(82.4 KiB, 736 DLs)

Gains on housing society redevelopment is non-taxable capital receipt

The assessee was the member of a housing society. The housing society and it’s members entered into an agreement with a developer pursuant to which the developer demolished the building owned by the housing society and reconstructed a new multistoried building by using the FSI arising out of the property and the outside TDR available under Development Control Regulations. The assessee, as a member of the housing society, received a larger flat in the new building, displacement compensation of Rs. 6 lakhs (at Rs.34,000 p.m. for the period of construction of the new building) and additional compensation of Rs.11.75 lakhs. The AO & CIT (A) held that the said “additional compensation” was assessable as income in the assessee’s hands. On appeal by the assessee, HELD allowing the appeal:

In principle, though the scope of “income” in s. 2(24) is very wide, a capital receipt is not chargeable to tax as income unless there is a specific provision to that effect. As the residential flat owned by the assessee in the society’s building was a capital asset in his hands, the compensation was a capital receipt. The department’s argument that the cash compensation was a “share in profits earned by the developer” is not acceptable because it proceeds on the fallacy that the nature of payment in the hands of the payer determines the nature in the hands of the recipient. However, as the said receipt reduced the cost of acquisition of the new flat, it had to be taken into when computing the gains from a transfer thereof in the future

(295.1 KiB, 302 DLs)

TPO can rely on “contemporaneous” data even if not available at specified date

In a transfer pricing appeal, the Tribunal had to consider two issues: (a) what is the data to be considered by the TPO at the time of determining ALP? & (b) whether the assessee should be given an opportunity to refute the material sought to be utilized by the TPO? HELD by the Tribunal:

(i) Under Rule 10D (4) the information and documents should as far as possible be contemporaneous and should exists latest by the ‘specified date’ specified in s. 92F (4) i.e. the due date for filing the ROI. There is no cut-off date upto which only the information available in public domain can be taken into consideration by the TPO while making the transfer pricing adjustments and arriving at the ALP. The assessee’s argument that s.92D and Rule 10D is defeated if the TPO takes the data which is available in the public domain after the specified date is not acceptable.

(ii) While the TPO is empowered by s. 131(1) & 133(6) to call for information without informing the assessee about the process, he cannot use such information against the assessee without giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing. If the assessee seeks an opportunity to cross-examine third parties, it has to be given the opportunity (Genisys Integrating Systems followed)

(57.7 KiB, 525 DLs)

S. 271(1)(c): CA’s opinion does not necessarily make claim “bona fide”

The assessee obtained the opinion of a Chartered Accountant on whether expenditure on fees to the Registrar of Companies for increasing authorized capital can be claimed as revenue expenditure. The CA relied on judicial precedents and opined that the issue was debatable and a claim could be made on the basis that if two views were possible, the view in favour of the assessee should be taken. The assessee claimed deduction and even the tax auditor did not qualify the same. The AO relying on Punjab State Industrial Development Corp 225 ITR 792 (SC) & Brooke Bond 225 ITR 798 (SC) disallowed the claim and levied s. 271(1)(c) penalty which was upheld by the CIT (A). Before the Tribunal, the assessee pleaded that as it had relied on the opinion of an expert in making the claim, its action was bona fide & penalty could not be levied. HELD dismissing the appeal:

In view of the two decisions of the Supreme Court which held the field when the return was filed, the claim was patently disallowable. The claim was also not discernible on the face of the record and the details of expenses had to be gone into in order to decipher the claim. The argument that the assessee does not have expertise in taxation matters and so it relied on expert opinion is not acceptable because the opinion was furnished for accounting purposes. An accountant’s view is not really material for deciding the deductibility or otherwise of an expenditure. The assessee knew about the problem at the time of filing of return, but still made the claim. Not only this, the claim was pursued even up to the level of the CIT (A) in gross disregard for the decision of the Supreme Court, which the assessee came to know at least after receiving the assessment order. Therefore, the claim was not only wrong but also false and it was persisted with for some time. The fact that the assessee did not even seek explanation from the tax auditor or the CA gave the impression that the whole thing was a sham.

