| COURT: | Supreme Court |
| CORAM: | Aniruddha Bose J, Deepak Gupta J |
| SECTION(S): | CST Act, GST Act |
| GENRE: | Other Laws |
| CATCH WORDS: | constructive delivery |
| COUNSEL: | - |
| DATE: | April 27, 2020 (Date of pronouncement) |
| DATE: | April 30, 2020 (Date of publication) |
| AY: | - |
| FILE: | Click here to view full post with file download link |
| CITATION: | |
| The concept of "constructive delivery" of goods as expounded in Arjan Dass Gupta 45 STC 52 (Del) is not proper to interpret the provisions of s. 3 of the CST Act. A legal fiction is created s. 3 that the movement of goods, from one State to another shall terminate, where the good have been delivered to a carrier for transmission, at the time of when delivery is taken from such carrier. There is no concept of constructive delivery either express or implied in the said provision. On a plain reading of the statute, the movement of the goods would terminate only when delivery is taken. There is no scope of incorporating any further word to qualify the nature and scope of the expression “delivery” within the said section. If the authorities felt any assessee or dealer was taking unintended benefit under the aforesaid provisions of the 1956 Act, then the proper course would be legislative amendment. The Tax Administration Authorities cannot give their own interpretation to legislative provisions on the basis of their own perception of trade practice. This administrative exercise, in effect, would result in supplying words to legislative provisions, as if to cure omissions of the legislature | |
In the case of Arjan Dass Gupta (supra) principle akin to constructive delivery was expounded and we have quoted the relevant passage from that decision earlier in this judgment. In our opinion, however, such construction would not be proper to interpret the provisions of Section 3 of the 1956 Act. A legal fiction is created in first explanation to that Section. That fiction is that the movement of goods, from one State to another shall terminate, where the good have been delivered to a carrier for transmission, at the time of when delivery is taken from such carrier. There is no concept of constructive delivery either express or implied in the said provision. On a plain reading of the statute, the movement of the goods, for the purposes of clause (b) of Section 3 of the 1956 Act would terminate only when delivery is taken, having regard to first explanation to that Section. There is no scope of incorporating any further word to qualify the nature and scope of the expression “delivery” within the said section. The legislature has eschewed from giving the said word an expansive meaning. The High Court under the judgment which is assailed in Civil Appeal No.2217 of 2011 rightly held that there is no place for any intendment in taxing statutes. We are of the view that the interpretation of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court given in the case of Arjan Dass Gupta does not lays down correct position of law. In the event, the authorities felt any assessee or dealer was taking unintended benefit under the aforesaid provisions of the 1956 Act, then the proper course would be legislative amendment. The Tax Administration Authorities cannot give their own interpretation to legislative provisions on the basis of their own perception of trade practise. This administrative exercise, in effect, would result in supplying words to legislative provisions, as if to cure omissions of the legislature
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