cannot be explained by relying on s. 292B. If such a course is permitted to be followed than that would amount to delegation of powers conferred on the AO by the Act. Delegation of powers of the AO u/s 143(3) is not the intent and purpose of the Act. An unsigned assessment order is not in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act (Kilasho Devi Burman 219 ITR 214 (SC) followed; Kalyankumar Ray 191 ITR 634 (SC) explained)

(61.1 KiB, 636 DLs)

S. 143(1) assessment cannot be reopening u/s 147 in absence of “new material”

The AO accepted the ROI filed by the assessee u/s 143(1). He thereafter issued a notice u/s 148 on the ground that the assessee had claimed a deduction for ERP software and that although only 20% of the said expenses was debited to the P&L A/c, the entire amount was claimed as a deduction. The assessee claimed that the reopening was not valid as there was no “new material” in the AO’s possession. HELD upholding the plea:

Though the assessment was originally u/s 143(1), it is clearly evident from the recorded reasons that there was no new material coming to the possession of the AO on the basis of which the s. 143(1) assessment was reopened. In Telco Dadaji Dhackjee Ltd, the Third Member held, after considering Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers 291 ITR 500 & Kelvinator of India 320 ITR 561 (SC), that a s. 143(1) assessment could not be reopened u/s 147 without there being any new material coming to the possession of the AO. As the AO had reopened the s. 143(1) assessment on the basis of the material which was already on record, the reopening was not valid.

(122.2 KiB, 724 DLs)

Tribunal’s order is binding and failure to follow it is ‘Contempt of Court’

Though the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case held that exemption u/s 11 was available and the facts were identical, the CIT (A), for a subsequent year, declined to follow it inter alia on the ground that the DR had not advanced arguments before the Tribunal in a ‘comprehensive and effective manner’. The assessee filed an appeal demanding exemplary costs u/s 254(2B). HELD by the Tribunal after a comprehensive review of the law on the subject:

It is well settled that the Tribunal is exercising judicial functions and has all powers of a Court. The proceeding before the Tribunal are deemed to be judicial proceedings. It appears to be the impression/ misunderstanding of some tax officials that the orders of the ITAT interpreting the law cannot be binding as it is a fact finding authority. However, this is not correct because the decision of a higher authority in the judicial hierarchy is binding on all the lower authorities below the line. Hence, the AO & CIT (A) are bound by the decision rendered by the jurisdictional Tribunal. Refusal to follow the order of the ITAT would render that authority guilty of committing contempt of Tribunal for which the concerned authority is liable to be proceeded against. If the decision of the Tribunal is found to be unacceptable to the authorities below, the right course to follow is to carry the matter in appeal to the High Court and to seek suspension of the operation of the order of the Tribunal. A person occupying the chair of CIT (A) is expected to be aware of judicial discipline and the binding nature of the Tribunal’s order. To avoid harassment to the assessee and unpleasant circumstances, the CBDT should take appropriate steps to enlighten all officials to ensure that judicial discipline is maintained. Costs u/s 254(2B) can be granted only if frivolous appeals are filed and not in a case like this. However, the assessee is free to take proper steps for initiating contempt proceeding against the CIT(A) (Ajay Gandhi Vs. B.Singh 265 ITR 451 (SC), ITAT Vs. V.K.Agarwal 235 ITR 175 (SC) & Agarwal Warehousing and Leasing 257 ITR 235 (MP) followed)

(144.1 KiB, 750 DLs)

S. 40(a)(ia) TDS: Even if Payee has paid tax, payer not eligible for deduction

For AY 2007-08 & 08-09, the assessee paid VSAT & transaction charges without deduction of TDS. The AO held the payment to be “fees for technical services” & disallowed the payment u/s 40(a)(ia) for want of TDS u/s 194J though the CIT (A) allowed the claim by relying on Skycell Communications 251 ITR 53 (Mad). Before the Tribunal, the assessee argued that though the merits was covered against it by CIT vs. Kotak Securities Ltd 340 ITR 333 (Bom), the deduction had to be allowed because (i) s. 40(a)(ia) was not a ‘tax-levying’ provision but was merely to ensure that tax was paid by either the payer or the payee. As the payee had already paid the taxes, the bar in s. 40(a)(i) did not apply in line with Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage 293 ITR 226 (SC) and (ii) in accordance with Kotak Securities, as the department had not objected to the non-deduction of TDS on transaction charges in the past, there was no justification for invocation of s.40(a)(ia). HELD by the Tribunal:

The argument that since the payee has already paid due tax on the income, s. 40(a)(ia) cannot be invoked is not correct. The law in Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage 293 ITR 226 (SC) that if the payee is assessed, the tax cannot be recovered from the payer was in the context of s.201 and pursuant to Circular No.275/201/95-IT dated 29-1-1997. In the absence of such circular in case of disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia), the principle laid down cannot be adopted for s. 40(a)(ia). As regards the principle that the department had accepted the position in the past, the defense is available for AY 2007-08 but not for AY 2008-09.

(124.3 KiB, 432 DLs)

s. 194H TDS: In absence of principal-agent relationship, payment, though called “commission”, not covered

The assessee obtained a bank guarantee and paid ‘bank guarantee commission’. The AO & CIT (A) took the view that since the payment was characterized as “commission” it fell within the ambit of s. 194H and the assessee ought to have deducted TDS. The assessee was held liable as assessee-in-default u/s 201. On appeal by the assessee, HELD reversing the AO & CIT (A):

S. 194H defines the expression “commission or brokerage” to include any payment received by a person acting on behalf of another person for services rendered or for any services in the course of buying or selling of goods …. Applying the principle of noscitur a sociis & ejusdem generis, the expression “commission” has to take its colour from the expression “brokerage”. As the expression “brokerage”, in common parlance and in law, means ‘fees or commission given to or charged by a broker’, the expression ‘commission’ must be confined to a payment made to agents etc for effecting sales and carrying out business transactions and cannot extend to payments which are for services rendered or products offered on a principal to principal basis. A principal-agent relationship is a sine qua non for invoking the provisions of s. 194 H. As there is no principal agent relationship between a bank issuing the bank guarantee and the assessee, the payment, though termed “commission”, is not covered by s. 194H (SRL Ranbaxy Ltd vs ACIT referred).