(475.0 KiB, 557 DLs)

S. 271(1)(c): Despite Surrender After Detection, Penalty Can be Waived

Pursuant to a search & s. 153A assessment on the basis of seized papers, statements etc; the assessee offered additional income of Rs. 2.68 crores on the basis that he was unable to explain the old records. Some of the other additions made by the AO were partly deleted by the CIT (A) & Tribunal. The AO & CIT (A) levied s. 271(1)(c) penalty on the ground that the assessee’s offer of additional income was not voluntary or bona fide. On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal, HELD allowing the appeal:

Though the assessee owned the unaccounted transactions only after search action, when an assessee admits his mistake and that he has committed a wrong and offers the additional income to tax, it cannot be said that his statement is false or not bona fide. Neither the CIT (A) nor the Tribunal were completely clear about the exact amount of concealment and there was no conclusive evidence as some additions had been deleted. S. 271(1)(c) gives discretion to the AO to exonerate the assessee from levy of penalty even in case where the assessee has concealed the income or furnished incorrect particulars of income. Penalty should not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. The AO has to exercise his discretion judiciously. If an assessee files a revised return though at a later stage or discloses true income, penalty need not be levied. No doubt, merely offering additional income will not automatically protect the assessee from levy of penalty but in a given case where the assessee came forward with additional income though after detection because he was not in a position to explain the seized material properly and expresses remorse in his conduct un-hesitantly, the AO has to exercise the discretion in favour of such assessee as otherwise the expression ‘may’ in s. 271(1)(c) becomes redundant. In a case of admitted income, concealment penalty is not automatic. The discretion vested in the AO should be used not to levy penalty. On facts, the case was most befitting to exercise such discretion because there was divergent opinion while deleting or sustaining the addition and there was no conclusive proof that the assessee concealed income or furnished inaccurate particulars of income. The assessee’s offer was to avoid litigation. If the AO had clinching evidence of concealment, he should not have accepted the assessee’s offer and should have proceeded on the basis of material on record (VIP Industries 112 TTJ 289, Siddharth Enterprises 184 TM 460 (P&H) & Reliance Petro Products 322 ITR 158 (SC) followed).

(215.5 KiB, 417 DLs)

Transfer Pricing: TPO is duty bound to eliminate differences in comparables’ data

In a Transfer Pricing matter, the Tribunal had to consider whether for purposes of making adjustment under Rule 10B (1)(e)(iii) ‘working capital’ constituted a ‘difference between the international transactions and the comparable uncontrolled transactions of between the enterprises entering into such transactions’ and if so whether the said difference ‘could materially affect’ the amount of net profit margin of relevant transactions in the open market. HELD by the Tribunal:

Rule 10B(e)(iii) provides that “the profit margin arising in comparable uncontrolled transactions has to be adjusted to take into account the differences, if any between the international transaction and the comparable uncontrolled transactions, or between the enterprises entering into such transactions, which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin in the open market“. While the “differences” are not specified, it covers “any differences” which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin. The litmus test to be applied is if the ‘difference, if any, is capable of affecting the NPM in open market? If yes, then the TPO is under statutory obligation to eliminate such differences. The revenue cannot say that difference is likely to exist in all accounts and so the demands of the assessee should be ignored. The revenue’s stand that the assessee is ineligible for any adjustments if he provides the set of comparable is not correct because under Rule 10(3) it is the duty of the AO/TPO/DRP to minimize/eliminate the difference which is likely to materially affect the price. It is the settled proposition that ‘working capital’ adjustment is an adjustment that is required to be made in TNMM. The revenue’s contention that the ‘differences’ specified should refer to only (i) the factor of demand and supply; (ii) existence of marketable intangibles i.e. brand name etc; (iii) geographical location and the like is not acceptable. Further, as the difference in the Arm’s length Operating Margin of the Comparables before and after making the adjustment for working capital was up to 3.77%, it was “material” and had to be eliminated (Mentor Graphics 109 ITD 101 (Del), E-gain Communication 118 ITD 243 (Pune) Sony India 114 ITD 448 (Del) & TNT India followed)

(120.6 KiB, 622 DLs)

S. 72: Gains arising from “business assets” not eligible for set-off against B/fd business loss

The assessee sold land & building used for business purposes. Though the gain was offered as capital gains, the assessee claimed, relying on Cocanada Radhaswami Bank Ltd 57 ITR 306 (SC) and other judgements, that as the assets were “business assets”, the gains there from were eligible for set-off against the brought forward business loss u/s 72. The issue was referred to a Special Bench. HELD by the Special Bench against the assessee:

S. 72 (1) allows brought forward business loss to be set-off against the “profits & gains of any business or profession” of the subsequent year. The expression “profits & gains of business” means income earned out of business carried on by the assessee and not just income connected in some way to the business or profession carried on by the assessee. The land & building were fixed & capital assets used by the assessee for its business purposes. The gains arising there from were assessable as capital gains and were not eligible for set-off against the brought forward business loss u/s 72 (Express Newspapers 53 ITR 250 (SC) followed; Cocanada Radhaswami Bank 55 ITR 17(SC) distinguished; Steelcon Industries reversed)

(148.3 KiB, 445 DLs)

