Search Results For: Ravindra Bhat J


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DATE: January 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 31, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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S. 68 Bogus capital gains: A transaction cannot be treated as fraudulent if the assessee has furnished documentary proof and proved the identity of the purchasers and no discrepancy is found. The AO has to exercise his powers u/s 131 & 133(6) to verify the genuineness of the claim and cannot proceed on surmises

The assessee has adduced the documentary evidences in support of the transaction in question. The identity of the purchasers of the shares was established as it was borne on the record of the Income Tax Department. The purchasers have PAN card as well. Turning to the shares which were sold by the appellant as per its version, there is no evidence or material to even suggest, as pointed out as on behalf of the assessee, that the cheques directly or indirectly emanated from the assessee so that it could be said that the assessee’s own money was brought back in the guise of sale proceeds of the shares. Though, the purchasers of the shares could not be examined by the AO, since they were existing on the file of the Income Tax Department and their Income Tax details were made available to the AO, it was equally the duty of the AO to have taken steps to verify their assessment records and if necessary to also have them examined by the respective AOs having jurisdiction over them which has not been done by him

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DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 147/ 151: The mere appending of the word "approved" by the CIT while granting approval u/s 151 to the reopening u/s 147 is not enough. While the CIT is not required to record elaborate reasons, he has to record satisfaction after application of mind. The approval is a safeguard and has to be meaningful and not merely ritualistic or formal

Section 151 of the Act clearly stipulates that the CIT (A), who is the competent authority to authorize the reassessment notice, has to apply his mind and form an opinion. The mere appending of the expression ‘approved’ says nothing. It is not as if the CIT (A) has to record elaborate reasons for agreeing with the noting put up. At the same time, satisfaction has to be recorded of the given case which can be reflected in the briefest possible manner. In the present case, the exercise appears to have been ritualistic and formal rather than meaningful, which is the rationale for the safeguard of an approval by a higher ranking officer

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DATE: November 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 2(42C)/ 50B: The fact that certain assets of the "undertaking" are left out of the sale transaction because it would cause inconvenience for the purchaser does not mean that the transaction is not a "slump sale". To expect a purchaser to buy and pay value for defunct or superfluous assets flies in the face of commercial sense

The sale transaction was reported for a total consideration of Rs.45.83 crores. The sale was for a going concern, which included ongoing service contracts, employment contracts and other tangible assets, and intangible assets such as technical know-how etc. To expect a purchaser to buy and pay value for defunct or superfluous assets flies in the face of commercial sense. Unfortunately, the Revenue’s understanding is that in a going concern the buyer is bound to pay good money, transact and purchase bad and irrecoverable debts. Not only does it fly in the face of common and commercial understanding, but it is not even a pre-condition , as is evident from the definition of “undertaking”, cited in Explanation (1) to Section 2 (19) (A) of the Act

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DATE: November 21, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 6, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 14A Rule 8D: The fact that the AO did not expressly record his dissatisfaction with the assessee's working does not mean that he cannot make the disallowance. The AO need not pay lip service and formally record dissatisfaction. It is sufficient if the order shows due application of mind to all aspects

Undoubtedly, the language of Section 14A presupposes that the AO has to adduce some reasons if he is not satisfied with the amount offered by way of disallowance by the assessee. At the same time Section 14A (2) as indeed Rule 8D(i) leave the AO equally with no choice in the matter inasmuch as the statute in both these provisions mandates that the particular methodology enacted should be followed. In other words, the AO is under a mandate to apply the formulae as it were under Rule 8D because of Section 14A(2). If in a given case, therefore, the AO is confronted with a figure which, prima facie, is not in accord with what should approximately be the figure on a fair working out of the provisions, he is but bound to reject it. In such circumstances the AO ordinarily would express his opinion by rejecting the disallowance offered and then proceed to work out the methodology enacted

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DATE: October 21, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
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Strictures: Department's recalcitrance to release the assessee's seized jewellery, even though it is so small as to constitute "stridhan" and even though no addition was sustained in the assessee's hands, is not "mere inaction" but is one of "deliberate harassment"

This court is of opinion that the respondent’s recalcitrance is not mere inaction; it is one of deliberate harassment. Unarguably, the first round of assessment proceedings culminated in no addition of the jewellery or its value in the hands of the petitioner’s husband. The matter ought to have rested there, because the further proceedings were at the behest of the petitioner’s husband who was aggrieved by the additions made (and not aggrieved by the decision on issues in his favour). The ITAT’s decision to proceed de novo, nevertheless strengthened the respondents’ obduracy and hardened their resolve not to release the jewellery. The de novo order did not result in any addition on that aspect at all; still the respondents cling to another ingenious argument- that till the petitioners’ husband’s tax demands are satisfied, they can detain the jewellery

