Month: August 2017

Archive for August, 2017


COURT:
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SECTION(S): ,
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COUNSEL:
DATE: May 15, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Severe strictures passed to condemn the illegal practice of the Dept of collecting undated cheques from taxpayers after search/ survey without even quantifying the extent of duty evasion. Attempt of the unscrupulous officers is to 'negotiate' the evaded duty by threats and coercion. It is not rule of law but anarchy unleashed by holders of public office. It is an abuse of law which has to be stopped

It is telltale that even after the Court issued notice to the Department in the present petition, the above instructions of the ADC have not been complied with. The undated cheques remained with the Department. What loss this entailed to the Government Exchequer is a different issue altogether. Then there is the loss of interest on the said amount. At least two scenarios are possible when such unbridled power of ‘collection’ of duty, on the spot, is allowed to go unchecked. One is that since there is nothing written down anywhere, the unscrupulous officers who constitute the survey/search team can ‘negotiate’ an amount of evaded duty and also agree to waiver of interest and penalty. This is without quantification and without a SCN. The duty evader gets away with a lighter amount and this is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The second scenario is where an Assessee refuses to comply with an illegal demand and under threat and coercion is compelled to issue cheques or pay cash which is supposed to constitute the differential duty. This is undoubtedly prejudicial to the Assessee and is harmful to public interest. It is not rule of law but anarchy unleashed by holders of public office. Neither is it an acceptable scenario in a system governed by the rule of law. It metamorphises into a system of rule by law and, worse still, by abuse of law. It has to be stopped

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DATE: August 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06 to 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 68: Statements recorded u/s 132 (4) do not by themselves constitute incriminating material. A copy of the statement together with the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent has to provided to the assessee. If the statement is retracted and/or if cross-examination is not provided, the statement has to be discarded. The onus of ensuring the presence of the deponent cannot be shifted to the assessees. The onus is on the Revenue to ensure his presence

A copy of the statement of Mr. Tarun Goyal, recorded under Section 132 (4) of the Act, was not provided to the Assessees. Mr. Tarun Goyal was also not offered for the cross-examination. The remand report of the AO before the CIT(A) unmistakably showed that the attempts by the AO, in ensuring the presence of Mr. Tarun Goyal for cross-examination by the Assessees, did not succeed. The onus of ensuring the presence of Mr. Tarun Goyal, whom the Assessees clearly stated that they did not know, could not have been shifted to the Assessees. The onus was on the Revenue to ensure his presence. Apart from the fact that Mr. Tarun Goyal has retracted his statement, the fact that he was not produced for cross-examination is sufficient to discard his statement. Statements recorded under Section 132 (4) of the Act of the Act do not by themselves constitute incriminating material as has been explained by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Harjeev Aggarwal (supra)

COURT:
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DATE: December 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing: A party is not barred in law from withdrawing from its list of comparables a company found to have been included on account of mistake of fact. The Transfer Pricing Mechanism requires comparability analysis to be done between like companies and controlled and uncontrolled transactions by carrying out of FAR analysis. The assessee's submission in arriving at the ALP is not final. It is for the TPO to examine and find out the companies listed as comparables which are in fact comparable

We find that the impugned order of the Tribunal holding that a party is not barred in law from withdrawing from its list of comparables, a company, if the same is found to have been included on account of mistake as on facts, it is not comparable. The Transfer Pricing Mechanism requires comparability analysis to be done between like companies and controlled and uncontrolled transactions. This comparison has to be done between like companies and requires carrying out of FAR analysis to find the same. Moreover, the Assessee’s submission in arriving at the ALP is not final. It is for the TPO to examine and find out the companies listed as comparables which are, in fact comparable

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DATE: August 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-99, 1999-00, 2000-01, 2001-02
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CITATION:
Interest on interim compensation received pending final disposal by the High Court is income if there is no direction given by the Court. The source of funds to earn income cannot determine the taxability of the income. The fact that the assessee may have to return the compensation and interest on the principle of restitution as provided under S. 144 of the Civil Procedure Code is not relevant because restitution is not a certainty. Paragon Construction 274 ITR 413 (Del) distinguished