Onus on AO to show foreign co has a PE in India. Under India-France DTAA, even dependent agent is not PE in absence of finding that transactions are not at ALP

The assessee, a French company, engaged in the operation of ships in international traffic, claimed that it did not have a PE in India and that no part of its income was chargeable to tax in India. The AO & DRP held that as the assessee had an agent in India which concluded contracts, obtained clearances and did the other work, there was a PE in India under Articles 5(5) & 5(6) of the DTAA. On appeal by the assessee, HELD allowing the appeal:

(i) In order to constitute a PE under Article 5(1) & 5(2), three criteria are required to be satisfied viz; physical criterion (existence), functionality criterion (carrying out of business through that place of physical location) & subjective criterion (right to use that place). There must exist a physical “location”, the enterprise must have the “right” to use that place and the enterprise must “carry on” business through that place. An “agency” PE will not satisfy this condition because the enterprise will not have the “right” to use the place of the agent. Under Article 5(6) of the India-French DTAA (which is at variance with the UN & OECD Model Conventions), even a wholly dependent agent is to be treated as an independent agent unless if it is shown that the transactions between him and the enterprise are not at arms’ length. The Department’s argument that as the AO had not examined whether the transactions were done in arm’s length conditions, the matter should be restored to him is not acceptable because the onus was on the Revenue to demonstrate that the assessee had a PE. The onus is greater where the very foundation of DAPE rested on the negative finding that the transactions between the agent and the enterprise were not made under at arms length conditions. A negative finding about transactions with the dependent agent not being at ALP is sine qua non for existence of a DAPE under the India-France DTAA. The AO could not be granted a fresh inning for making roving and fishing enquiries whether the transactions were at arm’s length conditions or not (Airlines Rotables 44 SOT 368 followed);

(ii) (Observed, on a conceptual note, taking note of revenue’s plea but without deciding) If as a result of a DAPE, no additional profits, other than the agent’s remuneration in the source country – which is taxable in the source state anyway de hors the existence of PE, become taxable in the source state, the very approach to the DAPE profit attribution seems incongruous. Further, before accepting the DAPE profit neutrality theory, as per Morgan Stanley 292 ITR 416 (SC), the arm’s length remuneration paid to the PE must take into account ‘all the risks of the foreign enterprise as assumed by the PE’. In an agency PE situation, a DAPE assumes the entrepreneurship risk in respect of which the agent can never be compensated because even as DAPE inherently assumes the entrepreneurship risk, an agent cannot assume that entrepreneurship risk. To this extent, there may be a subtle line of demarcation between a dependent agent and a dependent agency PE. The tax neutrality theory, on account of existence of DAPE, may not be wholly unqualified at least on a conceptual note.

(81.3 KiB, 652 DLs)

Long-term & short-term gains from PMS transactions taxable as business profits

The assessee offered LTCG & STCG on sale of shares which had arisen through a Portfolio Management Scheme of Kotak and Reliance. The investments were shown under the head “investments” in the accounts and were made out of surplus funds. Delivery of the shares was taken. The AO & CIT (A) held that as the transactions by the PMS manager were frequent and the holding period was short, the LTCG & STCG were assessable as business profits. On appeal by the assessee, HELD dismissing the appeal:

In a Portfolio Management Scheme, the choice of securities and its period of holding is left to the portfolio manager and the assessee has no control. Only the portfolio manager can deal with the Demat account of the assessee. While, at the time of depositing the amount, the assessee will make entry in his books of account as investment in PMS, he is not aware of the transactions in the shares being entered into by the portfolio manager on his behalf as his agent. Since the assessee comes to know about the purchase and sale of shares under PMS after the expiry of the quarter, the accounting treatment in the books of the assessee in respect of shares purchased/sold by the portfolio manager under PMS cannot be entered in the books of the assessee. It is at the end of the year the shares available in the DEMAT account can be entered. Therefore, at the time of deposit of amount, the intention of the assessee was to maximize the profit. As the purchase and sale of shares under PMS is not in the control of the assessee at all, it cannot be said that the assessee had invested money under PMS with intention to hold shares as investment. The portfolio manager carried out trading in shares on behalf of his clients to maximize the profits. Therefore, it cannot be said that shares were held by the assessee as investment. The fact that the transactions were frequent and its volume was high indicated that the portfolio manager had done trading on behalf of the assessee. The fact that the shares remaining at the end of the year were shown under the head ‘investment’ makes no difference. Even the LTCG is assessable as business profits and s. 10(38) exemption is not available. The fact that the AO took a contrary view in the preceding year is irrelevant. There is no difference between similar transactions carried out by an individual in shares and the transactions carried out by portfolio manager. There is, however, a difference between investment in a mutual fund and PMS.

