Year: 2016

Archive for 2016


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DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 200A/234E: As the amendment to s. 200A has come into effect on 1.6.2015 and has prospective effect, no computation of fee for the demand or the intimation for the fee u/s 234E can be made for TDS deducted prior to 1.6.2015. Hence, the demand notices u/s 200A for payment of fee u/s 234E is without authority of law

It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, we find that substitution made by clause (c) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 200A can be read as having prospective effect and not having retroactive character or effect. Resultantly, the demand under Section 200A for computation and intimation for the payment of fee under Section 234E could not be made in purported exercise of power under Section 200A by the respondent for the period of the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. However, we make it clear that, if any deductor has already paid the fee after intimation received under Section 200A, the aforesaid view will not permit the deductor to reopen the said question unless he has made payment under protest.

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DATE: September 30, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 50C: The proviso to s. 50C inserted by the Finance Act 2016 w.e.f. 01.04.2017 to provide that the stamp duty valuation of property on the date of execution of the agreement to sell should be adopted instead of the valuation on the date of execution of the sale deed is curative and intended to remove an undue hardship to the assessee and an apparent incongruity. It should accordingly be given retrospective effect from 1st April 2003, i.e. the date effective from which s. 50C was introduced

The Proviso to Section 50C inserted by the Finance Act 2016, with effect from 1st April 2017, on the recommendation of the Income Tax Simplification Committee (Easwar Committee) recognizes the genuine and intended hardship in the cases in which the date of agreement to sell is prior to the date of sale and introduces welcome amendments to the statue to take the remedial measures. However, this brings no relief to the assessee as the amendment is introduced only with prospective effect from 1st April 2017. There cannot be any dispute that this amendment in the scheme of Section 50C has been made to remove an incongruity, resulting in undue hardship to the assessee, as is evident from the observation in Easwar Committee report to the effect that “The (then prevailing) provisions of section 50C do not provide any relief where the seller has entered into an agreement to sell the asset much before the actual date of transfer of the immovable property and the sale consideration has been fixed in such agreement” recognizing the incongruity that the date agreement of sell has been ignored in the statute even though it was crucial as it was at this point of time that the sale consideration is finalized. The incongruity in the statute was glaring and undue hardship not in dispute

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DATE: September 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07 to 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Penalty cannot be imposed if the AO does not specify whether the penalty is for "concealment of income" or for "furnishing inaccurate particulars". Penalty cannot be imposed in respect of income surrendered by the assessee if the AO does not link the income to incriminating documents

The income is offered by appellant on ad hoc basis without co-relating the amount of year wise disclosure without any corroborating evidence. The above disclosure has been accepted by assessing officer without referring to any incriminating material pertaining to respective years. The assessing officer as well as the 1st appellate authority has also not referred to any material based on which disclosure is made and assessed by the assessing officer. In view of this it is apparent that disclosure is without any material but merely on the statement of appellant. In our view, there may be several reasons for making surrender by an assessee and merely on this basis an inference beyond doubt cannot be drawn that there was concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars thereof on the part of the assessee towards the surrendered income to attract penal provisions under sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act

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DATE: September 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 37(1): While expenditure for purchase of a capital asset is capital expenditure, guarantee commission to acquire the asset on installment terms is revenue expenditure

Expenditure incurred for the purchase of the machinery was undoutedly capital expenditure; for it brought in an asset of enduring advantage. But the guarantee commission stands on a different footing. By itself, it does not bring into existence any asset of an enduring nature; nor did it bring in any other advantage of an enduring benefit. The acquisition of the machinery on installment terms was only a business exigency

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DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 24, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 80P(2)(d): Interest and dividend earned by a co-op society on investments with other co-operative societies is eligible for deduction. The question whether the co-op society is engaged in the business of banking for providing credit facilities to its members and the head under which the income is assessable is not material (Totagar’s Co-op Society 322 ITR 283 (SC) distinguished)

