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DATE: July 23, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 21, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 147/50C: The assessment cannot be reopened (within 4 years) on the ground that the AO lost sight of a statutory provision like 50C. This amounts to a review. A.L.A. Firm 55 TM 497 (SC) distinguished on the basis that the reopening in that case was because the AO was unaware of a binding High Court judgement. Here it is not the case of the Revenue that the AO was not aware of s. 50C at the time of passing the S. 143(3) assessment order

The basis of reopening the assessment in A.L.A. Firm (Supra) was the decision in the case of G.R.Ramachari & Co. (Supra) coming to the knowledge of the Assessing Officer subsequent to the completion of assessment proceedings. In this case it is not the case of the Revenue that the Assessing Officer was not aware of Section 50C of the Act at the time of passing the Assessement Order dated 26.12.2007 under Section 143 of the Act. In this case the trigger to reopen assessment proceedings as recorded in the reasons is nonfurnishing of copy of the sale deed by the Respondent. This has been found factually to be incorrect. Therefore, once the sale deed was before Assessing Officer and enquiries were made during the assessment proceedings regarding the quantum of capital gains, it must follow that the Assessing Officer had while passing the order dated 26.12.2007 under Section 143(3) of the Act had taken view on facts and in law as in force at the relevant time. Thus, this is a case of change of opinion

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DATE: August 6, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 21, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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S. 68: If no cash is involved in the transaction of allotment of shares and it is a case of book adjustment, provisions of s. 68 treating it as unexplained cash credit are not attracted. Even if it were to be assumed that the subscribers to the increased share capital are not genuine, the amount of share capital would in no circumstances be regard as undisclosed income of the company

Counsel argued, and rightly, that when there was no cash involved in the transaction of allotment of shares, provisions of Section 68 of the said Act treating it as unexplained cash credit are not attracted

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DATE: October 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 14A Rule 8D: The expression “does not form part of the total income” in s. 14A envisages that there should be an actual receipt of the income, which is not includible in the total income. If no exempt income is received or receivable during the relevant previous year, no disallowance u/s 14A can be made

The expression “does not form part of the total income” in Section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 envisages that there should be an actual receipt of the income, which is not includible in the total income, during the relevant previous year for the purpose of disallowing any expenditure incurred in relation to the said income. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 14A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 would not apply to the facts of this case as no exempt income was received or receivable during the relevant previous year

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DATE: May 1, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 1984-85
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CITATION:
S. 37(1)/145(2): Entire law on accrual of liability under mercantile system of accounting explained in the context of Accounting Standard 4 (AS-4) (contingencies and events occurring after the balance sheet date) issued by the ICAI and s. 211 of the Companies Act, 1956, after referring to all important judgements of the Supreme Court and High Courts

While the judgment in Challapalli Sugars Ltd is that of a two Judge bench of the Supreme Court, the judgment in Tutirorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd is that of a three Judge bench of the Supreme Court. As the judgment in Challapalli Sugars Ltd was noticed by the Supreme Court, in its subsequent judgment in Tutirorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd, the law declared in Challapalli Sugars Ltd, as explained in the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Tutirorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd, is binding on this Court. The law declared in Challapalli Sugars Ltd, as explained in Tutirorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd, is that, in the absence of a provision in the Income-tax Act indicating the contrary, the rules of accountancy or the Accounting Standards framed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India can be adopted.

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DATE: June 21, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 37(1): Law on whether payment of a one-time fee to continue the business of mining constitutes capital expenditure or revenue expenditure explained with reference to R.B.Seth Moolchand Sugachand v CIT 86 ITR 647 (SC) and Bikaner Gypsums 187 ITR 39 (SC)

The distinction between the judgment in R.B. Seth Moolchand Sugachand and the judgment in Bikanker Gypsums Ltd is that in Bikaner Gypsums Ltd there was a pre-existing right and the expenditure was incurred not to assert a new right but to exercise a pre-existing right. In the present case, it is the same as in Bikaner Gypsums Ltd. since the mining licence was previously issued in favour of the assessee and the payment of the NPV did not extend the area of the assessee’s mining operations, it merely removed an impediment in the carrying on of the operations in terms of the original licence

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DATE: August 3, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 32(2): There is no conflict between CIT vs. Hindustan Unilever Ltd 394 ITR 73 (Bom) & Miltons/ Confidence Petroleum because while the former is at the stage of final hearing, the latter is at the stage of admission. Accordingly, the request for reference to a Larger Bench is not acceptable. Merely filing of an SLP would not make the order of this Court bad in law or give a license to the Revenue to proceed on the basis that the order is stayed and/or in abeyance

