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DATE: May 16, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 2(42C)/ 50B: A transaction by which an undertaking is transferred in consideration of the allottment of shares is an "exchange" and not a "sale". The fact that the agreement refers to the parties as "seller" and "purchaser" is irrelevant. S. 2(42C)/ 50B apply only to "sale" and not to "exchange". Entire law on "estoppel" explained. As there is no estoppel against a statute, an assessee is entitled to raise the claim regarding non-taxability at any stage of the proceedings

In the present case the consideration was not money but equity shares and debentures and hence the transaction was not a “Sale” but an “Exchange” and consequently, the provisions of Section 50B of the I.T. Act, are not attracted. In the case of CIT vs. Bharat Bijlee Ltd. (365 ITR 258) where an undertaking was transferred under a Scheme of Arrangement to a company which allotted preference shares and bonds as consideration to the Transferor company. Following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Motor & General Stores (P) Ltd. (66 ITR 692), the jurisdictional High Court held that the provisions of section 50B were inapplicable to the transaction

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DATE: May 4, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 30, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 69 Bogus Purchases: Purchases cannot be treated as Bogus if (a) they are duly supported by bills, (b) all payments are made by account payee cheques, (c) the supplier has confirmed the transactions, (d) there is no evidence to show that the purchase consideration has come back to the assessee in cash, (e) the sales out of purchases have been accepted & (f) the supplier has accounted for the purchases made by the assessee and paid taxes thereon

It can thus be seen that the appellate authority as well as the Tribunal came to concurrent conclusion that the purchases already made by the assessee from Raj Impex were duly supported by bills and payments were made by Account Payee cheque. Raj Impacts also confirmed the transactions. There was no evidence to show that the amount was recycled back to the assessee. Particularly, when it was found that the assessee the trader had also shown sales out of purchases made from Raj Impex which were also accepted by the Revenue, no question of law arises

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DATE: June 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 30, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus Capital Gains from Penny Stocks: 31000% increase in value of shares over 2 years is highly suspicious but cannot take the place of evidence. The addition cannot be made based on generalizations. Evidence collected from third parties cannot be used against the assessee without giving him a copy & an opportunity to rebut the same

The AO further relies on the shop increase of 31000% of the value of shares over the period of 2 years. Though this is highly suspicious, it cannot take the place of evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated that suspicion however strong cannot be the basis for making an addition. The evidence produced by the assessee listed above proves his case and the AO could not controvert the same by bringing on record any evidence. The evidence said to have been collected by the DIT (INV.), Kolkata and the report is not produced before this Bench

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DATE: June 25, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 27, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 260A: Entire law on when transfer pricing disputes constitute "substantial questions of law" for challenge in the High Court explained. Transfer Pricing Adjustments on the basis of the comparables are a matter of estimate of broad and fair guess-work of the Authorities based on relevant material. The exercise of fact finding or ‘Arm’s Length Price’ determination or ‘Transfer Pricing Adjustments’ should become final with a quietus at the hands of the final fact finding body, i.e. the Tribunal. The ITAT's findings of fact cannot be challenged in the High Court unless it is shown that the findings are ex-facie perverse and unsustainable and exhibit total non-application of mind by the Tribunal to the relevant facts of the case and evidence before it

This Court cannot be expected to undertake the exercise of comparison of the comparables itself which is essentially a fact finding exercise. Neither the sufficient Data nor factual informations nor any technical expertise is available with this Court to undertake any such fact finding exercise in the said appeals under Section 260-A of the Act. This Court is only concerned with the question of law and that too a substantial one, which has a well defined connotations as explained above and findings of facts arrived at by the Tribunal in these type of assessments like any other type of assessments in other regular assessment provisions of the Act, viz. Sections 143, 147 etc. are final and are binding on this Court. While dealing with these appeals under Section 260-A of the Act, we cannot disturb those findings of fact under Section 260-A of the Act, unless such findings are ex-facie perverse and unsustainable and exhibit a total nonapplication of mind by the Tribunal to the relevant facts of the case and evidence before the Tribunal.

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DATE: June 25, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 27, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus share capital: If the AO has remained silent with folded hands and has not made any independent inquiry from the concerned AO of share holder company and has not controverted the evidence produced by the assessee, that itself is sufficient to knock off the addition made. The fact that there is no personal appearance from director of said cash creditor (share holder) does not mean that an adverse inference u/s 68 can be drawn by the AO without the AO discharging the secondary burden lying upon him (All imp judgements referred)

All the relevant and necessary documents required to establish the subject transaction of share capital received are brought on records before AO and Ld CIT(A) and have totally remained uncontroverted. Specially the fact of positive response made by share holder in response to enquiry made u/s 131 and confirmation of subject investment therein by share holder to AO clinches the issue in favor of assessee. Moreover the share holder company having handsome net worth and assessed u/s 153C/153A for subject period also supports assessee’s case. Further AO has remained sited with folded hands and has not made any independent enquiry from concerned AO of share holder company which itself is sufficient to knock off the addition made

