Search Results For: limitation period


COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: March 16, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 20, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
A notice issued u/s 142(1) requiring the assessee to furnish a return of income when the assessee had already earlier filed a return is not valid. Once a valid return of income was available on record, which was already processed issuing notice u/s 142(1) of the Act asking the assessee to furnish fresh notice in itself is invalid making subsequently proceedings void ab initio. The assessment order has to be quashed for want of jurisdiction

In our considered opinion, once a valid return of income was available on record, which was already processed issuing notice u/s 142(1) of the Act asking the assessee to furnish fresh notice in itself is invalid making subsequently proceedings void ab initio.

COURT:
CORAM: , ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: July 10, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 15, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Extension of limitation period due to Covid-19 Lock down: Service of all notices, summons and exchange of pleadings may be effected by e-mail, FAX, WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal etc in addition to service of the same document by e-mail simultaneously on the same date. The Reserve Bank of India may consider whether the validity period of a cheque under the Negotiable Instruments Act should be extended or not

Extension of validity of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. With reference to the prayer, that the period of validity of a cheque be extended, we find that the said period has not been prescribed by any Statute but it is a period prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India under Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act,1949. We do not consider it appropriate to interfere with the period prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India, particularly, since the entire banking system functions on the basis of the period so prescribed.

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: May 14, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 15, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Rule 34(5) of the ITAT Rules provides that “ordinarily” the order on an appeal should be pronounced within no more than 90 days from the date of concluding the hearing. A pedantic view of the rule cannot be taken. The period of 90 days should be computed by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown due to Covid-19 was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted

In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days, disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the functioning of our justice delivery system.

COURT:
CORAM: , ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE: ,
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: March 23, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 23, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Extension of limitation period: To obviate difficulties caused by CoronaVirus in filing petitions/ applications/ suits/ appeals/ all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State) , it is ordered that the period of limitation in all such proceedings, irrespective of the limitation prescribed under the general law or Special Laws, whether condonable or not, shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March 2020 till further order/s to be passed by this Court in present proceedings

This Court has taken Suo Motu cognizance of the situation arising out of the challenge faced by the country on account of Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that may be faced by litigants across the country in filing their petitions/ applications/ suits/ appeals/all other proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under Special Laws (both Central and/or State)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 24, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 5, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 254(2): The limitation of six months for filing a rectification application was substituted by the Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 01.06.2016. Therefore, for assessment years prior thereto, the limitation period may be construed to be four years from the date of the order. Even otherwise, if the view is taken that the limitation period is six months, it is sufficient if the application is filed before that date. It is not necessary that the order has to be passed before that date. The assessee or AO can only bring the mistake to the notice of the Tribunal but have no control over the Tribunal. Neither party can be made to suffer for the inability of the Tribunal to pass an order within the limitation period (All judgements referred)

The use of the expression “may” in the aforesaid provision is clearly indicative of the legislative intent that the limitation period of six months from the end of the month in which the order was passed is not to be construed in such a manner that there can not be any extension of time beyond the said period of six months. This is so because the assessee or the Assessing Officer can only bring the mistake to the notice of the Tribunal. The assessee or the Assessing Officer has no control over the Tribunal. For one reason or the other, the Tribunal may not be in a position to pass the order under Section 254(2). For the inability of the Tribunal to pass such an order within the period provided, neither the assessee nor the revenue should suffer. What therefore becomes relevant is that the assessee or the Assessing Officer should bring the mistake to the notice of the Tribunal within the limitation period

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: October 1, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Search assessments. The time limit of 2 years u/s 153B for framing search assessment orders applies only to the original order and to orders passed after remand. The time limit for passing remand orders is governed by s. 153(3)/ erstwhile 153( 2A) & not by s. 153B. Limitation begins (for any purpose under the Act) from the point of time when the departmental representative receives the copy of a decision or an order of the ITAT

