Month: January 2020

Archive for January, 2020


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DATE: January 17, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2020 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 83 CGST Act: Power to provisionally attach bank accounts is a drastic power. Considering the consequences that ensue from provisional attachment of bank accounts, the power is not to be routinely exercised. S. 83 confers power on the authorities to provisionally attach bank accounts to safeguard Govt revenue but the same is within well-defined ambit. Only upon contingencies provided therein that the power u/s 83 can be exercised. This power is to be used in only limited circumstances and it is not an omnibus power. If proceedings are launched against one taxable person, bank account of another taxable person cannot be provisionally attached merely based on the summons issued u/s 70 to him.

Power to provisionally attach bank accounts is a drastic power. Considering the consequences that ensue from provisional attachment of bank accounts, the Courts have repeatedly emphasized that this power is not to be routinely exercised. Under Section 83, the legislature has no doubt conferred power on the authorities to provisionally attach bank accounts to safeguard government revenue, but the same is within well-defined ambit. Only upon contingencies provided therein that the power under section 83 can be exercised. This power is to be used in only limited circumstances and it is not an omnibus power

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DATE: January 20, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 226(3): Undue haste in recovery of disputed demands by issue of s. 226(3) garnishee notices, in respect of which the hearing of appeal as also the stay petition is already concluded, is indeed inappropriate. The revenue authorities should have at least waited the disposal of the stay petition. Interim stay granted and garnishee proceedings placed under suspension till the disposal of the stay petition

We have noted that the hearing of stay petition was concluded, as per information available to us, on 17th January 2020, but the order thereon has not been passed as yet since one of the Members constituting coram of the bench has gone on tour to Delhi benches due to unavoidable official exigencies. In the meantime, however, the revenue authorities have already issued garnishee notices, under section 226(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to the bankers of the assessee on 17th January 2020 itself. Such an undue haste in recovery of the disputed demands, in respect of which the hearing of appeal as also the stay petition is already concluded, is indeed inappropriate. The revenue authorities should have at least waited for the disposal of the stay petition.

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DATE: January 20, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
(i) 56(2)(vii)(b): The amendment w.e.f AY 2014-15 will not apply to a purchase transaction of immovable property for which full consideration is paid pre the amendment. Mere registration at a later date will not cover a transaction already executed in the earlier years and substantial obligations have already been discharged and a substantive right has accrued to the assessee therefrom. The Revenue is debarred to cover the transaction where inadequacy in purchase consideration is alleged (ii) Interest u/s 234A & 234B is chargeable with reference to the returned income and not the assessed income

It is not in dispute that purchase transactions of immovable property were carried out in FY 2011-12 for which full consideration was also parted with the seller. Mere registration at later date would not cover a transaction already executed in the earlier years and substantial obligations have already been discharged and a substantive right has accrued to the assessee therefrom. The pre-amended provisions will thus apply and therefore the Revenue is debarred to cover the transactions where inadequacy in purchase consideration is alleged

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DATE: November 18, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 18, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-00
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CITATION:
Capital Gains from Family Arrangements: A family settlement which is a settlement amongst family members in the context of their 'preexisting right' is not a "transfer". Such a settlement only defines a preexisting joint interest as a separate interest. However, if there is no preexisting right, the family arrangement constitutes a "transfer". Merely because dispute involved some family members and such dispute is ultimately settled by filing consent terms, the same cannot be styled as a family arrangement or family settlement so as to hold that the consideration received as a result of such settlement, does not constitute capital gain (all imp verdicts referred)

The settlement between the Appellant and the said two persons can hardly be described as a family settlement. The settlement may be enforceable inter-parties now that the same is incorporated in the consent terms, based upon a consent decree may have been issued. However such settlement, cannot be called as a family settlement or family arrangement, as is understood in the case of Kale and others (supra) or in the case of Sachin Ambulkar (supra). Merely because dispute involved some family members and such dispute is ultimately settled by filing consent terms, the same cannot be styled as a family arrangement or family settlement and on such basis, it cannot be held that the consideration received as a result of such settlement, does not constitute capital gain.