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DATE: April 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 27, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay (92 days): The AO was negligent in filing the remand report before the CIT(A). The same attitude has continued at the stage of filing appeal to the ITAT. The excuse that the appeal was not filed due to the AO being busy with time barring assessment is not acceptable. The AO deliberately overlooked the impugned order and did not file appeal before the Tribunal within the period of limitation. Even the authorization by Pr. CIT to file the appeal has been granted after the period of limitation. Hence sufficient cause is not shown

The same conduct of the AO continued even after passing of the impugned appellate order because the appellate order was kept pending without any action and no appeal has been filed by the Department within the period of limitation. It is simply stated in the application for condonation of delay that due to time barring assessment, the impugned order was overlooked and got barred by limitation. However, it is a fact that AO was aware that departmental appeal would be meritless. It is, therefore, clear that the AO deliberately overlooked the impugned order and did not file appeal before the Tribunal within the period of limitation. Even the authorization by Ld. Pr. CIT to file the appeal have been granted after the period of limitation to file the appeal on 07.06.2016. Therefore, no sufficient cause has been shown to explain the delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal beyond the period of limitation

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DATE: May 17, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 1997-98
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S. 260A: The time limit for filing an appeal to the High Court begins from the date of receipt of the order by the officer entitled to file the appeal. The fact that the ITAT may have dispatched the order earlier is not relevant. The fact that the officer may be aware of the ITAT's order owing to collateral proceedings is also not relevant

Section 260A creates a right of appeal and provides that appeal is to be preferred within a period of 120 days. The appeal is to be lodged within 120 days of the receipt of the order. Reading these provisions together, it is clear that what is contemplated by the law giver is that an appeal must be lodged within a period of 120 days from the date of receipt of the order and receipt is to be understood as meaning that there is a duty also on the Tribunal to communicate the order to the person, who is entitled to lodge the appeal

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DATE: June 21, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14, 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 90(2) DTAA: The failure to submit a 'Tax Residency Certificate' (TRC) as required by s.90(4) is not a bar to the grant of benefits under the DTAA. However, the assessee is required to produce reasonable evidence of the entitlement of the foreign entity to benefits under the DTAA

Section 90(4), in the absence of a non-obstante clause, cannot be read as a limitation to the treaty superiority under Section 90(2), we are of the considered view that an eligible assessee cannot be declined the treaty protection under section 90(2) on the ground that the said assessee has not been able to furnish a Tax Residency Certificate in the prescribed form. De hors the statutory provision under Section 90(4), the assessee has to satisfy his eligibility for treaty protection nevertheless and the onus of satisfying the same by any other mode, i.e. other than a TRC, appears to be much more demanding than furnishing of a TRC. To be entitled for Indo US tax treaty benefits in India, a foreign enterprise has to establish that it is a resident of the other contracting state, i.e. the United States

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DATE: June 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 139(5): There is no bar / restriction that an assessee cannot file a revised return of income after issuance of notice u/s 143(2). A revised return of income can be filed even in course of the assessment proceedings provided the time limit prescribed u/s 139(5) is available. The Departmental Authorities are not expected to deny assessee’s legitimate claim by raising technical objection

There is no bar / restriction in the provisions of section 139(5) of the Act that the assessee cannot file a revised return of income after issuance of notice under section 143(2) of the Act. It is trite law, the assessee can file a revised return of income even in course of the assessment proceedings, provided, the time limit prescribed under section 139(5) of the Act is available. That being the case, the revised return of income filed by the assessee under section 139(5) of the Act cannot be held as invalid

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DATE: June 14, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 21, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 263 Revision (show-cause notice): A Writ Petition to challenge a s. 263 notice is maintainable if the authority issuing the show-cause notice lacks jurisdiction and if the notice is clearly barred by law. As per Alagendran Finance 162 Taxman 465 (SC), the two year limitation period stipulated u/s 263(2) runs from the date of the original assessment and not from the date of reassessment when the s. 263 notice deals with issues which are not subject matter of reassessment proceedings (MAK Data 358 ITR 593 (SC) & Malabar Industrial Co 243 ITR 83 (SC) distinguished)

When a notice under Section 263 raises new issues, which are not subject matter of the re-assessment proceedings, then the two year period contemplated under Sub-section (2) of Section 263 would begin to run from the date of assessment and not from the date of re-assessment. In other words, the ratio laid down in Alagendran Finance 162 Taxman 465 (SC), particularly as elucidated in Paragraph 15 of the Alagendran Finance case, is to the effect that the two year limitation period stipulated under Section 263(2) will run from the date of assessment only and not from the date of reassessment when the Section 263 notice does not deal with the same subject as in assessment and when it deals with other issues which are not subject matter of reassessment proceedings

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