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DATE: August 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 24, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14, 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 144C DRP: Action of the DRP in granting time to the assessee till 24th July 2017 to submit documents but in still passing the order on the same day itself and that too without taking on record the documents produced by the assessee is clearly unreasonable and in violation of the principles of natural justice

Clearly, the Respondent acted in violation of the principles of natural justice, since despite the time being granted to the Petitioner till 24th July 2017 to submit documents sought by the DRP, the DRP passed the order on 24th July, 2017 itself and that too without taking on record the documents produced by the Petitioner till then. The time given for the Petitioner to do so was just four days. This was clearly unreasonable, particularly, since there was an intervening weekend between 20th and 24th July, 2017

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DATE: July 27, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 24, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 143(2)/ 144C: Though service of the notice is not a condition precedent to conferment of jurisdiction upon the AO to deal with the matter, it is a condition precedent to making of the order of assessment. Accordingly, the s. 143(2) notice has not only to be issued before the expiry of the limitation period but has also to be served upon the assessee before the expiry of the limitation period. Conflict between VRA Cotton Mills (P&H) and Lunar Diamonds 281 ITR 1 (Del) explained in light of CBDT Circular No. 549 dated 31.10.1989

Service under the 1961 Act is not a condition precedent to conferment of jurisdiction in the ITO to deal with the matter but it is a condition precedent to making of the order of assessment. The Hon’ble High Court, in our opinion, lost sight of the distinction and under a wrong basis felt bound by the judgment in Banarsi Devi’s case

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DATE: August 10, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 260A: Right of appeal is not a matter of procedure. It is a substantive right. This right gets vested in the litigants at the commencement of the lis and such a vested right cannot be taken away or cannot be impaired or imperilled or made more stringent or onerous by any subsequent legislation unless the subsequent legislation said so either expressly or by necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or impair or imperil a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or by necessary implication.

We may mention at the outset that after referring to the judgments noted above even the High Court in the impugned judgment has accepted that right of appeal is not a matter of procedure and that it is a substantive right. It is also recognised that this right gets vested in the litigants at the commencement of the lis and, therefore, such a vested right cannot be taken away or cannot be impaired or imperilled or made more stringent or onerous by any subsequent legislation unless the subsequent legislation said so either expressly or by necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or impair or imperil a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or by necessary implication. However, the High Court has still dismissed the writ petition as it was of the opinion that the vested right of appeal conferred under Section 260A of the IT Act, insofar as payment of court fee is concerned, is taken away by necessary implication. In other words, the provisions of Section 52A of the 1959 Act inserted by the Amendment Act of 2003, in that sense, have retrospective operation thereby effecting the earlier assessment also. This proposition is advanced with the logic that before prior to introduction of Section 260A in the IT Act with effect from October 01, 1998, there was no right of appeal

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DATE: July 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 271AAA: No penalty u/s 271AAA can be levied in respect of undisclosed income found during a search u/s 132 if the AO did not put a specific query to the assessee by drawing his attention to s. 271 AAA and asking him to specify the manner in which the undisclosed income, surrendered during the course of search, had been derived

The CIT(A) noted that no specific query had been put to the Assessee by drawing his attention to Section 271 AAA of the Act asking him to specify the manner in which the undisclosed income, surrendered during the course of search, had been derived. The CIT (A), therefore, relying on the decisions of this Court held that the jurisdictional requirement of Section 271AAA was not met. The above view has been concurred with by the ITAT. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court is of the view that the concurrent decision of the CIT(A) and the ITAT represent a plausible view which cannot be said to be perverse

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DATE: August 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2000-01 to 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 43(1) Explanation 10: The law laid down in PJ Chemicals 210 ITR 830 (SC) that only a subsidy or grant given to offset the cost of an asset can be reduced from the "actual cost" of the asset and not a general subsidy continues to hold good even after the insertion of Explanation 10 to s. 43(1). A subsidy/ grant from a foreign sovereign Country does not fall within Expl 10 because the foreign Country is not a "person" as defined in s. 2(31)

