Search Results For: 194C


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DATE: July 29, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 30, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
(i) Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia), 40A(3) etc are intended to enforce due compliance of the requirement of other provisions of the Act and to ensure proper collection of tax as also transparency in dealings. The interest of a bonafide assessee who had made the deduction as required and had paid the same to the revenue is safeguarded. No question about prejudice or hardship arises (ii) Payment made for hiring vehicles for the business of transportation of goods attracts TDS u/s 194C, (iii) Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) is not limited to the amount outstanding ("payable") but also to expenses that had already been incurred and "paid" by the assessee, (iv) Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) as introduced by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 w.e.f. 01.04.2005 is applicable to AY 2005-2006, (v) Benefit of amendment made in the year 2014 to s. 40(a)(ia) is not available

We may in the passing observe that the assessee-appellant was either labouring under the mistaken impression that he was not required to deduct TDS or under the mistaken belief that the methodology of splitting a single payment into parts below Rs. 20,000/- would provide him escape from the rigour of the provisions of the Act providing for disallowance. In either event, the appellant had not been a bonafide assessee who had made the deduction and deposited it subsequently. Obviously, the appellant could not have derived the benefits that were otherwise available by the curative amendments of 2008 and 2010. Having defaulted at every stage, the attempt on the part of assessee-appellant to seek some succor in the amendment of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 could only be rejected as entirely baseless, rather preposterous

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DATE: October 30, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 194C TDS: Law on whether the by-product allowed to be retained by the miller can be regarded as consideration 'paid' in kind by the procurement agency so as to create an obligation to deduct TDS thereon explained in the light of Kanchanganga Sea Foods Ltd. vs CIT 325 ITR 549 (SC) & other judgements

Though, before the milling of the paddy, the Government / procurement agencies remain the owner of the paddy, however, the moment the paddy is milled, the Government / procurement agencies lose their ownership and control over the paddy and the by-product but have right only on the ‘milled rice’ for which they pay a stipulated amount of Rs. 15/- as milling charges. The relevant words in the clause (8) of the Agreement that “the Government / Procuring Agency shall have no right or responsibility in this regard” speaks that to retain the by-product cannot always said to be ‘right’ over a thing but sometimes it becomes a ‘responsibility’ also and the Government / Procurement Agencies are not willing to own this responsibility.

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DATE: September 28, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 13, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17, 2017-18
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CITATION:
S. 271C & 206AA Penalty: The assessee has made out a prima facie case that the outcome of the appeal before the ITAT will directly impact the penalty proceedings which are hurriedly being finalized by the authorities which may entail huge liability by way of penalty on the assessee. The Revenue authorities are accordingly restrained from passing any order imposing penalty on the assessee so long as the appeal is pending before the Tribunal (Wander 44 Taxman.com 103 (Bom) & GE India Technology 46 Taxmann.com 374 (Guj) followed)

So far as the penalty proceedings are concerned, the assessee has made out a prima facie case in favour of the assessee proving that the outcome of the appeal before ITAT will directly impact the proceedings which are hurriedly being finalized by the authorities below, which may entail huge liability by way of penalty on the assessee. In our opinion, so long as the appeal is pending before the Tribunal, the Revenue authorities should be restrained from passing any order imposing penalty on the assessee u/s 271C and 206AA of the Act however the proceedings may continue

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DATE: June 15, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 29, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): Amounts paid by way of reimbursement of expenses do not constitute income in the hands of the recipient. Consequently, the payer is under no obligation to deduct TDS u/s 194C and no disallowance of the expenditure can be made u/s 40(a)(ia). CBDT Circular No.715 dated 08.08.1995 distinguished

The Tribunal, while giving the above decision, had also considered the effect of CBDT Circular No.715 dated 08.08.1995 and also ruled that the said Circular was applicable only where consolidated bills were raised inclusive of contractual payments and re-imbursement of actual expenditure. Same view was taken by the Bangalore Bench of this Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Dhanyaa Seeds (P) Ltd. (supra). Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Pr. CIT vs. Consumer Marketing (India) (P.) Ltd.(supra) held that when separate bills are there for reimbursement of expenditure received by C&F agent, TDS was not required to be made on reimbursement