The next question is whether the non-obstante clause under Section 153 of the Act, which prescribes a specific period of limitation to complete a search assessment for the block period concerned, could override the general period of limitation. In this context, the Court notices that Section 153 of the Act generally talks of various periods of limitation. It prescribes that no order of assessment shall be made either under Section 143 or Section 144 of the Act any time after expiry of twenty one months from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable. The exception carved by way of Section 153(2) – relates to reassessment and states that in cases covered by it, the period is reduced to nine months from any of financial year in which the notice for re-assessment is served

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: August 29, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 8, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Though s. 206C does not impose any limitation period for the AO to hold the assessee to be in default for collection of tax at source, a reasonable time limit of four years has to be read into the statute. Orders passed after this period are beyond the limitation and are void. The fact that the Dept became aware of the default later is irrelevant. The fact that the assessee admitted his liability is also irrelevant

There is no dispute that Section 206C or any other provisions of the Income Tax Act do not provide any limitation for passing the order by the Assessing Officer U/s 206C(6)/206C(7) of the Act holding the assessee in default due to failure to collect tax at source. However, non-providing the limitation in the statute would not confer the jurisdiction/powers to the Assessing Officer to pass order U/s 206C at any point of time disregarding the amount of time lapse from such default of collection of tax at source

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: May 17, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 1997-98
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 260A: The time limit for filing an appeal to the High Court begins from the date of receipt of the order by the officer entitled to file the appeal. The fact that the ITAT may have dispatched the order earlier is not relevant. The fact that the officer may be aware of the ITAT's order owing to collateral proceedings is also not relevant

Section 260A creates a right of appeal and provides that appeal is to be preferred within a period of 120 days. The appeal is to be lodged within 120 days of the receipt of the order. Reading these provisions together, it is clear that what is contemplated by the law giver is that an appeal must be lodged within a period of 120 days from the date of receipt of the order and receipt is to be understood as meaning that there is a duty also on the Tribunal to communicate the order to the person, who is entitled to lodge the appeal

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: April 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 31, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 254(2): The limitation period for filing a Rectification Application has to be computed from the date of "communication" of the order and not from the date of passing the order. The fact that the order was pronounced in open court is not relevant because the parties will not be aware of the mistakes therein until after perusal of the order.

So far as the arguments of the Ld. DR that the date of communication is to be taken either as ‘communication or knowledge, actual or constructive’ of the order sought to be reviewed’ is concerned, we are guided by the decision of the full Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘State of Punjab Vs. Mst.Qaisar Jehan Begum and Another’ AIR 1963 SC 1604: (1964) 1 SCR 971. (Full Bench), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the words ‘knowledge either actually or constructively’ has held that the knowledge of award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that the award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. The said proposition of law can be safely applied to the case in hand. Though the operative part of the order may be in the knowledge of the assessee, however, whether there is any mistake apparent on record in the contents of the order, it can be noticed only after going through the contents of the order

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 254(2) Limitation period: The amendment to s. 254(2) to curtail the limitation period for filing rectification applications to six months from four years is prospective and applicable to appeal orders passed after 01/06/2016 and not the orders passed prior to 01/06/2016. The contrary view in Lavanya Land (Mum ITAT) is not good law in view of K. Ravindranathan Nair (SC)

We found that Tribunal in the case of Lavanya Land Private Limited vide order dated 25/04/2017 have held that since miscellaneous application was filed beyond a period of six months from the date of the order of the Tribunal which was sought to be rectified, the miscellaneous application was barred by limitation. We observe that while rendering the decision, the Co-ordinate Bench has not considered the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Ravindranathan Nair (Supra) where Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that right to appeal is vested in the litigant at the commencement of Lis and therefore, such vested right cannot be taken away and cannot be impaired or made more stringent by any subsequent legislation unless the subsequent legislation said so either expressly or by necessary intendment. An intention in interfere or impair a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by the express words or by necessary implication