Category: High Court

Archive for the ‘High Court’ Category


COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: February 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06, 2006-07
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Entire law explained on whether levy of penalty is automatic if return filed by the assessee u/s 153A discloses higher income than in the return filed u/s 139(1) in the context of the law as it stood prior to, and after, the insertion of Explanation 5 to s. 271(1)(c). Also, the law on levy of penalty on revised returns explained

When the A.O. has accepted the revised return filed by the assessee under Section 153A, no occasion arises to refer to the previous return filed under Section 139 of the Act. For all purposes, including for the purpose of levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, the return that has to be looked at is the one filed under Section 153A. In fact, the second proviso to Section 153A(1) provides that “assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years referred to in this sub-section pending on the date of initiation of the search under Section 132 or making of requisition under Section 132A, as the case may be, shall abate.” What is clear from this is that Section 153A is in the nature of a second chance given to the assessee, which incidentally gives him an opportunity to make good omission, if any, in the original return. Once the A.O. accepts the revised return filed under Section 153A, the original return under Section 139 abates and becomes non-est. Now, it is trite to say that the “concealment” has to be seen with reference to the return that it is filed by the assessee. Thus, for the purpose of levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c), what has to be seen is whether there is any concealment in the return filed by the assessee under Section 153A, and not vis-a vis the original return under Section 139

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 194-I: S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act distinguishes between 'premium' for acquiring the lease and 'rent' for enjoying user of the property. Payment towards 'premium' for the lease (even if paid annually) is a capital payment and is not subject to s. 194-I TDS. CBDT Circular No. 35/2016 dated 13.10.2016 referred

That brings the court to the next question, which is as to the nature of the payments made towards lease. Do they constitute rent so as to attract Section 194-I? The court is of opinion that clearly these payments are not “rent”. That they are annual payments cannot be doubted. Yet, part of the payment is clearly capital in nature. Clause 1 of the lease deeds entered into in each of the cases, clearly points to the fact that a small percentage of the agreed amounts were paid as part of the lease premium and were towards acquisition of the asset; they fell, consequently in the capital stream and were not “rents”. The balance of such premium payments were spread over a period of 8 to 10 years, in specified annual or bi-annual installments. Here, distinction between a single payment made at the time of the settlement of the demised property and recurring payments made during the period of its enjoyment by the lessee is to be made. This distinction is clearly recognized in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, which defines both premium and rent. Such payments were held to constitute capital and not “rent” or advance rent,

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): If the quantum appeal is admitted by the High Court, it means that the issue is debatable and penalty cannot be levied. Argument of the Dept that Nayan Builders 368 ITR 722 (Bom) does not lay down this proposition is not correct

The Revenue had filed an appeal from the order of the Tribunal in Nayan Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) deleting the penalty. This appeal being CIT vs. Nayan Builders and Developers [(2014) 368 ITR 722] was not entertained by this Court. It upheld the view of the Tribunal that the imposition of penalty was not justified as admission of appeal in quantum proceeding on this issue as substantial question of law was proof enough of the issue being debatable. The aforesaid decision in Nayan Builders and Developers Pvt.Ltd (supra) was also followed by this Court in CIT-8 vs. Aditya Birla Power Co. Ltd. in Income Tax Appeal No. 851 of 2014 rendered on 2nd December, 2015

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: February 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
The Commissioner and his officials are playing a blame game. To cover up their lapses and deficiencies, they turned around and blamed their Advocates .. We are sorry to say that this is not what was expected from the Commissioner of Service Tax. If the officers are unaware of legal procedures, then, they have to be in touch with their Advocates and periodically. They cannot expect that the Advocate himself comes to their office and apprise them as to what further has to be done after the filing of an Appeal

While filing a cryptic affidavit in support, initially we had observed that the Commissioner and his officials are playing a blame game. To cover up their lapses and deficiencies, they turned around and blamed their Advocates. They are of the opinion that their Advocates ought to inform them and at every stage of the matter, particularly as to which office objections have to be complied with or are to be removed. If no such communication is made by the Advocates, then the Commissioner feels that he and his officers are not at fault. We are sorry to say that this is not what was expected from the Commissioner of Service Tax. If the officers are unaware of legal procedures, then, they have to be in touch with their Advocates and periodically. They cannot expect that the Advocate himself comes to their office and apprise them as to what further has to be done after the filing of an Appeal

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 164: The explanation to s. 164 cannot be read for determinability of the shares of the beneficiary with the quantum on the date when the Trust deed is executed. The real test is whether shares are determinable even when even or after the Trust is formed or may be in future when the Trust is in existence

