We are extremely unhappy with the delay of 3381 days in refiling the special leave petition but make no other comment. The concerned authorities need to wake up.
A similar situation, though in the context of section 54F of the Act, has been considered by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Smt.Leena J. Shah (supra); notably, so far as the impugned issue is concerned, the requirement of sections 54F & 54F of the Act is pari-materia, inter-alia, requiring the assessee to make investment in a new residential house in order to avail the exemption on the capital gains earned. As per the Hon’ble High Court, prior to the amendment the only stipulation was to invest in a new residential property and that there was no scope for importing the requirement of making such investment in a residential property located in India
From a plain reading of section 56(2)(vi) along with the Explanation to that section and on understanding the intention of the legislature from the section, we find that a gift received from “relative”, irrespective of whether it is from an individual relative or from a group of relatives is exempt from tax under the provisions of section 56(2)(vi) of the Act as a group of relatives also falls within the Explanation to section 56(2)(vi) of the Act. It is not expressly defined in the Explanation that the word “relative” represents a single person. And it is not always necessary that singular remains singular. Sometimes a singular can mean more than one, as in the case before us. In the case before us the assessee received gift from his HUF. The word “Hindu Undivided Family”, though sounds singular unit in its form and assessed as such for income-tax purposes, finally at the end a “Hindu Undivided Family” is made up of ‘a group of relatives”
Wherever there is an income from leasing out of premises and collecting rent, normally such an income is to be treated as income from house property, in case provisions of Section 22 of the Act are satisfied with primary ingredient that the assessee is the owner of the said building or lands appurtenant thereto. Section 22 of the Act makes ‘annual value’ of such a property as income chargeable to tax under this head. How annual value is to be determined is provided in Section 23 of the Act. ‘Owner of the house property’ is defined in Section 27 of the Act which includes certain situations where a person not actually the owner shall be treated as deemed owner of a building or part thereof. In the present case, the appellant is held to be “deemed owner” of the property in question by virtue of Section 27(iiib) of the Act. On the other hand, under certain circumstances, where the income may have been derived from letting out of the premises, it can still be treated as business income if letting out of the premises itself is the business of the assessee
On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 27.10.2009 reveals that the assessee has maintained the books of accounts in accordance with the prescribed standard as per Section 145 of ‘the Act’. The account books have not been rejected by the assessing officer. In view of the above, the Tribunal formed an opinion where once the account books are expected to be maintained in the prescribed accounting standard, the assessing officer could not have made any additions towards the sale of rice treating it to be outside the books of accounts or towards investing in stock of rice and wheat outside the books of accounts
When it was sent by R.P.A.D. to the address, it was returned by the postal authorities with the remark, that the addressee refused to accept the packet. That is why it is returned. Thus, the presumption that when the addressee whose address is set out on the envelope had an occasion to notice and peruse the packet, meant for him, but he refuses to accept it, then, that is deemed to be served. The addressee in this case is correctly described. There is no dispute about his identity. Even his address is correct. It is at that address the packet is carried and by the concerned postal authority. The duly authorised person carrying the packet reached the address. On noticing the addressee, he serves it, but the addressee after having perused the packet refused to accept it. It is in these circumstances, the postal remark that the concerned person has refused to accept; hence, returned to the sender denotes good and valid service.
Judicial discipline requires that such a blatant contradiction in such an important matter should have been avoided. The order passed in the case of Dr. R.K. Rana was on sound basis and though the court had noted that there was some overlapping of facts but the offences were different, it, however, has taken a different view in the impugned order for the reasons which are not understandable. The court ought to have been careful while dealing with such matters and consistency is the hallmark of the court due to which people have faith in the system and it is not open to the court to take a different view in the same matter with reference to different accused persons in the same facts and same case. Such inconsistent decision-making ought to have been avoided at all costs so as to ensure credibility of the system. The impugned orders are palpably illegal, faulty and contrary to the basic principles of law and Judge has ignored large number of binding decisions of this Court while giving impermissible benefit to the accused persons and delayed the case for several years. Interference had been made at the advanced stage of the case which was wholly unwarranted and uncalled for
Apart from the aforesaid discussion, we may also refer to the one more seminal feature of this case which would demonstrate the importance of non-striking off of irrelevant clause in the notice by the Assessing Officer. As noted earlier, in the assessment order dated 10.12.2010 the Assessing Officer records that the penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act are to be initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. However, in the notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s. 271(1)(c) of the Act of even date, both the limbs of Sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act are reproduced in the proforma notice and the irrelevant clause has not been struck-off. Quite clearly, the observation of the Assessing Officer in the assessment order and non-striking off of the irrelevant clause in the notice clearly brings out the diffidence on the part of Assessing Officer and there is no clear and crystallised charge being conveyed to the assessee u/s 271(1)(c), which has to be met by him. As noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra), the quasi-criminal proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act ought to comply with the principles of natural justice, and in the present case, considering the observations of the Assessing Officer in the assessment order alongside his action of non-striking off of the irrelevant clause in the notice shows that the charge being made against the assessee qua Sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act is not firm and, therefore, the proceedings suffer from non-compliance with principles of natural justice inasmuch as the Assessing Officer is himself unsure and assessee is not made aware as to which of the two limbs of Sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act he has to respond