Month: May 2015

Archive for May, 2015


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DATE: May 18, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 27, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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CITATION:
S. 43B Expl 3C: Conversion of outstanding interest into a loan does not amount to an "actual payment" of the interest and so deduction for the interest cannot be claimed

In view of the Explanation 3C appended to Section 43B with retrospective effect from 01.04.1989, conversion of interest amount into loan would not be deemed to be regarded as actually paid amount within the meaning of Section 43B of the Act

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DATE: May 14, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 42: Scope of deduction available in the context of a Production Sharing Contract entered into with the Govt explained

First and foremost aspect which has to be kept in mind while answering this issue is that the Income Tax Authorities while making assessment of income of any assessee have to apply the provisions of the Income Tax Act and make assessment accordingly. Translating this as general proposition contextually, what we intend to convey is that the Assessing Officer is supposed to focus on Section 42 of the Act on the basis of which he is to decide as to whether deductions mentioned in the said provision are admissible to the assessee who is claiming those deductions

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DATE: May 13, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 14A Rule 8D(2)(iii): Even strategic investment in group concerns for purposes of control & not for earning dividend attracts disallowance. Plea that no expenditure is incurred to earn dividend is not acceptable because earning dividend is not an automatic process.

The term ‘expenditure’ as per section 14A would include the expenditures that are related to investments made i.e. expenditures on administration, capital expenses, travelling expenses, operating expenses etc. It is difficult to accept that the assessee company was making investments decisions to the tune of Rs.6,31,637 lakhs of public money without incurring a single penny out of its pocket. Such decisions are highly strategic in nature and are required to be made by highly qualified and experienced professionals. The same would also require market research and analysis. The assessee company by acquiring controlling interest in the subsidiary companies would also be required to attend board meetings and make policy decisions with regard to the aforesaid huge amount of investments made. By no stretch of imagination, it can be assumed that such activities were done without incurring any expenditure

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DATE: May 13, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 194-I applies only to amounts paid for “use” of the land and not for amounts paid to “acquire” the rights. Distinction between “lease premium” and “rent” explained

The purport of section 194 I of the Act is not to bring in its purview payments of any or every kind. Only those payments which are in the nature of “use” of land come within the ambit of section 194 I of the Act. The word “use” is therefore of prime importance for transactions where the consideration paid for the property would be termed as “rent”. The term “use “according to us has to be interpreted keeping in mind the relationship between the landlord and the tenant. The same cannot be extended to bring within its purview exploitation of any kind with reference to the property by changing its identity for its own benefit and thereafter selling it for profit

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DATE: May 15, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 192 vs/ 194-J: Tests to determine whether there is an employer-employee relationship explained

Determination of the vexed questions as to whether a contract is a contract of service or contract for service and whether the employees concerned are employees of the contractors has never been an easy task. No decision of this Court has laid down any hard-and-fast rule nor is it possible to do so. The question in each case has to be answered having regard to the fact involved therein. No single test – be it control test, be it organisation or any other test – has been held to be the determinative factor for determining the jural relationship of employer and employee

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DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 254(2A): The Third Proviso which restricts the power of the ITAT to grant stay beyond 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee” is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory. It is struck down as violative of Article 14. The ITAT has the power to extend stay even beyond 365 days

While it could be argued that the condition that the stay order could be extended beyond a period of 180 days only if the delay in disposing of the appeal was not attributable to the assessee was a reasonable condition on the power of the Tribunal to the grant an order of stay, it can, by no stretch of imagination, be argued that where the assessee is not responsible for the delay in the disposal of the appeal, yet the Tribunal has no power to extend the stay beyond the period of 365 days. The intention of the legislature, which has been made explicit by insertion of the words – ‘even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee’– renders the right of appeal granted to the assessee by the statute to be illusory for no fault on the part of the assessee. The stay, which was available to him prior to the 365 days having passed, is snatched away simply because the Tribunal has, for whatever reason, not attributable to the assessee, been unable to dispose of the appeal

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DATE: May 15, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 80-IB(10): Restriction on extent of commercial area in “housing project” imposed w.e.f. 1.4.2005 does not apply to housing projects approved before 1.4.2005 even though completed after 1.4.2005

Can it be said that in order to avail the benefit in the assessment years after 1.4.2005, balconies should be removed though these were permitted earlier? Holding so would lead to absurd results as one cannot expect an assessee to comply with a condition that was not a part of the statute when the housing project was approved. The only way to resolve the issue would be to hold that clause (d) is to be treated as inextricably linked with the approval and construction of the housing project and an assessee cannot be called upon to comply with the said condition when it was not in contemplation either of the assessee or even the Legislature, when the housing project was accorded approval by the local authorities

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DATE: May 15, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1991-92
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S. 32: The assessee has the right to disclaim depreciation in its entirety. However, it cannot claim depreciation for the current year and disclaim unabsorbed depreciation

Once the unabsorbed carried forward depreciation has become a part of the depreciation of the current year, it is not open to the assessee to bifurcate the two again and exercising its choice to claim the depreciation of the current year under Section 32(1) of the Act and take a position that since unabsorbed depreciation of the previous years is not claimed, it cannot be thrusted upon the assessee. The position would have been different if the assessee had not claimed any depreciation at all. However, once the depreciation is claimed and while giving deductions the depreciation is to be set off against the profits of the current year prior to the unabsorbed carried forward investment allowance, it is the entire depreciation, namely, the depreciation of the current year as well as the unabsorbed carried forward depreciation, which is to be taken into account as by virtue of the fiction created under Section 32(2) of the Act

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DATE: May 13, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05 to 2009-10
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S. 132: While the revenue has to record reasons to show that “satisfaction” for the search was proper and the same is justiciable, the assessee is not entitled (till the start of the assessment proceedings) to inspect the documents or the reasons as it would be counter-productive and confer an unfair advantage on the assessee

The finding of the High Court that as the satisfaction recorded is justiciable, the documents pertaining to such satisfaction can be allowed to be inspected by the assessee is plainly incorrect. The necessity of recording of reasons, despite the amendment of Rule 112 (2) with effect from 1st October, 1975, has been repeatedly stressed upon by this Court so as to ensure accountability and responsibility in the decision making process. The necessity of recording of reasons also acts as a cushion in the event of a legal challenge being made to the satisfaction reached. Reasons enable a proper judicial assessment of the decision taken by the Revenue. However, the above, by itself, would not confer in the assessee a right of inspection of the documents or to a communication of the reasons for the belief at the stage of issuing of the authorization. Any such view would be counter productive of the entire exercise contemplated by Section 132 of the Act. It is only at the stage of commencement of the assessment proceedings after completion of the search and seizure, if any, that the requisite material may have to be disclosed to the assessee

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DATE: May 7, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1990-91
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CITATION:
S. 43B: "Vend fee" paid by the assessee to the Government, even if of the nature of "privilege fee" falls within the expression "fee by whatever name called"

A reading of Section 43B after it was substituted by the Finance Act, 1988 with effect from 01.04.1989 shows that sub clause (a) in Section 43B has been considerably widened by the amendment by the addition of the words “by whatever name called”. It is clear, therefore, that to attract this section any sum that is payable whether it is called tax, duty, cess or fee or called by some other name, becomes a deduction allowable under the said Section provided that in the previous year, relevant to the assessment year, such sum should be actually paid by the assessee