The Supreme Court in the case of Totagar’s Co-operative Sale Society Ltd held that a society has surplus funds which are invested in short term deposits where the society is engaged in the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members in that case the said income from short term deposits shall be treated and assessed as income from other sources and deduction u/s 80(P)(2)(a)(i) would not be available meaning thereby that deduction u/s 80(P)(2)(a)(i) is available only in respect of income which is assessable as business income and not as income from other sources. Whereas in distinction to this , the provisions of section 80(P)(2)(d) of the Act provides for deduction in respect of income of a coop society by way of interest or dividend from its investments with other coop society if such income is included in the gross total income of the such coop society

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DATE: August 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 24, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 10B: Export of Legal Services by a law firm to its overseas clients by transfer of customized electronic data constitutes export of "computer software" as per Explanation 2 to s. 10B and is eligible for deduction

The assessee has, by use of the legal database compiled by it over a period of more than 60 years (firm is in practice of law since 1943), earned reasonable amount of valuable foreign exchange for our country, thereby fulfilling the most core intention of the law for introduction of EOU Scheme under EXIM Policy and Section 10B of the Act. The assessee has also fulfilled the specific requirements of Section 10B of the Act, by providing Legal Services using Legal database

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DATE: August 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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CITATION:
Refundable deposits received by a housing company for allotment of flats and future maintenance is business income. However, share capital received for allotment of flats is a capital receipt and not income. The principles of mutuality does not apply to such transactions

The Karnataka High Court held, following Shree Nirmal Commercial vs. CIT 193 ITR 694 (Bom) and 213 ITR 361 (FB), that share capital and refundable deposits received by a housing company from its shareholders in consideration of allotting area to them is assessable as business profits. It was also held that the principles of mutuality are not applicable. It was also held that deposits received from the shareholders for future maintenance is assessable as business income. On appeal to the Supreme Court HELD

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DATE: August 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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Transfer Pricing: The assessee is obliged to carry out a bench-marking exercise with independent comparables and prove that its transactions with AEs are at arms length. Mere fact that the transaction is approved by the RBI and Govt is not sufficient

The RBI approval/FIPB approval is not determinative of ALP and cannot be considered to be a valid CUP. Automatic route under which FIPB approvals or RBI approvals are granted have been devised for the “ease of doing business”. These approvals emanate from other legislation or policy and are not in relation to determination of Arm’s Length Price. The purpose of the RBI approval/FIPB approval is entirely different and cannot be equated with the arm’s length principle. The approvals of rates given by the DIPP and the RBI are for different purposes, like for promotion of industries, management of foreign exchange etc. and it varies in accordance with the business practices prevalent at different times which are clear from the RBI approvals themselves. Going by the relevant TP provisions as enshrined under the Act and relevant Rules, it is mandatory that the appellant has to independently benchmark its international transaction with independent comparables so as to arrive at arm’s length price

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DATE: September 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 271B: Penalty for delay in furnishing tax audit report should not be imposed if there is no mala fide reason for the delay. Dispute with auditor is a reasonable cause u/s 273B for the delay in furnishing the tax audit report

The delay made by the assessee firm in filing the return of income is for the first time i.e. in A.Y. 2008-09 which was on account of dispute of audit fee between the assessee and the auditor. Hence, it appears that the dispute with the statutory auditor is a reasonable cause within the meaning of Section 273B as held in the case of Kripa Industries (I) Ltd. vs. JCIT by ITAT Pune Bench (2002) 76 TTJ 502 (Pune) that there is no mala fide reason for not obtaining the accounts audited in time and penalty u/s 271B should not be imposed

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DATE: August 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
S. 153A: Even in a case where only a s. 143(1) assessment is made, additions cannot be made without the backing of incriminating material if the s. 143(1) assessment has not abated

The making of an addition in an assessment under section 153A of the Act, without the backing of incriminating material, is unsustainable even in a case where the original assessment on the date of search stood completed under section 143(1) of the Act, thereby resulting in non-abatement of such assessment in terms of the Second Proviso to section 153A(1) of the Act