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DATE: October 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 1, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1997-98
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S. 147: Even if the claim for s. 80-IA deduction is contrary to Pandian Chemicals 262 ITR 278 (SC) and Liberty India 317 ITR 218 (SC), the assessment cannot be reopened (beyond 4 years) in the absence of tangible material. The reasons recorded for the reopening cannot be improved or supplemented later

The rationale furnished by the revenue in its counter affidavit and reiterated in the court during the hearing was that a component of income which was otherwise inadmissible but escaped the notice of the AO, because of the ratio in Liberty India and Pandian (supra) is unpersuasive. Besides, the lack of any reference to objective material, cannot in any way improve the case of the revenue – much less its reference to otherwise binding judgments that could have been the basis of a valid revision by the revenue under Section 264. It goes without saying that statutory orders containing reasons are to be judged on the basis of what is apparent and not what is explained later, as the validity of those orders does not improve with time or on account of better explanations furnished in the course of legal proceedings (refer M.S. Gill and Anr. vs. Chief Election Commissioner AIR 1978 SC 581)

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DATE: August 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 30, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 14A Rule 8D: The AO must examine the accounts closely and determine if at all any expenditure could be ascribed to the tax exempt dividend/interest earned by the assessee. If the tax exempted income was earned without the interference of any employee the question of attributing any expenditure cannot arise at all

Sub-rule (1) categorically and significantly states that the Assessing Officer having regard to the account of the assessee and on not being satisfied with the correctness of the claim of expenditure made by the assessee or claim that no expenditure was incurred in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under the Act, can go on to determine the disallowance under subrule (2) to Rule 8D of the Rules. Sub-rule (2) will not come into operation until and unless the specific precondition in sub-rule (1) is satisfied. Thus, section 14A (2) of the Act and rule 8D (1) in unison and affirmatively record that the computation or disallowance made by the assessee or claim that no expenditure was incurred to earn exempt income must be examined with reference to the accounts, and only and when the explanation/claim of the assessee is not satisfactory, computation under subrule (2) to rule 8D of the Rules is to be made

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DATE: July 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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S. 43B: Issue of debentures to fund the interest liability does not amount to “actual payment” of the interest so as to qualify for deduction under Explanation 3C to Section 43-B

The question which has to be decided is whether the decision of this court in CIT vs. M. M. Aqua Technologies Ltd, which held that because of Explanation 3C to Section 43-B, any adjustment other than actual payment does not qualify for deduction under Section 43-B. As is evident from the discussion, the assessee’s review is premised on two major arguments, i.e. that the judgments of the Supreme Court in Standard Chartered Bank v Andhra Bank, 2006 (6) SCC 94 and Sunrise Associates vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. 2006 (5) SCC 603, have categorically held that debentures (issued in favour of the bank, in this case to discharge interest liability) amounted to payment and that such debentures, being actionable claims and securities, were to be deemed paid once issued

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DATE: February 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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Transfer Pricing: Even if TNMM is found acceptable as regards all other transactions, it is open to the TPO to segregate a portion and subject it to an entirely different method i.e. CUP if the assessee does not provide satisfactory replies to his queries

The narrow controversy which this Court is called upon to decide is as to whether the adoption of the CUP method by the revenue authorities was justified. What the assessee urges essentially is that whereas the TP report furnished by it applied the TNMM method which was found acceptable as regards all other transactions/business activities, it was not open to the revenue to segregate a portion and subject it to an entirely different method, i.e. CUP. The assessee relies upon paras 3.6, 3.9 and 3.10 of the OECD guidelines in support of its contentions. It also relies upon certain rulings of different Benches of the ITAT to urge that such sequential segregation and setting portion of the TP exercise – so to say, to break with the integrity is unjustified and unsupported by the text of the law, i.e. Section 92C of the Income Tax Act. The assessee also relies upon Rule 10E of the Income Tax Rules, which guide the proper approach of the TPO in such matters

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DATE: February 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 9(1)(vi) vs. Article 12 of DTAA: The retrospective amendment to s. 9(1)(vi) so as to supersede the law laid down in Asia Satellite 332 ITR 340 (Del) and assess transmission fees as “royalty” has no impact on assessees covered by DTAA because a corresponding amendment has not been made to the definition of “royalty” therein. Amendments to domestic law do not affect the DTAA

This Court is of the view that no amendment to the Act, whether retrospective or prospective can be read in a manner so as to extend in operation to the terms of an international treaty. In other words, a clarificatory or declaratory amendment, much less one which may seek to overcome an unwelcome judicial interpretation of law, cannot be allowed to have the same retroactive effect on an international instrument effected between two sovereign states prior to such amendment. In the context of international law, while not every attempt to subvert the obligations under the treaty is a breach, it is nevertheless a failure to give effect to the intended trajectory of the treaty. Employing interpretive amendments in domestic law as a means to imply contoured effects in the enforcement of treaties is one such attempt, which falls just short of a breach, but is nevertheless, in the opinion of this Court, indefensible