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DATE: May 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 30, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 37(1): (i) Product Trial expenses of a new product is revenue in nature as it does not provide the assessee with any enduring benefit, (ii) Compensation paid to supplier to ensure goodwill and continued relationship is revenue expenditure

For allowing / disallowing any expenditure under Section 37 of the Act, the basic thing to be seen as to whether the expenditure was incurred for furtherance of business interest of the Assessee or not. It is a fact that in this case because of the expenditure incurred no new assets came into existence. The expenditure was incurred considering the old relation with the supplier and to avoid future business complications. If an assessee makes payment which is compensatory nature, it has to be allowed. In this case, the payment was made in pursuance of an agreement and that was of compensatory nature i.e.it was not penal, hence it was to be allowed

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DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) vs. 271AAA: Levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) on income disclosed in a search instead of u/s 271AAA is not sustainable

The penalty in this case, if at all leviable, it should have been levied under section 271AAA (1) and not u/s 271(1)(c) as has categorically been provided in sub-section (3) of section 271AAA. Intention of the legislative in incorporating the provisions contained u/s 271AA effective during the period 1st June, 2007 to 1st July, 2012 is to provide general amnesty in search and seizure cases, and the case of the assessee undisputedly falls u/s 271AAA and cannot be dealt with u/s 271(1)(c) by any stretch of imagination even

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DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 147: Non-furnishing by the AO of reasons recorded for reopening the assessment results in violation of the law laid down in GKN Driveshaft 259 ITR 19 (SC) & renders the reopening void

Despite repeated letters requesting to provide copy of the reasons recorded or the grounds on which the assessment was reopened, no such reasons were provided to the assessee. We find that the DR could not substantiate whether any reasons were provided by the Assessing Officer to the assessee and merely relying on the fact that general practice was followed in Department of supplying reasons, it cannot be presumed that reasons were supplied in the case of the assessee. The Assessing Officer has not complied with the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GKN Driveshaft (India) limited Vs. CIT (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC) providing reasons for reassessment within a reasonable time, and therefore respectfully following the decisions cited above, the reassessment completed by the Assessing Officer under section 147 of the Act cannot be sustained in the case of the assessee and quashed

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
The amendment to Explanation to s. 73 by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 w.e.f. 01.04.2015 is clarificatory in nature and operates retrospectively from 01.04.1977, being the date the Explanation to s. 73 was placed on the statute. Therefore, the loss incurred in share trading business by companies whose principal business is trading in shares will not be treated as speculation loss but as normal business loss and the same can be adjusted against income from business or other sources

The insertion of the amendment in the Explanation to section 73 of the Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014, in our view, is curative and classificatory in nature. If the amendment is applied prospectively from A.Y. 2015-16, a piquant situation would arise that an assessee who has earned profit from purchase and sale of shares in A.Y. 2015-16 would be treated as normal business profit and not speculation business profit in view of the exception carried out by the amendment in Explanation to section 73 of the Act. In these circumstances, speculation business loss incurred by trading in shares in earlier years will not be allowed to be set off against such profit from purchase and sale of shares to such companies in A.Y. 2015-16. For this reason also, the amendment inserted to Explanation to section 73 of the Act by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014 is to be applied retrospectively from the date of the insertion to Explanation to section 73 of the Act

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DATE: May 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
(i) Purchase of a license to use shelf/shrink-wrapped software is purchase of a “product” and not a “copyright”, (ii) The retrospective insertion of Explanation 4 to s. 9(1)(vi) to include “software” in the definition of “royalty” does not apply to DTAAs, (iii) In view of the conflict of views amongst the High Courts, the view in favour of the assessee should be followed, (iv) An obligation to deduct TDS u/s 195 cannot be imposed by the retrospective insertion of Explanation 4 to s. 9(1)(vi), (v) As payments for software were not “royalty” at the time of payment, the assessee cannot be held to be in default for not deducting TDS

The assessee cannot be said to have paid the consideration for use of or the right to use copyright but has simply purchased the copyrighted work embedded in the CD- ROM which can be said to be sale of “good” by the owner. The consideration paid by the assessee thus as per the clauses of DTAA cannot be said to be royalty and the same will be outside the scope of the definition of “royalty” as provided in DTAA and would be taxable as business income of the recipient. The assessee is entitled to the fair use of the work/product including making copies for temporary purpose for protection against damage or loss even without a license provided by the owner in this respect and the same would not constitute infringement of any copyright of the owner of the work even as per the provisions of section 52 of the Copyright Act,1957

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DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148/ 153C: A case where the AO detects incriminating material in search has to be processed only u/s 153C and not u/s 147. A notice u/s 148 to assess such undisclosed income is void ab initio

Reassessment was initiated on the basis of incriminating material found in search of third party and the validity of the same was challenged by the assessee before the Learned CIT(Appeals) and the Learned CIT(Appeals) vitiated the proceedings. The same was questioned by the Revenue before the ITAT and the ITAT after discussing the cases of the parties and the relevant provisions in details has come to the conclusion that in the above situation, provisions of sec. 153C were applicable which excludes the application of sections 147 and 148 of the Act. The ITAT held the notice issued under sec. 148 and proceedings under sec. 147 as illegal and void ab initio. It was held that Assessing Officer having not followed procedure under sec. 153C, reassessment order was rightly quashed by the CIT(Appeals)

