Year: 2015

Archive for 2015


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DATE: May 18, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 27, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05, 2010-11
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CITATION:
Consideration for supply of software (whether with or without equipment) is not taxable as "royalty" if there is no transfer of right in the copyright to the software

There was no transfer of any right in respect of copyright by the assessee and it was a case of mere transfer of a copyrighted article. The payment is for a copyrighted article and represents the purchase price of an article. Hence, the payment for the same is not in the nature of royalty under Article 12 of the Tax Treaty. The receipts would constitute business receipts in the hands of the Assessee and is to be assessed as business income subject to assessee having business connection/ PE in India

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DATE: May 25, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 27, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 to 2010-11
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CITATION:
ITAT laments non-representation/ inept-representation of matters before it by the Revenue. Suggests guidelines to remedy the state of affairs

it is noticed that some of the DRs had never had exposure to the functions of the Tribunal except the formal court observation as part of their training programme, which sometimes result in not supporting the stand of the Revenue effectively and in turn may affect a genuine case of the Revenue for want of proper prosecution. We would take this opportunity to suggest that any official, on being assigned the duty of DR, should be made to sit in the court room for observation at least for 15 days so that their services can be used effectively at a later stage.

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DATE: May 15, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 27, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1994-95
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CITATION:
Where the agreement between the parties (for sale of shares) indicates that the lump-sum consideration was in respect of two or more promises (i.e. sale of shares & non-compete covenant), it is liable to be bifurcated and apportioned between each of the assets (Vodafone distinguished)

It is difficult to understand how the mere fact that the parties have not apportioned the consideration between the two assets which were being dealt with by this agreement can make any difference to the rights of the parties. The position might have been different if the market value of the shares could not be ascertained. Then it might be said that it is difficult to put a proper value upon the shares and to put a proper value for the consideration. But when the market value is available and when it is known for what price these shares could be purchased or sold, there is no difficulty whatsoever in the apportionment

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DATE: May 18, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 27, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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CITATION:
S. 43B Expl 3C: Conversion of outstanding interest into a loan does not amount to an "actual payment" of the interest and so deduction for the interest cannot be claimed

In view of the Explanation 3C appended to Section 43B with retrospective effect from 01.04.1989, conversion of interest amount into loan would not be deemed to be regarded as actually paid amount within the meaning of Section 43B of the Act

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DATE: May 14, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 42: Scope of deduction available in the context of a Production Sharing Contract entered into with the Govt explained

First and foremost aspect which has to be kept in mind while answering this issue is that the Income Tax Authorities while making assessment of income of any assessee have to apply the provisions of the Income Tax Act and make assessment accordingly. Translating this as general proposition contextually, what we intend to convey is that the Assessing Officer is supposed to focus on Section 42 of the Act on the basis of which he is to decide as to whether deductions mentioned in the said provision are admissible to the assessee who is claiming those deductions

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DATE: May 13, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 14A Rule 8D(2)(iii): Even strategic investment in group concerns for purposes of control & not for earning dividend attracts disallowance. Plea that no expenditure is incurred to earn dividend is not acceptable because earning dividend is not an automatic process.

The term ‘expenditure’ as per section 14A would include the expenditures that are related to investments made i.e. expenditures on administration, capital expenses, travelling expenses, operating expenses etc. It is difficult to accept that the assessee company was making investments decisions to the tune of Rs.6,31,637 lakhs of public money without incurring a single penny out of its pocket. Such decisions are highly strategic in nature and are required to be made by highly qualified and experienced professionals. The same would also require market research and analysis. The assessee company by acquiring controlling interest in the subsidiary companies would also be required to attend board meetings and make policy decisions with regard to the aforesaid huge amount of investments made. By no stretch of imagination, it can be assumed that such activities were done without incurring any expenditure

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DATE: May 13, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 194-I applies only to amounts paid for “use” of the land and not for amounts paid to “acquire” the rights. Distinction between “lease premium” and “rent” explained

The purport of section 194 I of the Act is not to bring in its purview payments of any or every kind. Only those payments which are in the nature of “use” of land come within the ambit of section 194 I of the Act. The word “use” is therefore of prime importance for transactions where the consideration paid for the property would be termed as “rent”. The term “use “according to us has to be interpreted keeping in mind the relationship between the landlord and the tenant. The same cannot be extended to bring within its purview exploitation of any kind with reference to the property by changing its identity for its own benefit and thereafter selling it for profit

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DATE: May 15, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 192 vs/ 194-J: Tests to determine whether there is an employer-employee relationship explained

Determination of the vexed questions as to whether a contract is a contract of service or contract for service and whether the employees concerned are employees of the contractors has never been an easy task. No decision of this Court has laid down any hard-and-fast rule nor is it possible to do so. The question in each case has to be answered having regard to the fact involved therein. No single test – be it control test, be it organisation or any other test – has been held to be the determinative factor for determining the jural relationship of employer and employee

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DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 254(2A): The Third Proviso which restricts the power of the ITAT to grant stay beyond 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee” is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory. It is struck down as violative of Article 14. The ITAT has the power to extend stay even beyond 365 days

While it could be argued that the condition that the stay order could be extended beyond a period of 180 days only if the delay in disposing of the appeal was not attributable to the assessee was a reasonable condition on the power of the Tribunal to the grant an order of stay, it can, by no stretch of imagination, be argued that where the assessee is not responsible for the delay in the disposal of the appeal, yet the Tribunal has no power to extend the stay beyond the period of 365 days. The intention of the legislature, which has been made explicit by insertion of the words – ‘even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee’– renders the right of appeal granted to the assessee by the statute to be illusory for no fault on the part of the assessee. The stay, which was available to him prior to the 365 days having passed, is snatched away simply because the Tribunal has, for whatever reason, not attributable to the assessee, been unable to dispose of the appeal

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DATE: May 15, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 80-IB(10): Restriction on extent of commercial area in “housing project” imposed w.e.f. 1.4.2005 does not apply to housing projects approved before 1.4.2005 even though completed after 1.4.2005

Can it be said that in order to avail the benefit in the assessment years after 1.4.2005, balconies should be removed though these were permitted earlier? Holding so would lead to absurd results as one cannot expect an assessee to comply with a condition that was not a part of the statute when the housing project was approved. The only way to resolve the issue would be to hold that clause (d) is to be treated as inextricably linked with the approval and construction of the housing project and an assessee cannot be called upon to comply with the said condition when it was not in contemplation either of the assessee or even the Legislature, when the housing project was accorded approval by the local authorities