The source of funds to earn income cannot determine the taxability of the income earned on the capital amount which has been invested. This in the absence of any statutory mandate otherwise. The income earned would be chargeable to tax irrespective of the source of the funds from which the income has been earned. In the mercantile system of accounting, income accrues when the right to receive the same arises, even though the actual receipt could be at a later date. In the present case it is an accepted position that the right to receive the interest from the fixed deposits already accrued to the assessee. In such circumstances, the interest on the fixed deposit would be chargeable to tax, as sought to be done by the Assessing Officer under the head income from other sources

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DATE: August 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 80-IA: Difference between 'manufacturing' and 'production' explained. The word ‘production’ has a wider connotation in comparison to ‘manufacture’. Any activity which brings a commercially new product into existence constitutes production. The process of bottling of LPG renders it capable of being marketed as a domestic kitchen fuel and, thereby, makes it a viable commercial product

At the outset, it needs to be emphasised that the aforesaid provisions of the Act use both the expressions, namely, ‘manufacture’ as well as ‘production’. It also becomes clear after reading these provisions that an assessee whose process amounts to either ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ (i.e. one of these two and not both) would become entitled to the benefits enshrined therein. It is held by this Court in Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd. (2010) 320 ITR 79 (SC) that the word ‘production’ is wider than the word ‘manufacture’. The two expressions, thus, have different connotation. Significantly, Arihant Tiles judgment decides that cutting of marble blocks into marble slabs does not amount to manufacture. At the same time, it clarifies that it would be relevant for the purpose of the Central Excise Act. When it comes to interpreting Section 80-IA of the Act (which was involved in the said case), the Court was categorical in pointing out that the aforesaid interpretation of ‘manufacture’ in the context of Central Excise Act would not apply while interpreting Section 80-IA of the Act as this provision not only covers those assessees which are involved in the process of manufacture but also those who are undertaking ‘production’ of the goods

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DATE: January 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
For purposes of filing a rectification application, the period of limitation of six months commences from the date of receipt of the order sought to be rectified by the assessee and not from the date of passing of the order

The second part of the Section requires that the Tribunal shall make such amendments if the mistake is brought to its notice by either party to the appeal before it. The party to the appeal can bring the fact of apparent mistake on record only after going through the order made by the tribunal. Therefore, to read that the period of limitation has to computed at any time within six months from the date of the order does not fit in either with legislative intent or the language employed by the provision.

15. There is another angle from which the matter can be approached. It is only the party to the appeal who finds that the order contains a mistake apparent from the record and is aggrieved by such mistake, would be in a position to move an application seeking rectification of the order. Therefore also, unless and until a party to the appeal is in a position to go through and study the order it would not be possible, nor can it be envisaged, that a party can claim to be aggrieved by the mistake apparent from the record. Hence, even on this count the period of limitation has to be read and understood so as to mean from the date of the receipt of the order

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DATE: April 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): The amendment by the Finance Act 2016 w.e.f. 01.06.2016 to specify the time limit of 6 months to file a rectification application applies even to applications filed with respect to appeal orders passed prior to the date of the amendment. The Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing a Miscellaneous Application

It is to be noted that the earlier period of ‘four years’ has been substituted with ‘six months’ by the Finance Act, 2016 with effect from 01/06/2016. However, we find that no distinction has been made in this section between orders passed before 01/06/2016 and orders passed after 01/06/2016. Moreover, the Tribunal order was dated 22/03/2013 and therefore, the Revenue had ample time to go through the same and pin point the mistakes in the order but it has failed to do so. Therefore, we find no force in these miscellaneous petitions primarily because of the reason that the Statute does not authorize us to entertain any petition which has been filed u/s 254(2) at any time beyond a period of six months from the date of the order