Search Results For: A.K. Sikri J.


Khoday Distilleries Ltd vs. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Kharkhane Ltd (Supreme Court) (Larger Bench)

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DATE: March 1, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
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Articles 136, 141: Entire law on legal effect of dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) by a speaking/ non-speaking order explained. If the dismissal is by a speaking order & reasons are given, the same is a declaration of law which is binding under Article 141. The findings are also binding by way of judicial discipline. However, this does not mean that the order of the lower court has merged in the dismissal order of the Supreme Court

If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties

CIT vs. Tasgaon Taluka S.S.K. Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: March 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
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S. 37(1)/40A(2) Business expenditure vs. sharing of profit: The AO has to take into account the manner in which the business works, the modalities and manner in which SAP/additional purchase price/final price are decided and determine what amount forms part of the profit. Whatever is the profit component is sharing of profit/distribution of profit and the rest is deductible as expenditure

Merely because the higher price is paid to both, members and non-members, qua the members, still the question would remain with respect to the distribution of profit/sharing of the profit. So far as the non-members are concerned, the same can be dealt with and/or considered applying Section 40A (2) of the Act, i.e., the assessing officer on the material on record has to determine whether the amount paid is excessive or unreasonable or not

M/s Vijay Industries vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: March 1, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 1979-80, 1980-81
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S. 80-HH/ 80-I/ 80-AB: There is a difference between 'income' referred to in s. 80-AB and 'profits & gains' referred in s. 80-HH/80-I. Deduction u/s 80-HH/ 80-I has to be computed on the ‘profits and gains’, without deducting therefrom ‘depreciation’ and ‘investment allowance’ & not from ‘income’ as computed under the Act. S. 80AB is prospective. Motilal Pesticides 243 ITR 26 (SC) reversed

Reading of Section 80HH along with Section 80A would clearly signify that such a deduction has to be of gross profits and gains, i.e., before computing the income as specified in Sections 30 to 43D of the Act. It is correctly pointed out by Division Bench in the reference order that in Motilal Pesticides case, the Court followed the judgment rendered in the M/s. Cloth Traders (P) Ltd. which was a case under Section 80M of the Act, on the premise that language of Section 80HH and Section 80M is the same. This basis is clearly incorrect as the language of two provisions is materially different. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that judgment of Motilal Pesticides is erroneous. We, therefore, overrule this judgment.

PCIT vs. Aarham Softronics (Supreme Court)

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DATE: February 20, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2019 (Date of publication)
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S. 80-IC: An assessee availing exemption of 100% tax on setting up of a new industry, which is admissible for 5 years, and either on the expiry of 5 years or thereafter (but within 10 years) from the date when these assessees started availing exemption, they carried out substantial expansion of its industry, from that year the assessees become entitled to claim exemption @ 100% again (Classic Binding Industries 407 ITR 429 held not good law and reversed)

We have no hesitation to accept this mistake which occurred in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s. Classic Binding Industries 407 ITR 429. The Court specifically dealt with ‘initial assessment year’ and came into conclusion that there cannot be two initial assessment years within a span of 10 years which is the maximum period for allowing deduction as per sub-section (6) of Section 80-IC. As the issue directly concerned with initial assessment year, its definition contained in that very Section was missed out. To that extent, there is an error in the judgment dated 20th August, 2018 in Classic Binding Industries case

Ram Siromani Tripathi vs. State of U.P. (Supreme Court)

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DATE: February 7, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 14, 2019 (Date of publication)
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An adjournment cannot be sought on the ground that Counsel is out of station. The appeal has to be dismissed for non-prosecution. Under no circumstances, application for restoration shall be entertained

The appeals are dismissed for non-prosecution in terms of the signed order. We make it clear that since we have not found it to be a good ground for adjournment, under no circumstances, application for restoration shall be entertained

Anil Kumar Nehru vs. ACIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: December 3, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 20, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 260A Condonation of delay of 1662 days: The High Court should not take a technical approach and refuse to condone the delay when appeals for earlier years with identical issues are already pending before it

It is a matter of record that on the identical issue raised by the appellant in respect of earlier assessment, the appeal is pending before the High Court. In these circumstances, the High Court should not have taken such a technical view of dismissing the appeal in the instant case on the ground of delay, when it has to decide the question of law between the parties in any case in respect of earlier assessment year

CIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: October 26, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2018 (Date of publication)
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Condonation of abnormal delay of 1371 days in removing office objections: High Court refused to condone delay and held that Dept must "set its own house in order by sacking and removing the delinquent and negligent officials or penalising them otherwise so as to subserve larger public interest". The Supreme Court reversed this holding High Court ought to have condoned the delay and not dismissed the appeal. Dept to pay costs of Rs. 1 lakh (from taxpayers' funds) for condonation of delay

No doubt, there is a long delay in removing the objections, we are of the opinion that in a case like this the High Court should have condoned the delay in removing the office objections and heard the2matter on merits

ITO vs. Urban Improvement Trust (Supreme Court)

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DATE: October 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
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S. 10(20) Interpretation of statutes: Law on whether "functional test" as laid down in UOI vs. R.C. Jain, (1981) 2 SCC 308 is still good law explained in the context of whether the statutory functions conducted by a municipal committee enables it to qualify as a 'local authority'

The High Court based its decision on the fact that functions carried out by the assessee are statutory functions and it is carrying on the functions for the benefit of the State Government for urban development. The said reasoning cannot lead to the conclusion that it is a Municipal Committee within the meaning of Section 10(20) Explanation Clause (iii). The High Court has not adverted to the relevant facts and circumstances and without considering the relevant aspects has arrived at erroneous conclusions. Judgments of the High Court are unsustainable

CIT vs. Classic Binding Industries (Supreme Court)

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DATE: August 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
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S. 80-IC: An assessee who avails of deduction for a period of 5 years @ 100% of profits and gains is entitled to deduction on 'substantial expansion' for remaining 5 Assessment Years @ 25% (or 30% where the assessee is a company) and not @ 100% (Mahabir Industries v. PCIT 256 TM 201 (SC) distinguished)

As pointed out above, once the assessees had started claiming deduction under Section 80-IC and the initial Assessment Year has commenced within the aforesaid period of 10 years, there cannot be another initial Assessment Year thereby allowing 100% deduction for the next 5 years also when sub-section (3), in no uncertain terms, provides for deduction @ 25% only for the next 5 years. It may be asserted again that the assessees accept the legal position that they cannot claim deduction of more than 10 years in all under Section 80-IC

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) vs. ACIT (Supreme Court)(S. 194-I)

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DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
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S. 194-I TDS: Amounts paid as part of the lease premium or biannual or annual payments for a limited/specific period towards acquisition of lease hold rights are not subject to TDS, being capital payments. Amounts constituting annual lease rent, expressed in terms of percentage (e.g. 1%) of the total premium for the duration of the lease, are rent and subject to TDS

(1) Amounts paid as part of the lease premium in terms of the time schedule (s) to the Lease Deeds executed between the petitioners and GNOIDA, or biannual or annual payments for a limited/specific period towards acquisition of lease hold rights are not subject to TDS, being capital payments; (2) Amounts constituting annual lease rent, expressed in terms of percentage (e.g. 1%) of the total premium for the duration of the lease, are rent, and therefore subject to TDS

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