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DATE: May 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): S. 194C read with s. 200 are mandatory provisions. The disallowance stipulated in s. 40(a)(ia) for failure to deduct TDS u/s 194C is one of the consequences for the default. Accordingly, though there is a difference between “paid” and “payable”, s. 40(a)(ia) covers not only those cases where the amount is payable but also when it is paid. The contrary interpretation that s. 40(a)(ia) applies only to cases where amounts are “payable” will result in defaulters going scot free

It is clear that Section 40(a)(ia) deals with the nature of default and the consequences thereof. Default is relatable to Chapter XVIIB (in the instant case Sections 194C and 200, which provisions are in the aforesaid Chapter). When the entire scheme of obligation to deduct the tax at source and paying it over to the Central Government is read holistically, it cannot be held that the word ‘payable’ occurring in Section 40(a)(ia) refers to only those cases where the amount is yet to be paid and does not cover the cases where the amount is actually paid. If the provision is interpreted in the manner suggested by the appellant herein, then even when it is found that a person, like the appellant, has violated the provisions of Chapter XVIIB (or specifically Sections 194C and 200 in the instant case), he would still go scot free, without suffering the consequences of such monetary default in spite of specific provisions laying down these consequences

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DATE: December 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 194C vs. 194J: Law on whether payments for construction, erection & commissioning etc of plants involving inputs from technical personnel constitutes "payments for technical services" and attracts TDS obligations u/s 194J in the light of Bharti Cellular 330 ITR 239 (SC) explained

The contention of the revenue that in accordance with the judgement of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Bharti Cellular Ltd., (2011) 330 ITR 239 (SC), the matter ought to be remanded to the Assessing Officer to examine technical experts on this issue is not well founded. Firstly, the department never made an application for examining an expert. Secondly, it is not the department’s case that there was any material other than the contracts which required consideration. Apart from raising this contention, no such case was made out even before us at the hearing of this appeal. The case before us merely requires a construction of the contract. The extent of human intervention that was relied upon by the department is based on the provisions of the contract itself

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DATE: August 18, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 194C/ 194J TDS: Even if the supply contract is an integral part of a composite contract on single sale responsible basis, there is no obligation to deduct TDS. Service contracts, not being professional services, are not covered by s. 194J

The whole object of introduction of that Section is to deduct tax in respect of payments made for works contract. No division is, therefore, permissible in respect of a contract for supply of materials for carrying out the work. It is in a case of distinct contracts. The contract for supply of material being a separate and distinct contract, no division is permissible under Section 194C of the Act

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DATE: July 20, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 6, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06, 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia)/ 194C/ 194J: Deduction u/s 194C instead of u/s 194J renders the shortfall liable for disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia)

The expression “tax deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B” occurring in Section 40(a)(ia) has to be understood as tax deductible at source under the appropriate provision of Chapter XVII-B. Therefore, as in this case, if tax is deductible under Section 194J but is deducted under Section 194C, such a deduction would not satisfy the requirements of Section 40(a)(ia). The latter part of this Section that such tax has not been deducted, again refers to the tax deducted under the appropriate provision of Chapter XVII-B. Thus, a cumulative reading of this provision, therefore, shows that deduction under a wrong provision of law will not save an assessee from Section 40(a)(ia)

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DATE: July 20, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 28, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 to 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 194C/ 194J: No obligation to deduct TDS at stage of making provision for expenditure if payee cannot be identified. No obligation to deduct TDS if services (roaming charges) are rendered without human intervention and are not "technical services"

The assessee has to issue Form 16A prescribed under Rule 31(1)(b) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 for the tax deducted at source. The assessee has to necessarily give the details of name and address of deductee, the PAN of deductee and amount or credited. In this case, the assessee could not identify the name and address of deductee and and his PAN. The assessee also may not be in a position to quantify the amount required for incurring the expenditure for dismantling and restoration of site to its original position. In those circumstances, the provision which requires deduction of tax at source fails. Hence, the assessee cannot be faulted for non-deduction of tax at source while making a provision

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DATE: June 10, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 15, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 to 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 194C: Only payments "in pursuance of a contract" are subject to TDS. Payments made under a legal obligation are not covered

It is only when payments are made “in pursuance of a contract” that the provisions of section 194C come into play. The contract may be oral or written, express or implied but there must be a contract nevertheless. In the present case, the payment is on account of legal obligation under section 24(1) of the Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board Act 1976. Accordingly, the provisions of section 194C did not come into play