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DATE: January 8, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 18, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 68/ 69C Bogus purchases: Even if the purchases made by the assessee are to be treated as bogus, it does not mean that entire amount can be disallowed. As the AO did not dispute the consumption of the raw materials and completion of work, only a percentage of net profit on total turnover can be estimated (Mohommad Haji Adam & Paramshakti Distributors followed)

Assuming that the purchasers from whom the purchases were made were bogus, in view of the finding of fact that the material was consumed, the question would be of extending the percentage of net profit on total turnover. This would be a matter of calculations by the concerned authority

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DATE: January 10, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 18, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 54F: The words "in India" cannot be read into section 54F when Parliament in its legislative wisdom has deliberately not used the words. The assessee is entitled to exemption under section 54F of the Act though he has acquired house property in a foreign country. The amendment to s. 54F by the Finance Act, 2014 w.e.f. 2015 is applicable only prospectively (all imp verdicts considered)

Unless there is an ambiguity, it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the legislature should be primarily to gather from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and considered on surrounding circumstances and constitutionally proposed practices

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DATE: November 28, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13, 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 147/148: If the AO has failed to perform his statutory duty, he cannot review his decision and reopen on a change of opinion. Reopening is not an empty formality. There has to be relevant tangible material for the AO to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income and there must be a live link with such material for the formation of the belief. Merely using the expression “failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts” is not enough. The reasons must specify as to what is the nature of default or failure on the part of the assessee

Though, the recorded reasons allude to an ostensible failure on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, however, the recorded reasons except for using the expression “failure on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts”, do not specify as to what is the nature of default or failure on the part of the Assessee. The reasons also do not explain or specify as to what is the rationale connection between the reasons to believe and the material on record

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DATE: January 3, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 56(2)(viib)/ Rule 11UA: The legislative intent is to apply s. 56(2)(viib) where unaccounted money received in garb of share premium. The AO has not made out a case that stated money is not clean money. Also, the assessee has given approved valuer (CA) report justifying share premium raised based on valid and prescribed method being DCF and said report is in accordance with ICAI norms. AO has not countered the said report by substitute valuation. Also, if the shares are sold in next FY at much higher amount, the premium cannot be said to be excessive (Lalithaa Jewellery 178 ITD 503 (Chennai) followed)

Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and by applying the principles from the aforesaid decision and legislative intent behind insertion of section 56(2)(viib), I hold that addition made by AO on account of alleged excess share premium is unjustified when those very shares are sold in next financial year at much higher amount after proper due diligence, that to a non resident buyer and further there is no case of unaccounted money being brought in garb of stated share premium, hence, addition made u/s 56(2)(vii) of the Act is hereby deleted

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DATE: December 23, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 147 vs. S. 263: If the AO has incorrectly or erroneously applied law and income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, the Revenue should resort to s. 263 and revise the assessment and not reopen u/s 147. When matter was referred to the CIT for seeking approval, instead of holding that the matter falls u/s 263 and not u/s 148, has given approval u/s 151 which shows non-application of mind and mechanical grant of approval. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction u/s 147 cannot be sustained and is held as invalid in eyes of law

In such a situation, where the Assessing officer has incorrectly or erroneously applied law and income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, the Revenue is not without remedy and resort to provisions of section 263 could have been made by the ld CIT. In fact, the revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263 is meant to deal with such type of cases where the ld CIT can step-in and correct the Assessing officer. In the instant case, the original assessment proceedings were completed vide order u/s 143(3) dated 29.02.2016 and therefore, the provisions of section 263 could have been invoked by the ld CIT by 31.03.2018. However, instead of invoking the revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263 by ld. CIT, the Assessing officer has assumed the jurisdiction u/s 147 of the Act by issuance of notice dated 28.02.2017. Interestingly, for such assumption of jurisdiction, the ld CIT has accorded the approval u/s 151 of the Act. It is therefore a case where matter was referred to the ld CIT for seeking his approval and the ld CIT instead of holding that the matter falls under section 263 and not under section 148 has given the approval u/s 151 of the Act which shows non-application of mind and mechanical grant of approval

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DATE: December 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 276-B Criminal Prosecution for TDS default: A Director, who is not in charge of and not responsible for day to day business of the Company, is not liable for criminal prosecution, unless specifically it is described in the complaint how he is involved in day to day conduct of the business of the Company (Shyam Sunder AIR 1984 SC 53 & Homi Phiroz Ranina 2003 Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 793 followed)

Unless the complaint disclosed a prima facie case against the applicants/accused of their liability and obligation as principal officers in the day today affairs of the company as directors of the company under section 278(b) the applicants cannot be prosecuted for the offences committed by the company. In the absence of any material in the complaint itself prima facie disclosing responsibility of the accused for the running of the day to day affairs of the company process could not have been issued against them. The applicants cannot be made to undergo the ordial of a trial unless it could be prima facie showed that they are legally liable for the failure of the company in paying the amount deducted to the credit of the company. Otherwise, it would be a travesty without their knowledge