We have also gone through the provisions of Section 43(1) as well as Explanation 10 thereof. We noted that Section 43(1) defines the actual cost to mean the actual cost of the assets of the assessee reduced by that portion of the cost thereof, if any, as has been met directly or indirectly by other person or authority. In the impugned case, we noted that what the ICICI has financed by way of conditional grant to the assessee is the amount received from USA under the project grant agreement for the Program for Acceleration of Commercial Energy Research. Now the question arises whether USA can be regarded to be a person or authority. In our view, this provision cannot be read without Explanation 10. From the reading of the said explanation, it is explicitly clear that if a portion of a cost of an asset acquired by the assessee has been met directly or indirectly by Central Government or State Government or any authority established under any law or by any other person in the form of a subsidy or a grant or reimbursement, said subsidy grant or reimbursement as is relatable to the asset shall be reduced out of the actual cost of the assessee to the assessee. USA is a sovereign and cannot be Central Government or State Government or any authority established by any law in India

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DATE: August 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 16, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 80P Test of Mutuality: An assessee cannot be treated as a co-operative society meant only for its members and providing credit facilities to its members if it has carved out a category called ‘nominal members’. These are those members who are making deposits with the assessee for the purpose of obtaining loans, etc. and, in fact, they are not members in the real sense. Most of the business of the assessee was with this category of persons who have been giving deposits which are kept in Fixed Deposits with a motive to earn maximum returns. A portion of these deposits is utilised to advance gold loans, etc. to the members of the first category. It is found that the depositors and borrowers are quite distinct. In reality, such activity of the appellant is that of finance business and cannot be termed as co-operative society

It is pointed out by the Assessing Officer that the assessee is catering to two distinct categories of people. The first category is that of resident members or ordinary members. There may not be any difficulty as far as this category is concerned. However, the assessee had carved out another category of ‘nominal members’. These are those members who are making deposits with the assessee for the purpose of obtaining loans, etc. and, in fact, they are not members in real sense. Most of the business of the appellant was with this second category of persons who have been giving deposits which are kept in Fixed Deposits with a motive to earn maximum returns. A portion of these deposits is utilised to advance gold loans, etc. to the members of the first category. It is found, as a matter of fact, that the depositors and borrowers are quiet distinct. In reality, such activity of the appellant is that of finance business and cannot be termed as co-operative society. It is also found that the appellant is engaged in the activity of granting loans to general public as well. All this is done without any approval from the Registrar of the Societies. With indulgence in such kind of activity by the appellant, it is remarked by the Assessing Officer that the activity of the appellant is in violation of the Co-operative Societies Act

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DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 16, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 115JA/ JB Book Profits: Clause (i) to the Explanation was inserted to supersede HCL Comnet 305 ITR 409 (SC). Accordingly, a mere provision for bad debts has to be added back for computation of book profit u/s 115JA/JB. However, in terms of Vijaya Bank 323 ITR 166 (SC), if there is a simultaneous reduction from the loans and advances on the asset side of the balance sheet, the provision amounts to a write-off of the debt which is not hit by clause (i) of the Explanation to section 115JB

By way of culmination of above judicial pronouncements and statutory provisions, the situation that arises is that prior to the introduction of clause(i) to the explanation to section 115JB, as held by the Supreme Court in case of HCL Comnet Systems and Services Ltd. (supra), the then existing clause (c) did not cover a case where the assessee made a provision for bad or doubtful debt. With insertion of clause (i) to the explanation with retrospective effect, any amount or amounts set aside for provision for diminution in the value of the asset made by the assessee, would be added back for computation of book profit under section 115JB of the Act. However, if this was not a mere provision made by the assessee by merely debiting the Profit and Loss Account and crediting the provision for bad and doubtful debt, but by simultaneously obliterating such provision from its accounts by reducing the corresponding amount from the loans and advances on the asset side of the balance sheet and consequently, at the end of the year showing the loans and advances on the asset aside of the balance sheet as net of the provision for bad debt, it would amount to a write off and such actual write off would not be hit by clause (i) of the explanation to section 115JB