By no interpretative process the explanation to Section 164 of the Act, which is pressed in service can be read for determinability of the shares of the beneficiary with the quantum on the date when the Trust deed is executed and the second reason is that the real test is the determinability of the shares of the beneficiary and is not dependent upon the date on which the trust deed was executed if one is to connect the same with the quantum. The real test is whether shares are determinable even when even or after the Trust is formed or may be in future when the Trust is in existence

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: February 7, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 143(2)/ 292BB: The issue of a notice u/s 143(2) bearing the wrong (old) address of the assessee does not amount to a valid service of the notice u/s 282 r.w.s. 27 of the General Clauses Act. The non-service of a notice u/s 143(2) before the expiry of 12 months from the end of the month in which the return was filed renders the assessment void. As the assessee objected to the same before completion of proceedings, the assessment order is not saved by s. 292BB

It is undisputed position before us that the notice under Section 143(2) of the Act which was handed over to the post office on 30th November, 2007 was incorrectly addressed i.e. it was addressed to the assessee’s old office at Nariman Point, Mumbai. In terms of Section 282 of the Act as existing in 2007 a notice may be served on the person named therein either by post or as if it were a summons issued by the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act provides that where any Central Act requires a document to be served by post where the expression “serve” or “given” or “sent” shall be deemed to have been effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting. In such cases, unless the contrary is proved which would be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post to the addressee. In this case admittedly the envelope containing the notice was wrongly addressed. Thus the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: February 7, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 153C: The requirement that the documents found during search should “belong” to the assessee is a condition precedent and a jurisdictional issue. The non-satisfaction of the condition renders the entire proceedings null and void. The fact that the searched person and the assessee are alleged to be “hand in glove” is irrelevant

The grievance of the Revenue as submitted by Mr.Kotangale is a submission made on the basis of suspicion and not on the basis of any evidence on record which would indicate that the respondent – assessee and persons searched were all part of the same group. Be that as it may, the requirement of Section 153C of the Act cannot be ignored at the alter of suspicion. The Revenue has to strictly comply with Section 153C of the Act. We are of the view that non satisfaction of the condition precedent viz. the seized document must belong to the respondent – assessee is a jurisdictional issue and non satisfaction thereof would make the entire proceedings taken thereunder null and void. The issue of Section 69C of the Act can only arise for consideration if the proceedings under Section 153C of the Act are upheld

COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 10, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 14A Rule 8D: No disallowance with respect to exempt income can be made if the securities are held as stock-in-trade. CBDT Circular No. 5/2014 dated 11.02.2014 referred

The Tribunal found that the assessee does not have any investment and all the shares are held as stock in trade as is evident from the orders of the lower authorities. On those facts the Tribuanl held:- “Once, the assessee has kept the shares as stock in trade, the rule 8D of the Rules will not apply.” In view of the clear finding of fact regarding the exempt income claimed treated to be business income and the shares held by the assessee having been treated as stock in trade, we do not find the case involves a substantial question of law

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: January 31, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 8, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 80-IB(10): The profits of an undertaking eligible for deduction cannot be treated as "inflated" in the absence of material on record to show that there is an arrangement between the eligible unit and the non-eligible unit to generate more than ordinary profits for the eligible unit. The mere fact that there are common customers of both the units does not by itself indicate transfer of profits to the eligible unit

We note the fact that the CIT(A) has rendered a finding that there is nothing on record to indicate that there is any arrangement between the Appellant’s Jammu unit and his wife’s unit at Valsad to generate more than ordinary profits or any transfer of goods and/or services inter se, below the market price, resulting in inflated profits to the Appellant’s Jammu unit. Even before us, nothing has been shown by the Revenue that there is any business transacted between Appellant’s unit at Jammu and his wife’s unit at Valsad which resulted in inflating the profits being earned by the Appellant or that there is any transaction between them. The Tribunal has without considering the validity of the above finding of CIT(A), adopted the test of common customers of both the Appellant’s Jammu unit and his wife’s unit at Valsad, to conclude that profits of the Appellants, are inflated. Common customers by itself in the absence of some arrangement between the parties does not indicate transfer of profits to Appellant’s Jammu unit

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: February 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 8, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 254(2): Plea that the appeal was mistakenly withdrawn on the advice of Counsel and that the same should be restored should be backed by evidence. If the assessee voluntarily withdraws the appeal, he cannot seek restoration on the ground that the withdrawal was an apparent mistake

At the very outset we must point out that it is the petitioner’s case that he acted on the advise of the Counsel in withdrawing the appeal. However, this submission of the petitioner is without there being anything on record from the Advocate concerned that he advised the petitioner to withdraw his appeal. Further the communication dated 23rd April, 2010 addressed to the Tribunal for withdrawal of the appeal was by the petitioner himself and in that communication he does not mention that the appeal is being withdrawn on account of legal advise. In fact it is an unconditional withdrawal of the appeal