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DATE: March 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Installation services provided by a foreign enterprise which are inextricably connected to the sale of goods are not assessable as "fees for technical services" or as "business profits" under the DTAA

Though service of installation is covered by the FTS clause as well as Installation PE clause of the India China treaty and though the installation contract (including period of after sales service) exceeded 183 days, the income from installation activity was neither taxable as FTS nor as business income since (i) the service of installation was inextricably connected to sale of goods, the same could not be treated as FIS or FTS (ii) specific installation PE clause in India China Treaty will override General FTS clause (iii) the aforesaid threshold limit of 183 days would have to be applied to the actual period of installation (which was less than 183 days) and not the contractual period

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DATE: October 28, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 & 2008-09
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CITATION:
(i) Important law laid down on applicability of transfer pricing provisions to non-AEs, Law on (ii) deductibility of unpaid service-tax u/s 43B and (iii) carry forward of losses of amalgamating company u/s 72A and Rule 9C explained

Disallowance of unpaid service tax could not be made under section 43B where the assessee did not claim the same in its Profit and Loss account. Where the assessee fulfilled all the conditions prescribed under Section 72A read with Rule 9C, the AO could not deny the claim of carry forward of losses pertaining to the amalgamating company

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 263: Even if the AO has conducted an inquiry into the taxability of share capital receipts u/s 68, the CIT is entitled to revise u/s 263 if the AO has not applied his mind to important aspects. Law in Lovely Exports 299 ITR 268, Sophia Finance 205 ITR 98 etc does not apply as they are prior to the Money Laundering Act 2002. Qs whether receipt towards share capital is taxable pre s. 56(2)(viib) & whether proviso to s. 68 is retrospective are left open

Whether receipt of share capital was a taxable event prior to 1st April, 2013 before introduction of Clause (VII b) to the Sub-section 2 of Section 56 of the Income Tax Act; whether the concept of arms length pricing in a domestic transaction before introduction of Section 92A and 92BA of the Income Tax Act was there at the relevant point of time are not questions which arise for determination in this case. The assessee with an authorised share capital of Rs.1.36 crores raised nearly a sum of Rs.32 crores on account of premium and chose not to go in for increase of authorised share capital merely to avoid payment of statutory fees is an important pointer necessitating investigation. Money allegedly received on account of share application can be roped in under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act if the source of the receipt is not satisfactorily established by the assessee. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgement in the case of Sumati Dayal –Vs- CIT (supra) wherein Their Lordships held that any sum “found credited in the books of the assessee for any previous year, the same may be charged to income tax….”. We are unable to accept the submission that any further investigation is futile because the money was received on capital account. The Special Bench in the case of Sophia Finance Ltd. (supra) opined that “the use of the words “any sum found credited in the books” in Section 68 indicates that the said section is very widely worded and an Income-tax Officer is not precluded from making an enquiry as to the true nature and source thereof even if the same is credited as receipt of share application money. Mere fact that the payment was received by cheque or that the applicants were companies, borne on the file of Registrar of Companies were held to be neutral facts and did not prove that the transaction was genuine as was held in the case of CIT –Vs- Nova Promoters and Finlease (P) Ltd. (supra). Similar views were expressed by this Court in the case of CIT –Vs- Precision Finance Pvt. Ltd. (supra). We need not decide in this case as to whether the proviso to Section 68 of the Income Tax Act is retrospective in nature. To that extent the question is kept open. We may however point out that the Special Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Sophia Finance Ltd. (supra) held that “the ITO may even be justified in trying to ascertain the source of depositor”. Therefore, the submission that the source of source is not a relevant enquiry does not appear to be correct. We find no substance in the submission that the exercise of power under Section 263 by the Commissioner was an act of reactivating stale issues. In the case of Gabriel India Ltd. (supra) the CIT was unable to point out any error in the explanation furnished by the assessee. Whereas in the present case we have tabulated the evidence which was before the assessing officer which should have provoked him to make further investigation. The assessing officer did not attach any importance to that aspect of the matter as discussed above by us

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DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 158BC: A stay on the conduct of a "special audit" u/s 142(2A) amounts to a "stay of the assessment proceedings" and extends limitation u/s 158BE. One warrant of authorisation can be used for multiple visits and searches and limitation commences only after the panchnama records the conclusion of the search

As a general rule, therefore, when there is no stay of the assessment proceedings passed by the Court, Explanation 1 to Section 158BE of the Act may not be attracted. However, this general statement of legal principle has to be read subject to an exception in order to interpret it rationally and practically. In those cases where stay of some other nature is granted than the stay of the assessment proceedings but the effect of such stay is to prevent the assessing officer from effectively passing assessment order, even that kind of stay order may be treated as stay of the assessment proceedings because of the reason that such stay order becomes an obstacle for the assessing officer to pass an assessment order thereby preventing the assessing officer to proceed with the assessment proceedings and carry out appropriate assessment

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