(265.5 KiB, 654 DLs)

Transfer Pricing: Important Principles on scope, data & comparability set out

In a transfer pricing matter, the Tribunal had to consider the following issues (i) whether transfer pricing adjustments have to be restricted to AE transactions only, (ii) whether a turnover filter can be applied and only companies with turnover within the range can be considered for comparison; (iii) whether the TPO is entitled to collect information u/s 133(6) for determining the ALP or he is confined to data available in public domain on the specified date, (iv) Whether the +/-5% adjustment is a “standard deduction”, (v) whether an adjustment to the ALP can be made for “low capacity utilization”? HELD by the Tribunal:

(i) Under Chapter X, only international transactions between AEs are required to be computed having regard to the ALP. Accordingly, the transfer pricing adjustments have to be restricted to the AE transactions by adopting the operating revenue and operating costs of only those transactions (Starlite 133 TTJ 425 (Mum) followed);

(ii) Though the Act & Rules does not provide for a turnover filter, there has to be an upper and lower limit because size does matter in business. A big company is in a position to bargain the price and attract more customers. It also has a broad base of skilled employees who are able to give better output. A small company may not have these benefits and the turnover would come down reducing profit margin. When are loss making companies are excluded from comparables, super-profit making companies should also be excluded. A reasonable classification of companies on the basis of net sales or turnover has to be made (Sony India 114 ITD 448 (Del), Indo American Jewellery 41 SOT 1 (Mum) & Philips Software 26 SOT 226 followed);

(iii) While Rule 10D(4) requires that the information should be “contemporaneous” and exist latest by the “specified date”, there is no “cut-off date” upto which only the information available in public domain can be considered by the TPO. Even data that becomes available in the public domain after the specified date can be considered. If the TPO collects information u/s 133(6), he is not required to inform the assessee about the process used by him nor is he required to furnish the entire information to the assessee. However, the assessee must be given proper hearing if any information is proposed to be used against it;

(iv) The +/-5% adjustment is a “standard deduction” and not merely the range within which if the ALP falls that the ALP of the assessee is required to be accepted (Philips Software 26 SOT 226, Development Consultants 23 SOT 455 followed)

(v) All comparables have to be compared on similar standards and the assessee cannot be put in a disadvantageous position, when in the case of other companies adjustments for under utilization of manpower is given. The assessee should also be given adjustment for under utilization of its infrastructure.

(134.5 KiB, 727 DLs)

S. 194H TDS: Tests to determine “Principal-Agent” Relationship Explained

The assessee entered into agreements with hospitals etc (“collection centres“) in accordance with which the centres collected samples from patients seeking laboratory tests and forwarded it to the assessee. The centres raised a bill on the patient, retained their “discount” and paid the balance to the assessee. The assessee claimed that it had rendered “professional services” & that the centres had rightly deducted TDS u/s 194J. The AO held that in collecting the sample and forwarding it to the assessee, the centres acted as an “agent” of the assessee and that the “discount” retained by it was “commission” and that the assessee ought to have deducted TDS u/s 194H. He consequently disallowed the “discount” u/s 40(a)(i) in the hands of the assessee. This was upheld by the CIT (A). On appeal by the assessee, HELD reversing the AO & CIT(A):

(i) To fall within s. 194-H, the payment must be by a “person acting on behalf of another person“. The element of “agency” has necessarily to be there. If the dealings between the parties is not on a “principal to agent” basis, s. 194-H does not get attracted;

(ii) On facts, the relationship between the assessee and the Centres was not on a “principal & agent” basis because (a) under the agreement, the Centres availed the professional services of the assessee to test the samples and were under no obligation to always forward these samples to the assessee; (b) The Centres issued its own bill to the patient, collected the fees and issued the receipt, (c) the assessee raised its invoice on the Centres after giving a “discount” over the standard price list; (d) the rates charged by the Centres from its customers were not decided by the assessee, (e) there was no privity of contract between the assessee & the patient, (f) the amounts collected by the Centres was not on behalf of the assessee. Consequently, the relationship between the assessee and the Centres was on principal to principal basis and s. 194H did not apply (Ahmedabad Stamp Vendor Association 257 ITR 202 (Guj), Bhopal Sugar Industries AIR 1977 (SC) 1275, Singapore Airlines 319 ITR 29 (Del), Qantas Airways 332 ITR 25 (Bom) considered);

(iii) Further, the obligation of TDS u/s 194 H arises only at the time of “payment” or “credit”. As the assessee had not paid or credited any amount to the account of the Centres, s. 194H had no application. The assessee had only credited the net amount received from the Centres as its income.