Therefore, no reason has been shown to us at the final hearing, why the decision is Hindustan Unilever Ltd. (supra) is not to be followed. Merely filing of an SLP from the order of Hindustan Unilever Ltd. (supra) would not make the order of this Court bad in law or give a license to the Revenue to proceed on the basis that the order is stayed and/or in abeyance. The Revenue is entitled to challenge the view taken by us following our decision in Hindustan Unilever (supra) by challenging this decision in the Apex Court. However, in the present facts, at this stage, there can be no question of our not following the order in Hindustan Unilever

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DATE: August 14, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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S. 2(42A)/45: The law laid down in Suraj Lamps & Industries 340 ITR 1 (SC) that transfer of immovable property is effective only on registration of conveyance deed is not applicable for computing the holding period of property. Holding period should be computed from the date of issue of the allotment letter and not from the date of the conveyance deed (Rasiklal M. Parikh vs. ACIT 393 ITR 536 (Bom) distinguished)

The definition as contained in Section 2 (42A) of the Act, though uses the words, “a capital asset held an assessee for not more than thirty-six months immediately preceding the date of its transfer”, for the purpose of holding an asset, it is not necessary that, he should be the owner of the asset, with a registered deed of conveyance conferring title on him. In the light of the expanded definition as contained in Section 2(47), even when a sale, exchange, or relinquishment or extinguishment of any right, under a transaction the assessee is put in possession of an immovable property or he retained the same in part performance of the contract under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, it amounts to transfer

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DATE: August 10, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 68/ 56(2)(viib)/ Rule 11 UA(2)(a): Law on whether share capital/ share premium received by a Company from investors can be assessed as 'unexplained cash credit' explained in the light of judgements of the Courts and Tribunal (All imp judgements referred)

The A.O. failed to conduct scrutiny of the documents at assessment stage and merely suspected the transactions in question on the irrelevant reasons. The A.O. did not make any enquiry from the Banker of the Investor and Income Tax record of the Investor Company. The valuation report filed by the assessee support explanation of assessee that shares were issued at premium which were below the fair market value per share of Rs.1221. The assessee, thus, proved the identity of the Investor, its creditworthiness and genuineness of the transaction in the matter. No material has been produced before us to rebut the explanation of assessee. We, therefore, did not find any justification to sustain the addition

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DATE: August 8, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 263 Revision: Even after the insertion of Explanation 2, the CIT has to show that the view of the AO is wholly unsustainable in law. It is only in a very gross case of inadequacy in inquiry or where inquiry is per se mandated on the basis of record available before the AO and such inquiry was not conducted, the revisional power so conferred can be exercised to invalidate the action of AO. Otherwise, every order of the AO would become susceptible to S. 263 and, in turn, will cause serious unintended hardship to the tax payer concerned for no fault on his part

The Revisional Commissioner is expected show that the view taken by the AO is wholly unsustainable in law before embarking upon exercise of revisionary powers. The revisional powers cannot be exercised for directing a fuller inquiry to merely find out if the earlier view taken is erroneous particularly when a view was already taken after inquiry. If such course of action as interpreted by the Revisional Commissioner in the light of the Explanation 2 is permitted, Revisional Commissioner can possibly find fault with each and every assessment order without himself making any inquiry or verification and without establishing that assessment order is not sustainable in law. This would inevitably mean that every order of the lower authority would thus become susceptible to Section 263 of the Act and, in turn, will cause serious unintended hardship to the tax payer concerned for no fault on his part. Apparently, this is not intended by the Explanation. Howsoever wide the scope of Explanation 2(a) may be, its limits are implicit in it. It is only in a very gross case of inadequacy in inquiry or where inquiry is per se mandated on the basis of record available before the AO and such inquiry was not conducted, the revisional power so conferred can be exercised to invalidate the action of AO

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DATE: August 6, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 147/ 151: (i) Sanction granted by writing "Yes, I am satisfied" is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of s. 151 because it means that the approving authority has recorded satisfaction in a mechanical manner and without application of mind, (ii) If information is received from investigation wing that assessee was beneficiary of accommodation entries but no further inquiry was undertaken by AO, said information cannot be said to be tangible material per se and, thus, reassessment on said basis is not justified (All imp judgements referred)

This shows that the AO proceeded to initiate reassessment proceedings on the basis of borrowed satisfaction without any application of mind and exercise on the information received from the Investigation Wing of the Department. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the AO proceeded to initiate reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act and to issue notice u/s. 148 of the Act on the basis of borrowed satisfaction and without any application of mind and examination of the so called material and information received from the investigation wing to establish any nexus, even prima facie, with the such information

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