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DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 16, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1995-96
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CITATION:
S. 68 "Peak Credits": An accommodation entry provider wanting to avail the benefit of the 'peak credit' has to make a clean breast of all the facts within his knowledge concerning the credit entries in the accounts. He has to explain with sufficient detail the source of all the deposits in his accounts as well as the corresponding destination of all payments from the accounts. The assessee should be able to show that money has been transferred through banking channels from the bank account of creditors to the bank account of the assessee, the identity of the creditors and that the money paid from the accounts of the assessee has returned to the bank accounts of the creditors. The assessee has to discharge the primary onus of disclosure in this regard

The legal position in respect of an accommodation entry provider seeking the benefit of ‘peak credit’ appears to have been totally overlooked by the ITAT in the present case. Indeed, if the Assessee as a self-confessed accommodation entry provider wanted to avail the benefit of the ‘peak credit’, he had to make a clean breast of all the facts within his knowledge concerning the credit entries in the accounts. He has to explain with sufficient detail the source of all the deposits in his accounts as well as the corresponding destination of all payments from the accounts. The Assessee should be able to show that money has been transferred through banking channels from the bank account of creditors to the bank account of the Assessee, the identity of the creditors and that the money paid from the accounts of the Assessee has returned to the bank accounts of the creditors. The Assessee has to discharge the primary onus of disclosure in this regard

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DATE: May 15, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Severe strictures passed to condemn the illegal practice of the Dept of collecting undated cheques from taxpayers after search/ survey without even quantifying the extent of duty evasion. Attempt of the unscrupulous officers is to 'negotiate' the evaded duty by threats and coercion. It is not rule of law but anarchy unleashed by holders of public office. It is an abuse of law which has to be stopped

It is telltale that even after the Court issued notice to the Department in the present petition, the above instructions of the ADC have not been complied with. The undated cheques remained with the Department. What loss this entailed to the Government Exchequer is a different issue altogether. Then there is the loss of interest on the said amount. At least two scenarios are possible when such unbridled power of ‘collection’ of duty, on the spot, is allowed to go unchecked. One is that since there is nothing written down anywhere, the unscrupulous officers who constitute the survey/search team can ‘negotiate’ an amount of evaded duty and also agree to waiver of interest and penalty. This is without quantification and without a SCN. The duty evader gets away with a lighter amount and this is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The second scenario is where an Assessee refuses to comply with an illegal demand and under threat and coercion is compelled to issue cheques or pay cash which is supposed to constitute the differential duty. This is undoubtedly prejudicial to the Assessee and is harmful to public interest. It is not rule of law but anarchy unleashed by holders of public office. Neither is it an acceptable scenario in a system governed by the rule of law. It metamorphises into a system of rule by law and, worse still, by abuse of law. It has to be stopped

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DATE: August 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06 to 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 68: Statements recorded u/s 132 (4) do not by themselves constitute incriminating material. A copy of the statement together with the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent has to provided to the assessee. If the statement is retracted and/or if cross-examination is not provided, the statement has to be discarded. The onus of ensuring the presence of the deponent cannot be shifted to the assessees. The onus is on the Revenue to ensure his presence

A copy of the statement of Mr. Tarun Goyal, recorded under Section 132 (4) of the Act, was not provided to the Assessees. Mr. Tarun Goyal was also not offered for the cross-examination. The remand report of the AO before the CIT(A) unmistakably showed that the attempts by the AO, in ensuring the presence of Mr. Tarun Goyal for cross-examination by the Assessees, did not succeed. The onus of ensuring the presence of Mr. Tarun Goyal, whom the Assessees clearly stated that they did not know, could not have been shifted to the Assessees. The onus was on the Revenue to ensure his presence. Apart from the fact that Mr. Tarun Goyal has retracted his statement, the fact that he was not produced for cross-examination is sufficient to discard his statement. Statements recorded under Section 132 (4) of the Act of the Act do not by themselves constitute incriminating material as has been explained by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Harjeev Aggarwal (supra)

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